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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Copyright 2001 Internet Security Systems (trademark) THE POWER TO PROTECT INTERNET THREAT & SOLUTIONS UPDATE for Oct 1st - Oct 3rd, 2001 ISS X-Force Special Operations Group - -------------------------------------- CURRENT THREAT ASSESSMENT & THREAT FORECAST - -------------------------------------- AlertCon 1 Today, Oct 1st, 2001 AlertCon 1 For Oct 2nd and 3rd, 2001 Today's Focus: Preparing for Cyber Attacks During the War on Terrorism ************* - - Because 'Return of the Nimda Warrior' has proven to be somewhat of a non-event, we are returning to AlertCon 1, normal warfare on the Internet, without any specific threat to highlight. - - We did see an increase in Nimda activity from last Friday but it had no apparent impact on our monitored networks. - -------------------------------------- Recommended Security Focus - -------------------------------------- - - Preparing for Cyber Attacks During the War on Terrorism. The link below takes you to an excellent threat analysis by a group at Dartmouth College's Institute for Security Technology Studies. It makes excellent reading for Internet and Network security professionals at this time. Every one of us should be developing contingency plans for worst case scenarios to protect against, detect, and respond to everything from politically motivated script kiddies to aggressive cyber attacks specifically designed to deny services or damage files in your company. <http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/ISTS/counterterrorism/cyber_attacks.htm> Our thanks to Dartmouth College for permission to cite this link. - --------------------------------------- SOLUTIONS - --------------------------------------- Defense Against Cyber Attacks During the War On Terrorism: - - The Dartmouth analysis suggests reasonable security measures for all network security operations and security teams to focus on. I would add to this that the fundamentals of network security have never applied more; protect what you consider most critical to business operations and continuity, make sure you have intrusion detection so you'll know when people get around your defenses, and have a response team and a response plan for that team to execute should a cyber emergency happen in your network. - - Another consideration strikes to the core of your perimeter defense--inbound and outbound traffic are not threat equals, and you should not treat them equally. Clearly, rules for inbound traffic should be tighter. Either your router access control lists or your firewalls should not be accepting inbound ports you don't use, or accepting IP addresses you don't do business with. - - Ask yourself this question: If we're not doing business with central Asia (for example), why am I accepting traffic from them region? Extend that thought to any region not on your customer list or routine legitimate traffic logs. Strongly consider denying those IP blocks at your gateways. Some research will need to be done to find the domains and address blocks that define those areas but this is not difficult. The rule of thumb to adopt in times like these is "deny everything you don't need". If you go this route, you may want to consider allowing e-mail from these address blocks so any legitimate customer can let you know they are having trouble getting in. While it's true that a determined attack can come from a spoofed address coming from a region that is not blocked, that's an extra step that needs to be taken just to reach you. For certain, you will be blocking the bulk of the automated, broadcast threats from regions of the world you can safely ignore. - - Ports are just as important in your defensive strategy as IP Addresses. We've been seeing attacks lately from ports in the 31,000 range, all 'unassigned'. You have to decide how much potential there is for legitimate traffic in a high port like that but clearly, the known Trojan ports <http://home.tiscalinet.be/bchicken/trojans/trojanpo.htm> should be blocked. Unusual ports should also be blocked unless there is a clearly established need for them in your network. The link for common ports is noted here: <http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers> - - One clear message to take from the Dartmouth study is that now is a good time for a full court press to establish a good security and disaster recovery posture for your networks and your Internet connections. It will take additional resources both in the NOC that has to implement the new security measures, in the IT Security Staff that does the survey and makes the recommendations, and for outside consultants in both these areas if you don't have the resources in house. - - Another concurrent avenue to consider is special insurance designed to cover Internet and Network related damage or loss. Marsh is accepted as one of the leading pioneers in this field. Nimda Solutions: - - Re-install patches previously instructed by ISS and software vendors for IIS vulnerabilities, etc. - - Get management involved to help you marshal the resources you need to patch everything and keep it patched. Remember that whenever OS are installed or reinstalled if the patches are not also included you have left gaping holes in your network. The same is true for anti-virus updates. All patches from the date of the OS you are installing must be manually researched and installed. The Microsoft 'mega patch' at the link below is a big help in this effort. - - Users everywhere are reminded that one of the features of Nimda is randomly booby-trap web sites throughout the Web. Opening an infected site invites Nimda infection via Java script. Networks with strong, updated gateway protection notify the user and strip the malicious logic from the packet stream. Small office and home networks may have less protection but should be moving rapidly towards commercial anti-virus solutions. - - Microsoft's web site has the full solution set for its products at this site: <http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/technet/sec urity/topics/Nimda.asp> - - All the major anti-virus vendors now have Nimda solutions. Aris has an excellent write-up on the Worm and some further links to security solutions: <http://aris.securityfocus.com/alerts/nimda/010919-Analysis-Nimda.pdf> - ------------------------------------- Attack Signatures - global IDS, midnight - midnight, previous day, % of total - ------------------------------------- Denial Of Service 50.84% Unauth Access Attempts 25.19% Protocol Decode 17.24% Suspicious Activity 05.35% Pre-Attack Probe 01.39% Back Doors 00.00% - ------------------------------------- Top Ten Destination Ports - global IDS, midnight - midnight, previous day, % of top ten (ports found at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers> - ------------------------------------- 80 (http) 97.01% 21 (ftp) 01.01% 25 (smtp) 00.62% 143 (imap) 00.36% 24452 (unassigned) 00.27% 443 (https) 00.22% 123 (ntp) 00.18% 69 (tftp) 00.15% 137 (netbios-ns) 00.12% 1 (tcpmux) 00.06% - --------------------------------------- VIRUS, VULNERABILITY, NEWS UPDATES - --------------------------------------- - - Visit <http://www.iss.net/> under 'Global Internet Threat Intelligence Service' - --------------------------------------- Web Defacements - --------------------------------------- - - Alldas.de stats show that since April, 2000, the most defaced OS is Windows, with a total of 15,011 defacements reported, for 65% of the total. Linux is a distant second with 3735 defacements for 16% of the total. - - Alldas reports 50 web defacements yesterday, Sept 30th. These numbers are below average for any day, and particularly so for a Sunday. - - A review of the 6 mirrors captured so far today (as of 1215 GMT) none were overtly political but one by the Brazilian group Innocent Boys slammed Osama Bin Ladin in a one-liner down at the bottom. <http://defaced.alldas.de/mirror/2001/10/01/www.colegioblasi.com.br/> - --------------------------------------- NOTE, DISCLAIMER AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE - --------------------------------------- NOTE: Our web site has this information in more attractive format and graphics available to the public at no cost at <http://www.iss.net/> under 'Global Internet Threat Intelligence Service'. Screen captures (Control/PrtSc) of the site's pages dropped into PowerPoint can be an effective way to communicate various aspects of the Internet threat, e.g. the graph depicting 'AlertCon Trends'. We provide this information on Internet threat metrics, viruses, vulnerabilities, patches, and breaking news, in the spirit of PDD 63, to help security professionals wage the war against Internet threats more effectively. Information in this update derived primarily from global, real time, 24 x 7 IDS feeds, ISS X-Force R&D Team research, and professional liaison. Other sources as noted. AlertCon 1 reflects the global, malicious, determined, 24 x 7 attacks experienced by all networks. AlertCon 2 means increased vigilance/action recommended due to a specific threat or concern. AlertCon 3 means increased attacks against specific targets or vulnerabilities on a scale that is unusually high, action required. AlertCon 4 reflects an Internet emergency for a target or group of targets whose business continuity may depend on some sort of immediate, decisive action. All summaries cover 24 hours the previous workday, GMT. Monday summaries may cover some weekend activity. Copyright 2001 Internet Security Systems, Inc. Permission is granted for the redistribution of the Internet Threat Update electronically. It is not to be sold or edited in any way without express consent of ISS. Refer comments or questions to [EMAIL PROTECTED] Disclaimer: This information is subject to change without notice. Use of this information constitutes acceptance for use in an 'as is' condition. There are no warranties with regard to this information. In no event shall the author be liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or spread of this information. Any use of this information is at the user's own risk. No other use authorized. FOIA Exemption 4. Dennis Dennis Treece Director, Global MSS Special Operations Group Internet Security Systems (ISS) 6303 Barfield Road Atlanta, Georgia 30328 404-236-4065 Cell 404-667-9345 Fax 404-236-2626 Internet Security Systems -- The Power to Protect -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 6.5 iQA/AwUBO7iNCOOOe/7N9KJeEQL6yQCg59eEQ+0wnMe1curIQs5qiEXKP6IAoI1w DP6Kk46BZyCtRh6xm75bssLo =ClP7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
