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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Copyright 2001 Internet Security Systems (trademark) THE POWER TO PROTECT INTERNET THREAT & SOLUTIONS UPDATE for Oct 3rd - Oct 5th, 2001 ISS X-Force Special Operations Group - -------------------------------------- CURRENT THREAT ASSESSMENT & THREAT FORECAST - -------------------------------------- AlertCon 1 Today, Oct 3rd, 2001 AlertCon 1 For Oct 4th and 5th, 2001 The Week's Focus: Preparing for Cyber Attacks During the War on Terrorism ************* - - We continue to see Nimda and Code Blue activity on our monitored networks. It is encouraging to see the levels on the decline but it's too early to determine if this is due to an internal clock or increased patching. - - AlertCon 1 may be our lowest alert level but it is not 'low'. It assumes all malicious code in the wild, all vulnerabilities, all misconfigured and unpatched machines, all overworked and under trained network staffs, all weak passwords (or no passwords), all insider mischief, and the 24 x 7 assaults of the world's hacker community. - -------------------------------------- Recommended Security Focus This Week - -------------------------------------- - - Preparing for Cyber Attacks During the War on Terrorism. The link below takes you to an excellent threat analysis by a group at Dartmouth College's Institute for Security Technology Studies. It makes excellent reading for Internet and Network security professionals at this time. Every one of us should be developing contingency plans for worst case scenarios to protect against, detect, and respond to everything from politically motivated script kiddies to aggressive cyber attacks specifically designed to deny services or damage files in your company. <http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/ISTS/counterterrorism/cyber_attacks.htm> Our thanks to Dartmouth College for permission to cite this link. - --------------------------------------- SOLUTIONS - --------------------------------------- Defense Against Cyber Attacks During the War On Terrorism: - - The Dartmouth analysis suggests reasonable security measures for all network security operations and security teams to focus on. I would add to this that the fundamentals of network security have never applied more; protect what you consider most critical to business operations and continuity, make sure you have intrusion detection so you'll know when people get around your defenses, and have a response team and a response plan for that team to execute should a cyber emergency happen in your network. - - Another consideration strikes to the core of your perimeter defense--inbound and outbound traffic are not threat equals, and you should not treat them equally. Clearly, rules for inbound traffic should be tighter. Either your router access control lists or your firewalls should not be accepting inbound ports you don't use, or accepting IP addresses you don't do business with. - - Allow everything, deny by exception OR Deny everything, allow by exception. In this potentially threatening era, it might be time to look real hard at the these choices. Most networks today are basically in the 'allow everything' mode. Is this still wise? Ask yourself this question: If we're not doing business with central Asia (for example), why am I accepting traffic from the region? Extend that thought to any region not on your customer list or routine legitimate traffic logs. Strongly consider denying those IP blocks at your gateways. Some research will need to be done to find the domains and address blocks that define those areas but this is not difficult. The rule of thumb to adopt in times like these is 'deny everything you don't need'. If you go this route, you may want to consider allowing e-mail from these address blocks so any legitimate customer can let you know they are having trouble getting in. While it's true that a determined attack can come from a spoofed address coming from a region that is not blocked, that's an extra step that needs to be taken just to reach you. For certain, you will be blocking the bulk of the automated, broadcast threats from regions of the world you can safely ignore. - - Ports are just as important in your defensive strategy as IP Addresses. You have to decide how much potential there is for legitimate traffic from ports you don't normally use but allow by default. BTW, the known Trojan ports <http://home.tiscalinet.be/bchicken/trojans/trojanpo.htm> should be blocked. Unusual ports should also be blocked unless there is a clearly established need for them in your network. The link that defines the common port assignments is noted here: <http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers> - - One clear message to take from the Dartmouth study is that now is a good time for a full court press to establish a good security and disaster recovery posture for your networks and your Internet connections. It will take additional resources both in the NOC that has to implement the new security measures, in the IT Security Staff that does the survey and makes the recommendations, and for outside consultants in both these areas if you don't have the resources in house. - - Another concurrent avenue to consider is special insurance designed to cover Internet and Network related damage or loss. Marsh is accepted as one of the leading pioneers in this field. - - Microsoft's web site has the full solution set for its products at this site: <http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/technet/sec urity/topics/Nimda.asp> - ------------------------------------- Attack Signatures - global IDS, midnight - midnight, previous day, % of total - ------------------------------------- Unauth Access Attempts 36.38% Protocol Decode 35.29% Denial Of Service 14.41% Suspicious Activity 07.91% Pre-Attack Probe 05.92% Back Doors 00.09% - ------------------------------------- Top Ten Destination Ports - global IDS, midnight - midnight, previous day, % of top ten (ports found at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers> - ------------------------------------- 80 (http) 87.27% 21 (ftp) 06.42% 25 (smtp) 03.89% 11374 (unassigned) 00.42% 15104 (unassigned) 00.37% 123 (ntp) 00.36% 12754 (unassigned) 00.35% 69 (tftp) 00.32% 143 (imap) 00.30% 443 (https) 00.28% - --------------------------------------- VIRUS, VULNERABILITY, NEWS UPDATES - --------------------------------------- - - Visit <http://www.iss.net/> under 'Global Internet Threat Intelligence Service' - --------------------------------------- Defacement Watch - --------------------------------------- - - Alldas.de stats show that since April, 2000, the most defaced OS is Windows, with a total of 15,045 defacements reported, for 65% of the total. Linux is a distant second with 3746 defacements for 16% of the total. - - Alldas reports 28 web defacements yesterday, Oct 2nd. These numbers are below average. Details can be seen at www.alldas.de. - - A check of yesterday's defacements shows a mixed bag of targets and messages. - - While most contained the standard 'gotcha' message to the site administrator, there was some political content, not all of which was related to the events of 9/11. - - Once again, the Brazilian group Cyb3r Attack was active, with 4 defacements reported. The mirrors show one pro-Osama/anti-US message, 2 anti-US messages, and 1 with no political content. Their targets were in Brazil, Taiwan, and Japan. - - Dark Code, writing in French, defaced a Moroccan government site and gave a kind of general 'better watch out' message to 'Arab countries'. - - Anti India Crew went after sites in India with their standard message. - - An Italian group hitting an Italian site asked that the terrorists responsible for 9/11 be brought to justice, but peacefully, through trial in a court, not by indiscriminate bombing. - - And, two hackers indicated they were out of work and looking for jobs. - --------------------------------------- NOTE, DISCLAIMER AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE - --------------------------------------- NOTE: Our web site has this information in more attractive format and graphics available to the public at no cost at <http://www.iss.net/> under 'Global Internet Threat Intelligence Service'. Screen captures (Control/PrtSc) of the site's pages dropped into PowerPoint can be an effective way to communicate various aspects of the Internet threat, e.g. the graph depicting 'AlertCon Trends'. We provide this information on Internet threat metrics, viruses, vulnerabilities, patches, and breaking news, in the spirit of PDD 63, to help security professionals wage the war against Internet threats more effectively. Information in this update derived primarily from global, real time, 24 x 7 IDS feeds, ISS X-Force R&D Team research, and professional liaison. Other sources as noted. AlertCon 1 reflects the global, malicious, determined, 24 x 7 attacks experienced by all networks. AlertCon 2 means increased vigilance/action recommended due to a specific threat or concern. AlertCon 3 means increased attacks against specific targets or vulnerabilities on a scale that is unusually high, action required. AlertCon 4 reflects an Internet emergency for a target or group of targets whose business continuity may depend on some sort of immediate, decisive action. All summaries cover 24 hours the previous workday, GMT. Monday summaries may cover some weekend activity. Copyright 2001 Internet Security Systems, Inc. Permission is granted for the redistribution of the Internet Threat Update electronically. It is not to be sold or edited in any way without express consent of ISS. Refer comments or questions to <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> . Disclaimer: This information is subject to change without notice. Use of this information constitutes acceptance for use in an 'as is' condition. There are no warranties with regard to this information. In no event shall the author be liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or spread of this information. Any use of this information is at the user's own risk. No other use authorized. FOIA Exemption 4.
