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<snipped in places>

> > > Many of these signatures operate by searching through TCP and UDP
traffic
> > > for so called "banners" announced by backdoor and trojan software.
> > Naturally,
> > > this traffic originates from the infected computer and not from the
> > attackers
> > > computer.
> >
> > No. The traffic is originating from the attacker. The attacker is
> > initiating
> > the connection to the trojan port. It is true that the PACKETS carrying
the
> > banner
> > will originate from the trojan port, but what is important is the
direction
> > of the connection not individual packets.
>
> What matters is if the IDS administrator has the ability, from host
assessment
> and IDS logs, to determine which is the attacking host and which is the
victim.
> Ideally, this process could be immediatly short circuited by describing
the
> signature in greater detail within the RealSecure help files. Mea culpa,
as
> they say.

Making life easier for the administrator wouldn't hurt.

> >
> > > This explains why you will see an event, for say "Asylum," which
> > > will show an originating TCP port of 23432 and not the ephemeral port
> > most
> > > likely doled out by the attacker's OS.
> >
> > Well there's a problem then. Not with documentation as you say below,
but
> > with
> > the fact that the signature is too simplistic. Simply searching for
> > "banner" and
> > packet source port = 23432 is not enough, the signature needs to keep
track
> > of the direction
> > of the connection. ie search for "banner" and packet source port =
23432
> > AND connection dest port
> > is 23432.
>
> I'm aware of less than a handful of backdoor/trojan servers which
validate
> connecting attackers by their source port number. This is why you can use
> telnet or netcat to connect to most backdoor servers and issue commands.

Yes, but on a packet level the banner issued by the trojan server will be
contained
in a packet coming from the server which will have 23432 as its source
port. Once you
have a match on that you check whether the direction of the connection was
to the server and if it was then you know that someone has connected to the
trojan
server.

> >
> > > Ultimately what this means is that the RealSecure help sort of makes
> > sense
> > > once you know the above details on how these signatures work.
However, it
> > > certainly could be improved to describe the operation of these
signatures
> > > in greater detail. I will talk with our documentation group about
having
> > > these blurbs improved in a future release of RealSecure.
> >
> > Having help that only "sort of" makes sense AFTER extra info is
ellicited
> > is hardly
> > good enough.
> >
> > > I previously replied to Mr. Wangler about his inquiry, but
unfortunately
> > > Cc'd the incorrect address for ISS-Forum. The traffic he was seeing
> > trigger
> > > this event was in fact a false positive, caused by an FTP 'PASV'
command
> > > originating from an ephemeral which just happened to be 23432. This
> > > particular signature searches for a banner of "PAS", among others,
which
> > > saw "PASV" and thought it was seeing backdoor traffic. This false
> > positive
> > > will be corrected in XPU 4.1, due out shortly.
> >
> > This false positive wouldn't occur if the direction of the traffic were
> > tracked.
>
> That's incorrect, this particular false positive would still have occured
> if the "direction of the traffic were tracked." The falso positive would
> still be reported but with the source and destination ports swapped as
> discussed.

Really? If the direction had been tracked

ie client port 23432, server port 21
and then "PAS" is spotted from 23432 to 21 it would be clear that this
was a command from the client and not a banner from the server.

in a really scenario perhaps the setting might be
client port 21 (unlikely) server port 23432
"PAS" would then travel from the server to the client.

So would the false positive still have occured? Explain.

> >
> > At least one positive thing came out of this, the fact that there is
more
> > to the signatures than simply the ports used.
> >
> > So from what you've said, Realsecure is little more than a management
> > interface onto of ngrep, or perhaps "snoop | grep".
> >
>
> Well.. these backdoor signatures are the simplest of the simple
RealSecure
> decodes, because that's all you need to do to be reasonably sure you're
> observing backdoor activity.

Clearly that isn't the case, otherwise we wouldn't be seing all these false
positives.

> > I probably shouldn't cloud the issue, but on the topic of simplistic
> > signatures,
> > how about these URLs being considered as HTTP_Shells
> > /shareholdercentre/
> > /bb/investorCentre/shareholderMeetings.jsp
> > /bb/investorCentre/shares.jsp
> >
> > my guess would be that the signature simply reads: alert if URL
contains
> > "/sh"
> > This speaks volumes about Realsecure as a product.>

> Which version of RealSecure are you observing this on? This signature
> shouldn't be firing on those URL's because the shell name is followed by
an
> alphanumeric character.

Hard to believe isn't?
I used to see it on 6.0 and now on 6,5.

Oliver



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