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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-23842?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel
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Andrea Cosentino updated CAMEL-23842:
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Fix Version/s: 4.22.0
> Camel-PQC: PQCDataFormat uses ECB mode without integrity protection (use
> authenticated encryption)
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: CAMEL-23842
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-23842
> Project: Camel
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: camel-pqc
> Reporter: Andrea Cosentino
> Assignee: Andrea Cosentino
> Priority: Major
> Fix For: 4.22.0
>
>
> The PQC DataFormat performs the symmetric (DEM) layer of its KEM-DEM
> construction with {{Cipher.getInstance(symAlg)}} where {{symAlg}} is a bare
> algorithm name such as "AES" (PQCDataFormat#marshal / #unmarshal). With most
> JCE providers this resolves to {{AES/ECB/PKCS5Padding}}:
> * ECB leaks plaintext block structure (identical plaintext blocks =>
> identical ciphertext blocks) within a message.
> * There is no IV/nonce and no integrity/authentication (no GCM tag, no HMAC),
> so the ciphertext is malleable and the DEM layer is not IND-CCA2 secure.
> For a data format whose purpose is quantum-resistant confidentiality,
> shipping ECB without integrity is a meaningful weakness.
> h3. Proposal
> * Default to an authenticated mode (e.g. {{AES/GCM/NoPadding}}) with a
> freshly generated random nonce, written to the output stream alongside the
> existing {{[encapsulation length][encapsulation]}} framing.
> * Optionally bind associated data (AAD).
> * Consider backward compatibility for payloads encrypted with the current
> format and document it in the upgrade guide.
> Affected: {{components/camel-pqc}} PQCDataFormat (marshal/unmarshal).
> ----
> _Filed by Claude Code on behalf of Andrea Cosentino._
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