oscerd commented on code in PR #802: URL: https://github.com/apache/commons-vfs/pull/802#discussion_r4415716515
########## src/site/markdown/threat-model-0.1.0.md: ########## @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +<!--- + Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. + The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0 + (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with + the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + + https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + + Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + limitations under the License. +---> +# Apache Commons VFS Threat Model + +**Status:** ACCEPTED 2026-10-27, bound to 2.11.0-SNAPSHOT (`master` @ `08d2eff08`). Review Comment: Done — dropped the status line and the version binding. Being published on the site is enough; the git history has the when and what. ########## src/site/markdown/threat-model-0.1.0.md: ########## @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +<!--- + Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. + The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0 + (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with + the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + + https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + + Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + limitations under the License. +---> +# Apache Commons VFS Threat Model + +**Status:** ACCEPTED 2026-10-27, bound to 2.11.0-SNAPSHOT (`master` @ `08d2eff08`). +This is a VFS-specific amendment to the +[Apache Commons Threat Model v0.1.0](https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/commons/cms-site/trunk/content/markdown/threat-model-0.1.0.md), Review Comment: Done — now links the published HTML model (`threat-model-0.1.0.html`). ########## src/site/markdown/threat-model-0.1.0.md: ########## @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +<!--- + Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. + The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0 + (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with + the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + + https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + + Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + limitations under the License. +---> +# Apache Commons VFS Threat Model + +**Status:** ACCEPTED 2026-10-27, bound to 2.11.0-SNAPSHOT (`master` @ `08d2eff08`). +This is a VFS-specific amendment to the +[Apache Commons Threat Model v0.1.0](https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/commons/cms-site/trunk/content/markdown/threat-model-0.1.0.md), +which governs everything not stated here; report findings per the +[Apache Commons security process](https://commons.apache.org/security.html). + +Apache Commons VFS is an in-process Java library that resolves a caller-supplied +URI to a `FileObject` over many backends (local, FTP/FTPS, SFTP, HTTP(S), +WebDAV, HDFS, archive, and in-process schemes). By the family model's JDK-parity +principle, connecting to or reading whatever a URI names is doing what the caller +asked and is not a vulnerability: the URI and `FileSystemOptions` are trusted Review Comment: Done — removed the phrase; the sentence states the behaviour directly now. ########## src/site/markdown/threat-model-0.1.0.md: ########## @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +<!--- + Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. + The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0 + (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with + the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + + https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + + Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + limitations under the License. +---> +# Apache Commons VFS Threat Model + +**Status:** ACCEPTED 2026-10-27, bound to 2.11.0-SNAPSHOT (`master` @ `08d2eff08`). +This is a VFS-specific amendment to the +[Apache Commons Threat Model v0.1.0](https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/commons/cms-site/trunk/content/markdown/threat-model-0.1.0.md), +which governs everything not stated here; report findings per the +[Apache Commons security process](https://commons.apache.org/security.html). + +Apache Commons VFS is an in-process Java library that resolves a caller-supplied +URI to a `FileObject` over many backends (local, FTP/FTPS, SFTP, HTTP(S), +WebDAV, HDFS, archive, and in-process schemes). By the family model's JDK-parity +principle, connecting to or reading whatever a URI names is doing what the caller +asked and is not a vulnerability: the URI and `FileSystemOptions` are trusted +configuration, while everything a backend returns is untrusted. The only security Review Comment: Done — dropped that clause; it wasn't pulling its weight. ########## src/site/markdown/threat-model-0.1.0.md: ########## @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +<!--- + Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. + The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0 + (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with + the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + + https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + + Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + limitations under the License. +---> +# Apache Commons VFS Threat Model + +**Status:** ACCEPTED 2026-10-27, bound to 2.11.0-SNAPSHOT (`master` @ `08d2eff08`). +This is a VFS-specific amendment to the +[Apache Commons Threat Model v0.1.0](https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/commons/cms-site/trunk/content/markdown/threat-model-0.1.0.md), +which governs everything not stated here; report findings per the +[Apache Commons security process](https://commons.apache.org/security.html). + +Apache Commons VFS is an in-process Java library that resolves a caller-supplied +URI to a `FileObject` over many backends (local, FTP/FTPS, SFTP, HTTP(S), +WebDAV, HDFS, archive, and in-process schemes). By the family model's JDK-parity +principle, connecting to or reading whatever a URI names is doing what the caller +asked and is not a vulnerability: the URI and `FileSystemOptions` are trusted +configuration, while everything a backend returns is untrusted. The only security +properties VFS adds over the JDK are its own `NameScope` subtree confinement +(`CHILD`/`DESCENDENT`; broken by CVE-2025-27553) and the masking of URI passwords Review Comment: Reworded to drop the "adds over the JDK" framing. I kept URI-password masking alongside `NameScope` confinement since it's the second property VFS genuinely promises, but happy to reduce it to `NameScope`-only if you'd prefer. ########## src/site/markdown/threat-model-0.1.0.md: ########## @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +<!--- + Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. + The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0 + (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with + the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + + https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + + Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + limitations under the License. +---> +# Apache Commons VFS Threat Model + +**Status:** ACCEPTED 2026-10-27, bound to 2.11.0-SNAPSHOT (`master` @ `08d2eff08`). +This is a VFS-specific amendment to the +[Apache Commons Threat Model v0.1.0](https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/commons/cms-site/trunk/content/markdown/threat-model-0.1.0.md), +which governs everything not stated here; report findings per the +[Apache Commons security process](https://commons.apache.org/security.html). + +Apache Commons VFS is an in-process Java library that resolves a caller-supplied +URI to a `FileObject` over many backends (local, FTP/FTPS, SFTP, HTTP(S), +WebDAV, HDFS, archive, and in-process schemes). By the family model's JDK-parity +principle, connecting to or reading whatever a URI names is doing what the caller +asked and is not a vulnerability: the URI and `FileSystemOptions` are trusted +configuration, while everything a backend returns is untrusted. The only security +properties VFS adds over the JDK are its own `NameScope` subtree confinement +(`CHILD`/`DESCENDENT`; broken by CVE-2025-27553) and the masking of URI passwords +in its own diagnostics such as `getFriendlyURI()` (broken by CVE-2025-30474); +both were fixed in 2.10.0, a break of either is a valid finding, and everything Review Comment: Done — removed the CVE numbers and fix versions; they stay on the Security Vulnerabilities section of this page. -- This is an automated message from the Apache Git Service. To respond to the message, please log on to GitHub and use the URL above to go to the specific comment. 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