[
https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/FLINK-41435?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel
]
LuChengxiang updated FLINK-41435:
---------------------------------
Description:
h2. Summary
Flink periodically obtains HDFS delegation tokens and distributes them through
HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver. The receiver adds refreshed credentials to
UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser() of the thread running the refresh. A
long-lived Hadoop client, especially a checkpoint-storage DFSClient, may
instead use the UGI/Subject captured when that client was created. If those
identities differ, the token refresh succeeds and the receiver reports success,
but the new credentials are not delivered to the client's UGI. The client
continues using its startup token and fails at the 24h HDFS token deadline with
SecretManager$InvalidToken.
In the observed Kubernetes application-mode reproduction, the mismatch becomes
reachable through ForkJoinPool compensation. The provider blocks in
{{CompletableFuture.get()}} on a ForkJoinWorkerThread; FJP creates dispatcher
workers while {{freshUGI.doAs(...)}} is effective, and those workers inherit
the fresh Subject. A later {{cluster-io}} worker created by one of them
inherits the same Subject and can run a token receiver under it.
The defect is receiver target selection, not token acquisition or client
binding. The proposed fix targets the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext,
falling back to the login UGI, instead of a pooled worker's current UGI. Here
"UGI" means the Hadoop UserGroupInformation wrapper and "Subject" means the
identity it carries; identity comparisons use Subject identity.
h2. Observed failure
This was observed in a Flink 1.20.5 Kubernetes application-mode job using
ZooKeeper-based high availability and HDFS-backed checkpoint storage. The
primary failure was in the checkpoint storage path:
{noformat}
CheckpointCoordinator.initializeCheckpointLocation
-> FsCheckpointStorageAccess.initializeLocationForCheckpoint
-> HadoopFileSystem.mkdirs
-> DFSClient.mkdirs
{noformat}
After the 24h deadline, the checkpoint-storage client reported InvalidToken for
its startup token even though refresh had obtained a new HDFS token and the
receiver reported success.
Not every Kubernetes application-mode job is affected. The failure is
timing-dependent: a long-lived Hadoop client must capture one Subject/UGI
lifecycle, and a later refresh receiver must run under a different one.
h2. Root cause
The delivery bug is in HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver. It targets
{{UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser()}} of the refresh thread.
{{getCurrentUser()}} resolves from the thread's effective AccessControlContext
and is not guaranteed to be the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext or the UGI
captured by a long-lived checkpoint-storage DFSClient. In the observed failure,
the checkpoint client's captured UGI had the login/HadoopSecurityContext
Subject, while the receiver could run under a pooled worker's inherited fresh
Subject.
h3. Acquisition and refresh phases
Token delivery in the JobManager has three phases. Within each phase, the
provider and the JM-local receiver run on the same token-manager thread.
* Bootstrap acquisition: {{ClusterEntrypoint.initializeServices()}} calls
{{DefaultDelegationTokenManager.obtainDelegationTokens()}} on {{main}} before
BlobServer starts. It updates local receivers for early external filesystem
access. The receiver runs after {{freshUGI.doAs(...)}} returns, when current is
login, so this phase is safe.
* ResourceManager startup acquisition: {{ResourceManager.onStart()}} ->
{{DefaultDelegationTokenManager.start()}} -> {{startTokensUpdate()}} runs on
{{default-dispatcher}}. This provider call is where the observed ForkJoinPool
expansion occurs, but the startup receiver itself still runs on
{{default-dispatcher}} after the provider returns, so it does not target the
fresh Subject.
* Scheduled refresh: later updates are submitted through {{cluster-io}}. A
receiver running on a {{cluster-io}} worker that inherited the fresh Subject
resolves {{getCurrentUser()}} to that Subject and can target the wrong UGI.
TaskManager receivers are invoked by {{TaskExecutor}} token updates, not on
{{cluster-io}}; the probe in this issue covers the JM-local receiver path only.
These two startup token acquisitions are separate from the double
{{SecurityUtils.install}} sequence discussed under Scope and boundaries.
h3. How the fresh Subject reaches a pooled worker
The observed Subject-propagation window is the ResourceManager startup
acquisition. The provider runs on a ForkJoinWorkerThread. The fresh Subject
comes from {{KerberosLoginProvider.doLoginAndReturnUGI()}}, which calls
{{UserGroupInformation.loginUserFromKeytabAndReturnUGI(principal, keytab)}}.
That creates a new UGI for the same principal and does not replace the process
login user.
While {{freshUGI.doAs(...)}} is effective, {{fs.addDelegationTokens(...)}}
performs a blocking HDFS RPC in {{CompletableFuture.get()}}. ForkJoinPool
enters {{managedBlock()}}/{{tryCompensate()}} and creates three dispatcher
workers during the blocked RPC.
The Thread constructor captures the effective AccessControlContext returned by
{{AccessController.getContext()}} into the new thread's
{{inheritedAccessControlContext}}. This is a stack-derived snapshot of the
effective context, not the entire live Java stack, and it includes the Subject
active during {{doAs}}. After {{doAs}} returns, current on the provider thread
resolves to login again, but the newly created workers retain the fresh Subject.
The probe block below combines the observed call chain, Subject identities, and
worker creation. Here HadoopSecurityContext Subject means the Subject of the
UGI held by the installed HadoopSecurityContext; it matches the login Subject
in this probe, but that is not guaranteed in general.
{noformat}
provider thread = default-dispatcher-12
freshUGI Subject = 817147333
login/HadoopSecurityContext Subject = 1333938290
freshUGI.doAs(...)
-> fs.addDelegationTokens(...)
-> HDFS RPC blocked in CompletableFuture.get()
-> ForkJoinPool.managedBlock()
-> tryCompensate()
-> createWorker()
-> new dispatcher workers inherit the fresh Subject
-> later, one of them triggers creation of a cluster-io worker
current Subject before doAs = 1333938290
current Subject inside doAs = 817147333
current Subject after doAs = 1333938290
FJP workers created during the provider's blocked RPC:
default-dispatcher-13 / 14 / 15, creator=default-dispatcher-12
later cluster-io worker:
cluster-io-thread-3, creator=default-dispatcher-15
current Subject / JM-local receiver target (getCurrentUser()) = 817147333
login/HadoopSecurityContext Subject = 1333938290
{noformat}
{{fs.addDelegationTokens(...)}} is the provider-side acquisition step: it
obtains the filesystem delegation token or tokens and stores them in a local
{{Credentials}} object. The receiver later delivers that object to the selected
UGI.
{{cluster-io}} is a fixed-size executor; its threads are created lazily on task
submission. In the probe, an FJP-created dispatcher thread later submits a task
to this executor, which creates a cluster-io thread that copies the submitter's
inherited ACC and starts with the fresh Subject. This thread creation is not
the token refresh itself; it only determines the Subject under which the later
scheduled refresh runs. A receiver invocation on that thread resolves
{{getCurrentUser()}} to the fresh Subject and writes credentials there, while
the login and HadoopSecurityContext UGIs remain unchanged and still resolve to
the login Subject shown above.
This is a per-thread inherited security context, not a global mutation of
UserGroupInformation. It is a receiver target-selection mismatch, not a
client-binding error. Clients created under an unrelated transient Subject
require separate rebinding or recreation and are out of scope.
h2. Proposed change
This issue fixes token delivery for the observed long-lived-client case,
primarily checkpoint storage.
* Add an accessor for the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext.
* In HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver, select a single target UGI: use the UGI
held by HadoopSecurityContext when present; otherwise fall back to
{{UserGroupInformation.getLoginUser()}}. Add refreshed credentials only to that
UGI. Do not target {{UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser()}}, which may be a
pooled worker's inherited Subject.
* Add unit tests for the receiver's context-first and login-fallback target
selection.
The change makes the delivery target deterministic. It does not rebind a client
already created under a different Subject.
h2. Scope and boundaries
h3. Out of scope
* Preventing HDFS client initialization or blocking RPCs from occurring inside
{{freshUGI.doAs(...)}} or the provider's ForkJoinPool worker.
* Closing or rebinding FileSystem instances created under a transient fresh
Subject; this is a separate client-lifecycle cleanup.
* Delivering credentials to clients created under an unrelated transient
Subject; those clients require separate rebinding or recreation.
* Changing the provider's {{getCurrentUser()}} usage.
{{HadoopFSDelegationTokenProvider}} already acquires tokens inside
{{KerberosLoginProvider.doLoginAndReturnUGI()}}; its remaining
{{getCurrentUser()}} use is a token-required pre-check and renewer-name lookup.
No provider change is required for the observed receiver mismatch; it remains a
separate follow-up if provider-side behavior is observed.
* Double security installation and {{SecurityUtils.install}} idempotency. A
diagnostic build where the second installation was skipped still failed at the
24h deadline. The early/duplicate installation adds lifecycle complexity, but
the probe does not establish it as a cause of the receiver mismatch.
h3. YARN
YARN is not a confirmed reproduction in this issue. In one controlled YARN
application-mode probe, the provider also ran on a Pekko {{default-dispatcher}}
worker, but its provider window stayed at {{poolSize=3}} / {{active=2}} with no
{{tryCompensate}} or {{createWorker}}, so no new dispatcher worker was created
during the provider's fresh-Subject window.
YARN did show ForkJoinPool expansion during the separate JobGraph-generation
startup path, so this is not evidence that YARN is immune. The sample is
limited: the provider's {{CompletableFuture}} state was not instrumented, so
the YARN trigger is not established.
h3. Versions
Before 1.17, the legacy {{HadoopModule}} path added credentials directly to the
login user; the {{HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver}} /
{{UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser()}} path starts with 1.17. 1.18, 1.19,
and 1.20 share that receiver behavior. 1.18 is not claimed to be immune.
h2. Testing
* Add receiver unit tests for (a) HadoopSecurityContext UGI precedence with
login/current not updated, (b) login fallback when no HadoopSecurityContext is
installed, and (c) the inherited current UGI not targeted.
* Trigger multiple post-startup token refreshes in a long-running job and
verify which executor runs the provider, whether new ForkJoinPool workers are
created, and which Subject the receiver's current user resolves to.
* Repeat the YARN provider-window probe while instrumenting the provider's
{{CompletableFuture}} state; the current YARN sample is summarized under Scope
and boundaries.
* A deployed application-mode job should survive the 24h token deadline and
continue checkpointing without SecretManager$InvalidToken. Verify that the
checkpoint-storage DFSClient receives the new token.
* Run a controlled application-mode probe that verifies the receiver updates
the UGI selected by the new logic rather than a pooled worker's inherited
current UGI; cover the TaskManager receiver path separately.
h2. Acceptance criteria
* A token refresh updates the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext when present,
otherwise the login UGI, and does not use a pooled worker's inherited current
UGI; a checkpoint-storage client bound to the selected UGI receives the new
token.
* A long-running application-mode job survives the 24h HDFS token deadline.
was:
h2. Summary
Flink periodically obtains HDFS delegation tokens and distributes them through
HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver. The receiver adds refreshed credentials to
UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser() of the thread running the refresh. A
long-lived Hadoop client, especially a checkpoint-storage DFSClient, may
instead use the UGI/Subject captured when that client was created. If those
identities differ, the token refresh succeeds and the receiver reports success,
but the new credentials are not delivered to the client's UGI. The client
continues using its startup token and fails at the 24h HDFS token deadline with
SecretManager$InvalidToken.
In the observed Kubernetes application-mode reproduction, the mismatch becomes
reachable through ForkJoinPool compensation. The provider blocks in
{{CompletableFuture.get()}} on a ForkJoinWorkerThread; FJP creates dispatcher
workers while {{freshUGI.doAs(...)}} is effective, and those workers inherit
the fresh Subject. A later {{cluster-io}} worker created by one of them
inherits the same Subject and can run a token receiver under it.
The defect is receiver target selection, not token acquisition or client
binding. The proposed fix targets the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext,
falling back to the login UGI, instead of a pooled worker's current UGI. Here
"UGI" means the Hadoop UserGroupInformation wrapper and "Subject" means the
identity it carries; identity comparisons use Subject identity.
h2. Observed failure
This was observed in a Flink 1.20.5 Kubernetes application-mode job using
ZooKeeper-based high availability and HDFS-backed checkpoint storage. The
primary failure was in the checkpoint storage path:
{noformat}
CheckpointCoordinator.initializeCheckpointLocation
-> FsCheckpointStorageAccess.initializeLocationForCheckpoint
-> HadoopFileSystem.mkdirs
-> DFSClient.mkdirs
{noformat}
After the 24h deadline, the checkpoint-storage client reported InvalidToken for
its startup token even though refresh had obtained a new HDFS token and the
receiver reported success.
Not every Kubernetes application-mode job is affected. The failure is
timing-dependent: a long-lived Hadoop client must capture one Subject/UGI
lifecycle, and a later refresh receiver must run under a different one.
h2. Root cause
The delivery bug is in HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver. It targets
{{UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser()}} of the refresh thread.
{{getCurrentUser()}} resolves from the thread's effective AccessControlContext
and is not guaranteed to be the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext or the UGI
captured by a long-lived checkpoint-storage DFSClient. In the observed failure,
the checkpoint client's captured UGI had the login/HadoopSecurityContext
Subject, while the receiver could run under a pooled worker's inherited fresh
Subject.
h3. Acquisition and refresh phases
Token delivery in the JobManager has three phases. Within each phase, the
provider and the JM-local receiver run on the same token-manager thread.
* Bootstrap acquisition: {{ClusterEntrypoint.initializeServices()}} calls
{{DefaultDelegationTokenManager.obtainDelegationTokens()}} on {{main}} before
BlobServer starts. It updates local receivers for early external filesystem
access. The receiver runs after {{freshUGI.doAs(...)}} returns, when current is
login, so this phase is safe.
* ResourceManager startup acquisition: {{ResourceManager.onStart()}} ->
{{DefaultDelegationTokenManager.start()}} -> {{startTokensUpdate()}} runs on
{{default-dispatcher}}. This provider call is where the observed ForkJoinPool
expansion occurs, but the startup receiver itself still runs on
{{default-dispatcher}} after the provider returns, so it does not target the
fresh Subject.
* Scheduled refresh: later updates are submitted through {{cluster-io}}. A
receiver running on a {{cluster-io}} worker that inherited the fresh Subject
resolves {{getCurrentUser()}} to that Subject and can target the wrong UGI.
TaskManager receivers are invoked by {{TaskExecutor}} token updates, not on
{{cluster-io}}; the probe in this issue covers the JM-local receiver path only.
These two startup token acquisitions are separate from the double
{{SecurityUtils.install}} sequence discussed under Scope and boundaries.
h3. How the fresh Subject reaches a pooled worker
The observed Subject-propagation window is the ResourceManager startup
acquisition. The provider runs on a ForkJoinWorkerThread. The fresh Subject
comes from {{KerberosLoginProvider.doLoginAndReturnUGI()}}, which calls
{{UserGroupInformation.loginUserFromKeytabAndReturnUGI(principal, keytab)}}.
That creates a new UGI for the same principal and does not replace the process
login user.
While {{freshUGI.doAs(...)}} is effective, {{fs.addDelegationTokens(...)}}
performs a blocking HDFS RPC in {{CompletableFuture.get()}}. ForkJoinPool
enters {{managedBlock()}}/{{tryCompensate()}} and creates three dispatcher
workers during the blocked RPC.
The Thread constructor captures the effective AccessControlContext returned by
{{AccessController.getContext()}} into the new thread's
{{inheritedAccessControlContext}}. This is a stack-derived snapshot of the
effective context, not the entire live Java stack, and it includes the Subject
active during {{doAs}}. After {{doAs}} returns, current on the provider thread
resolves to login again, but the newly created workers retain the fresh Subject.
The probe block below combines the observed call chain, Subject identities, and
worker creation. Here HadoopSecurityContext Subject means the Subject of the
UGI held by the installed HadoopSecurityContext; it matches the login Subject
in this probe, but that is not guaranteed in general.
{noformat}
provider thread = default-dispatcher-12
freshUGI Subject = 817147333
login/HadoopSecurityContext Subject = 1333938290
freshUGI.doAs(...)
-> fs.addDelegationTokens(...)
-> HDFS RPC blocked in CompletableFuture.get()
-> ForkJoinPool.managedBlock()
-> tryCompensate()
-> createWorker()
-> new dispatcher workers inherit the fresh Subject
-> later, one of them triggers creation of a cluster-io worker
current Subject before doAs = 1333938290
current Subject inside doAs = 817147333
current Subject after doAs = 1333938290
FJP workers created during the provider's blocked RPC:
default-dispatcher-13 / 14 / 15, creator=default-dispatcher-12
later cluster-io worker:
cluster-io-thread-3, creator=default-dispatcher-15
current Subject / JM-local receiver target (getCurrentUser()) = 817147333
login/HadoopSecurityContext Subject = 1333938290
{noformat}
{{fs.addDelegationTokens(...)}} is the provider-side acquisition step: it
obtains the filesystem delegation token or tokens and stores them in a local
{{Credentials}} object. The receiver later delivers that object to the selected
UGI.
{{cluster-io}} is created with {{Executors.newFixedThreadPool(...)}}, so its
size is fixed, but its worker threads are created lazily on task submission
rather than when the pool is constructed. In the probe, one of the workers
created during the provider's {{doAs}} window later submits a task to that
executor. That submission creates the cluster-io worker shown above; its Thread
constructor copies that worker's inherited context, so current Subject on the
new worker is the fresh Subject. The login UGI and the UGI held by
HadoopSecurityContext are unchanged and still resolve to the login Subject
shown above. This thread creation is not the token refresh itself; it
determines the Subject under which the later scheduled refresh runs. A receiver
invocation on this worker resolves {{getCurrentUser()}} to the fresh Subject
and writes credentials there, not to the UGI captured by the long-lived client.
This is a per-thread inherited security context, not a global mutation of
UserGroupInformation. It is a receiver target-selection mismatch, not a
client-binding error. Clients created under an unrelated transient Subject
require separate rebinding or recreation and are out of scope.
h2. Proposed change
This issue fixes token delivery for the observed long-lived-client case,
primarily checkpoint storage.
* Add an accessor for the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext.
* In HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver, select a single target UGI: use the UGI
held by HadoopSecurityContext when present; otherwise fall back to
{{UserGroupInformation.getLoginUser()}}. Add refreshed credentials only to that
UGI. Do not target {{UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser()}}, which may be a
pooled worker's inherited Subject.
* Add unit tests for the receiver's context-first and login-fallback target
selection.
The change makes the delivery target deterministic. It does not rebind a client
already created under a different Subject.
h2. Scope and boundaries
h3. Out of scope
* Preventing HDFS client initialization or blocking RPCs from occurring inside
{{freshUGI.doAs(...)}} or the provider's ForkJoinPool worker.
* Closing or rebinding FileSystem instances created under a transient fresh
Subject; this is a separate client-lifecycle cleanup.
* Delivering credentials to clients created under an unrelated transient
Subject; those clients require separate rebinding or recreation.
* Changing the provider's {{getCurrentUser()}} usage.
{{HadoopFSDelegationTokenProvider}} already acquires tokens inside
{{KerberosLoginProvider.doLoginAndReturnUGI()}}; its remaining
{{getCurrentUser()}} use is a token-required pre-check and renewer-name lookup.
No provider change is required for the observed receiver mismatch; it remains a
separate follow-up if provider-side behavior is observed.
* Double security installation and {{SecurityUtils.install}} idempotency. A
diagnostic build where the second installation was skipped still failed at the
24h deadline. The early/duplicate installation adds lifecycle complexity, but
the probe does not establish it as a cause of the receiver mismatch.
h3. YARN
YARN is not a confirmed reproduction in this issue. In one controlled YARN
application-mode probe, the provider also ran on a Pekko {{default-dispatcher}}
worker, but its provider window stayed at {{poolSize=3}} / {{active=2}} with no
{{tryCompensate}} or {{createWorker}}, so no new dispatcher worker was created
during the provider's fresh-Subject window.
YARN did show ForkJoinPool expansion during the separate JobGraph-generation
startup path, so this is not evidence that YARN is immune. The sample is
limited: the provider's {{CompletableFuture}} state was not instrumented, so
the YARN trigger is not established.
h3. Versions
Before 1.17, the legacy {{HadoopModule}} path added credentials directly to the
login user; the {{HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver}} /
{{UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser()}} path starts with 1.17. 1.18, 1.19,
and 1.20 share that receiver behavior. 1.18 is not claimed to be immune.
h2. Testing
* Add receiver unit tests for (a) HadoopSecurityContext UGI precedence with
login/current not updated, (b) login fallback when no HadoopSecurityContext is
installed, and (c) the inherited current UGI not targeted.
* Trigger multiple post-startup token refreshes in a long-running job and
verify which executor runs the provider, whether new ForkJoinPool workers are
created, and which Subject the receiver's current user resolves to.
* Repeat the YARN provider-window probe while instrumenting the provider's
{{CompletableFuture}} state; the current YARN sample is summarized under Scope
and boundaries.
* A deployed application-mode job should survive the 24h token deadline and
continue checkpointing without SecretManager$InvalidToken. Verify that the
checkpoint-storage DFSClient receives the new token.
* Run a controlled application-mode probe that verifies the receiver updates
the UGI selected by the new logic rather than a pooled worker's inherited
current UGI; cover the TaskManager receiver path separately.
h2. Acceptance criteria
* A token refresh updates the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext when present,
otherwise the login UGI, and does not use a pooled worker's inherited current
UGI; a checkpoint-storage client bound to the selected UGI receives the new
token.
* A long-running application-mode job survives the 24h HDFS token deadline.
> Hadoop delegation token refresh can target a different UGI than Hadoop clients
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: FLINK-41435
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/FLINK-41435
> Project: Flink
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: Runtime / Configuration
> Affects Versions: 2.0.0, 1.19.0, 1.20.0, 2.1.0, 2.2.0, 2.3.0, 2.4.0
> Environment: Flink 1.19.0 and later (1.19.x, 1.20.x, 2.0 through
> 2.4), plus master (2.5-SNAPSHOT); Kubernetes and standalone application mode
> with Kerberos and HDFS delegation tokens. The mismatch is more likely when
> FileSystemJobResultStore and the token manager share the cluster-io executor
> (FLINK-27204).
> Reporter: LuChengxiang
> Priority: Major
>
> h2. Summary
> Flink periodically obtains HDFS delegation tokens and distributes them
> through HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver. The receiver adds refreshed
> credentials to UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser() of the thread running
> the refresh. A long-lived Hadoop client, especially a checkpoint-storage
> DFSClient, may instead use the UGI/Subject captured when that client was
> created. If those identities differ, the token refresh succeeds and the
> receiver reports success, but the new credentials are not delivered to the
> client's UGI. The client continues using its startup token and fails at the
> 24h HDFS token deadline with SecretManager$InvalidToken.
> In the observed Kubernetes application-mode reproduction, the mismatch
> becomes reachable through ForkJoinPool compensation. The provider blocks in
> {{CompletableFuture.get()}} on a ForkJoinWorkerThread; FJP creates dispatcher
> workers while {{freshUGI.doAs(...)}} is effective, and those workers inherit
> the fresh Subject. A later {{cluster-io}} worker created by one of them
> inherits the same Subject and can run a token receiver under it.
> The defect is receiver target selection, not token acquisition or client
> binding. The proposed fix targets the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext,
> falling back to the login UGI, instead of a pooled worker's current UGI. Here
> "UGI" means the Hadoop UserGroupInformation wrapper and "Subject" means the
> identity it carries; identity comparisons use Subject identity.
> h2. Observed failure
> This was observed in a Flink 1.20.5 Kubernetes application-mode job using
> ZooKeeper-based high availability and HDFS-backed checkpoint storage. The
> primary failure was in the checkpoint storage path:
> {noformat}
> CheckpointCoordinator.initializeCheckpointLocation
> -> FsCheckpointStorageAccess.initializeLocationForCheckpoint
> -> HadoopFileSystem.mkdirs
> -> DFSClient.mkdirs
> {noformat}
> After the 24h deadline, the checkpoint-storage client reported InvalidToken
> for its startup token even though refresh had obtained a new HDFS token and
> the receiver reported success.
> Not every Kubernetes application-mode job is affected. The failure is
> timing-dependent: a long-lived Hadoop client must capture one Subject/UGI
> lifecycle, and a later refresh receiver must run under a different one.
> h2. Root cause
> The delivery bug is in HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver. It targets
> {{UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser()}} of the refresh thread.
> {{getCurrentUser()}} resolves from the thread's effective
> AccessControlContext and is not guaranteed to be the UGI held by
> HadoopSecurityContext or the UGI captured by a long-lived checkpoint-storage
> DFSClient. In the observed failure, the checkpoint client's captured UGI had
> the login/HadoopSecurityContext Subject, while the receiver could run under a
> pooled worker's inherited fresh Subject.
> h3. Acquisition and refresh phases
> Token delivery in the JobManager has three phases. Within each phase, the
> provider and the JM-local receiver run on the same token-manager thread.
> * Bootstrap acquisition: {{ClusterEntrypoint.initializeServices()}} calls
> {{DefaultDelegationTokenManager.obtainDelegationTokens()}} on {{main}} before
> BlobServer starts. It updates local receivers for early external filesystem
> access. The receiver runs after {{freshUGI.doAs(...)}} returns, when current
> is login, so this phase is safe.
> * ResourceManager startup acquisition: {{ResourceManager.onStart()}} ->
> {{DefaultDelegationTokenManager.start()}} -> {{startTokensUpdate()}} runs on
> {{default-dispatcher}}. This provider call is where the observed ForkJoinPool
> expansion occurs, but the startup receiver itself still runs on
> {{default-dispatcher}} after the provider returns, so it does not target the
> fresh Subject.
> * Scheduled refresh: later updates are submitted through {{cluster-io}}. A
> receiver running on a {{cluster-io}} worker that inherited the fresh Subject
> resolves {{getCurrentUser()}} to that Subject and can target the wrong UGI.
> TaskManager receivers are invoked by {{TaskExecutor}} token updates, not on
> {{cluster-io}}; the probe in this issue covers the JM-local receiver path
> only. These two startup token acquisitions are separate from the double
> {{SecurityUtils.install}} sequence discussed under Scope and boundaries.
> h3. How the fresh Subject reaches a pooled worker
> The observed Subject-propagation window is the ResourceManager startup
> acquisition. The provider runs on a ForkJoinWorkerThread. The fresh Subject
> comes from {{KerberosLoginProvider.doLoginAndReturnUGI()}}, which calls
> {{UserGroupInformation.loginUserFromKeytabAndReturnUGI(principal, keytab)}}.
> That creates a new UGI for the same principal and does not replace the
> process login user.
> While {{freshUGI.doAs(...)}} is effective, {{fs.addDelegationTokens(...)}}
> performs a blocking HDFS RPC in {{CompletableFuture.get()}}. ForkJoinPool
> enters {{managedBlock()}}/{{tryCompensate()}} and creates three dispatcher
> workers during the blocked RPC.
> The Thread constructor captures the effective AccessControlContext returned
> by {{AccessController.getContext()}} into the new thread's
> {{inheritedAccessControlContext}}. This is a stack-derived snapshot of the
> effective context, not the entire live Java stack, and it includes the
> Subject active during {{doAs}}. After {{doAs}} returns, current on the
> provider thread resolves to login again, but the newly created workers retain
> the fresh Subject.
> The probe block below combines the observed call chain, Subject identities,
> and worker creation. Here HadoopSecurityContext Subject means the Subject of
> the UGI held by the installed HadoopSecurityContext; it matches the login
> Subject in this probe, but that is not guaranteed in general.
> {noformat}
> provider thread = default-dispatcher-12
> freshUGI Subject = 817147333
> login/HadoopSecurityContext Subject = 1333938290
> freshUGI.doAs(...)
> -> fs.addDelegationTokens(...)
> -> HDFS RPC blocked in CompletableFuture.get()
> -> ForkJoinPool.managedBlock()
> -> tryCompensate()
> -> createWorker()
> -> new dispatcher workers inherit the fresh Subject
> -> later, one of them triggers creation of a cluster-io worker
> current Subject before doAs = 1333938290
> current Subject inside doAs = 817147333
> current Subject after doAs = 1333938290
> FJP workers created during the provider's blocked RPC:
> default-dispatcher-13 / 14 / 15, creator=default-dispatcher-12
> later cluster-io worker:
> cluster-io-thread-3, creator=default-dispatcher-15
> current Subject / JM-local receiver target (getCurrentUser()) = 817147333
> login/HadoopSecurityContext Subject = 1333938290
> {noformat}
> {{fs.addDelegationTokens(...)}} is the provider-side acquisition step: it
> obtains the filesystem delegation token or tokens and stores them in a local
> {{Credentials}} object. The receiver later delivers that object to the
> selected UGI.
> {{cluster-io}} is a fixed-size executor; its threads are created lazily on
> task submission. In the probe, an FJP-created dispatcher thread later submits
> a task to this executor, which creates a cluster-io thread that copies the
> submitter's inherited ACC and starts with the fresh Subject. This thread
> creation is not the token refresh itself; it only determines the Subject
> under which the later scheduled refresh runs. A receiver invocation on that
> thread resolves {{getCurrentUser()}} to the fresh Subject and writes
> credentials there, while the login and HadoopSecurityContext UGIs remain
> unchanged and still resolve to the login Subject shown above.
> This is a per-thread inherited security context, not a global mutation of
> UserGroupInformation. It is a receiver target-selection mismatch, not a
> client-binding error. Clients created under an unrelated transient Subject
> require separate rebinding or recreation and are out of scope.
> h2. Proposed change
> This issue fixes token delivery for the observed long-lived-client case,
> primarily checkpoint storage.
> * Add an accessor for the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext.
> * In HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver, select a single target UGI: use the UGI
> held by HadoopSecurityContext when present; otherwise fall back to
> {{UserGroupInformation.getLoginUser()}}. Add refreshed credentials only to
> that UGI. Do not target {{UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser()}}, which may
> be a pooled worker's inherited Subject.
> * Add unit tests for the receiver's context-first and login-fallback target
> selection.
> The change makes the delivery target deterministic. It does not rebind a
> client already created under a different Subject.
> h2. Scope and boundaries
> h3. Out of scope
> * Preventing HDFS client initialization or blocking RPCs from occurring
> inside {{freshUGI.doAs(...)}} or the provider's ForkJoinPool worker.
> * Closing or rebinding FileSystem instances created under a transient fresh
> Subject; this is a separate client-lifecycle cleanup.
> * Delivering credentials to clients created under an unrelated transient
> Subject; those clients require separate rebinding or recreation.
> * Changing the provider's {{getCurrentUser()}} usage.
> {{HadoopFSDelegationTokenProvider}} already acquires tokens inside
> {{KerberosLoginProvider.doLoginAndReturnUGI()}}; its remaining
> {{getCurrentUser()}} use is a token-required pre-check and renewer-name
> lookup. No provider change is required for the observed receiver mismatch; it
> remains a separate follow-up if provider-side behavior is observed.
> * Double security installation and {{SecurityUtils.install}} idempotency. A
> diagnostic build where the second installation was skipped still failed at
> the 24h deadline. The early/duplicate installation adds lifecycle complexity,
> but the probe does not establish it as a cause of the receiver mismatch.
> h3. YARN
> YARN is not a confirmed reproduction in this issue. In one controlled YARN
> application-mode probe, the provider also ran on a Pekko
> {{default-dispatcher}} worker, but its provider window stayed at
> {{poolSize=3}} / {{active=2}} with no {{tryCompensate}} or {{createWorker}},
> so no new dispatcher worker was created during the provider's fresh-Subject
> window.
> YARN did show ForkJoinPool expansion during the separate JobGraph-generation
> startup path, so this is not evidence that YARN is immune. The sample is
> limited: the provider's {{CompletableFuture}} state was not instrumented, so
> the YARN trigger is not established.
> h3. Versions
> Before 1.17, the legacy {{HadoopModule}} path added credentials directly to
> the login user; the {{HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver}} /
> {{UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser()}} path starts with 1.17. 1.18, 1.19,
> and 1.20 share that receiver behavior. 1.18 is not claimed to be immune.
> h2. Testing
> * Add receiver unit tests for (a) HadoopSecurityContext UGI precedence with
> login/current not updated, (b) login fallback when no HadoopSecurityContext
> is installed, and (c) the inherited current UGI not targeted.
> * Trigger multiple post-startup token refreshes in a long-running job and
> verify which executor runs the provider, whether new ForkJoinPool workers are
> created, and which Subject the receiver's current user resolves to.
> * Repeat the YARN provider-window probe while instrumenting the provider's
> {{CompletableFuture}} state; the current YARN sample is summarized under
> Scope and boundaries.
> * A deployed application-mode job should survive the 24h token deadline and
> continue checkpointing without SecretManager$InvalidToken. Verify that the
> checkpoint-storage DFSClient receives the new token.
> * Run a controlled application-mode probe that verifies the receiver updates
> the UGI selected by the new logic rather than a pooled worker's inherited
> current UGI; cover the TaskManager receiver path separately.
> h2. Acceptance criteria
> * A token refresh updates the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext when present,
> otherwise the login UGI, and does not use a pooled worker's inherited current
> UGI; a checkpoint-storage client bound to the selected UGI receives the new
> token.
> * A long-running application-mode job survives the 24h HDFS token deadline.
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