[ 
https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/FLINK-41435?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel
 ]

LuChengxiang updated FLINK-41435:
---------------------------------
    Description: 
h2. Summary

Flink periodically obtains HDFS delegation tokens and distributes them through 
HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver. The receiver adds refreshed credentials to 
UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser() of the thread running the refresh. A 
long-lived Hadoop client, especially a checkpoint-storage DFSClient, may 
instead use the UGI/Subject captured when that client was created. If those 
identities differ, the refresh succeeds and the receiver reports success, but 
the new credentials are not delivered to the client's UGI. The client keeps 
using its startup token and fails at the 24h HDFS token deadline with 
SecretManager$InvalidToken.

The defect is receiver target selection, not token acquisition or client 
binding. A pooled thread's current UGI can be inherited from a different 
Subject lifecycle than the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext or the login user. 
The proposed fix targets the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext, falling back to 
the login UGI, instead of a pooled thread's current UGI.

Here "UGI" means the Hadoop UserGroupInformation wrapper and "Subject" means 
the identity it carries; identity comparisons use Subject identity.

h2. Observed failure

This was observed in a Flink 1.20.5 Kubernetes application-mode job using 
ZooKeeper-based high availability and HDFS-backed checkpoint storage. The 
primary failure was in the checkpoint storage path:

{noformat}
CheckpointCoordinator.initializeCheckpointLocation
  -> FsCheckpointStorageAccess.initializeLocationForCheckpoint
  -> HadoopFileSystem.mkdirs
  -> DFSClient.mkdirs
{noformat}

After the 24h deadline, the checkpoint-storage client reported InvalidToken for 
its startup token even though refresh had obtained a new HDFS token and the 
receiver reported success.

Not every application-mode job is affected. The failure is timing-dependent: a 
long-lived Hadoop client must capture one Subject/UGI lifecycle, and a later 
refresh receiver must run under a different one.

h2. Root cause

HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver targets UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser() of 
the refresh thread. getCurrentUser() resolves from the thread's effective 
AccessControlContext and is not guaranteed to be the UGI held by 
HadoopSecurityContext or the UGI captured by a long-lived checkpoint-storage 
DFSClient.

In the observed failure, the checkpoint client's captured UGI had the 
login/HadoopSecurityContext Subject, while the receiver could run under a 
pooled thread's inherited Subject.

h3. How the refresh thread's current UGI can differ

The provider obtains tokens inside freshUGI.doAs(...). One observed propagation 
path is ForkJoinPool managed-block compensation:

{noformat}
freshUGI.doAs(...)
  -> fs.addDelegationTokens(...)
  -> HDFS RPC blocked in CompletableFuture.get()
  -> ForkJoinPool.managedBlock()
  -> tryCompensate()
  -> createWorker()
  -> new dispatcher worker inherits the fresh Subject
  -> later, that worker creates a cluster-io worker
  -> receiver runs on the cluster-io worker with the fresh Subject
{noformat}

The Thread constructor copies the effective AccessControlContext into the new 
thread's inheritedAccessControlContext, so a thread created while 
freshUGI.doAs(...) is effective can retain the fresh Subject after doAs 
returns. This is a per-thread inherited security context, not a global mutation 
of UserGroupInformation.

A receiver running on such a thread resolves getCurrentUser() to the fresh 
Subject and writes credentials there, while the login and HadoopSecurityContext 
UGIs remain unchanged. This is the receiver target-selection mismatch.

h2. Proposed change

This issue fixes token delivery for the observed long-lived-client case, 
primarily checkpoint storage.

* Add an accessor for the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext.
* In HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver, select a single target UGI: the UGI held by 
HadoopSecurityContext when present; otherwise fall back to 
UserGroupInformation.getLoginUser(). Add refreshed credentials only to that 
UGI. Do not target UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser().
* Add unit tests for the receiver's context-first and login-fallback target 
selection.

The change makes the delivery target deterministic. It does not rebind a client 
already created under a different Subject.

h2. Scope and boundaries

h3. Out of scope

* Preventing HDFS client initialization or blocking RPCs from occurring inside 
freshUGI.doAs(...) or the provider's ForkJoinPool thread.
* Closing or rebinding FileSystem instances created under a transient Subject; 
this is a separate client-lifecycle cleanup.
* Changing the provider's getCurrentUser() usage. The provider already acquires 
tokens inside KerberosLoginProvider.doLoginAndReturnUGI(); its remaining 
getCurrentUser() use is a token-required pre-check and renewer-name lookup. A 
provider change is a separate follow-up if provider-side behavior is observed.
* Double security installation and SecurityUtils.install idempotency. A 
diagnostic build where the second installation was skipped still failed at the 
24h deadline.

h3. Deployment scope

The failure was observed in a Kubernetes application-mode job. Controlled YARN 
application-mode probes did not reproduce it. This is not a platform-level 
exemption: the decisive condition is the Subject under which the receiver runs, 
not the deployment type.

h3. Versions

Before 1.17, the legacy HadoopModule path added credentials directly to the 
login user; the HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver / getCurrentUser() path starts 
with 1.17. 1.18, 1.19, and 1.20 share that receiver behavior. 1.18 is not 
claimed to be immune.

h2. Testing

* Add receiver unit tests for (a) HadoopSecurityContext UGI precedence, (b) 
login fallback when no HadoopSecurityContext is installed, and (c) the 
inherited current UGI not being targeted.
* A deployed application-mode job should survive the 24h token deadline and 
continue checkpointing without SecretManager$InvalidToken. Verify that the 
checkpoint-storage DFSClient receives the new token.
* Run a controlled application-mode probe that verifies the receiver updates 
the UGI selected by the new logic rather than a pooled thread's inherited 
current UGI; cover the TaskManager receiver path separately.

h2. Acceptance criteria

* A token refresh updates the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext when present, 
otherwise the login UGI, and does not use a pooled thread's inherited current 
UGI; a checkpoint-storage client bound to the selected UGI receives the new 
token.
* A long-running application-mode job survives the 24h HDFS token deadline.


  was:
h2. Summary

Flink periodically obtains HDFS delegation tokens and distributes them through 
HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver. The receiver adds refreshed credentials to 
UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser() of the thread running the refresh. A 
long-lived Hadoop client, especially a checkpoint-storage DFSClient, may 
instead use the UGI/Subject captured when that client was created. If those 
identities differ, the token refresh succeeds and the receiver reports success, 
but the new credentials are not delivered to the client's UGI. The client 
continues using its startup token and fails at the 24h HDFS token deadline with 
SecretManager$InvalidToken.

In the observed Kubernetes application-mode reproduction, the mismatch becomes 
reachable through ForkJoinPool's managed-block compensation. The provider 
blocks in {{CompletableFuture.get()}} on a ForkJoinWorkerThread; when no idle 
FJP thread is available and the pool has capacity, the compensation path 
creates additional dispatcher threads while {{freshUGI.doAs(...)}} is 
effective, and those threads inherit the fresh Subject. A later {{cluster-io}} 
thread created by one of them inherits the same Subject and can run a token 
receiver under it.

The defect is receiver target selection, not token acquisition or client 
binding. The proposed fix targets the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext, 
falling back to the login UGI, instead of a pooled thread's current UGI. Here 
"UGI" means the Hadoop UserGroupInformation wrapper and "Subject" means the 
identity it carries; identity comparisons use Subject identity.

h2. Observed failure

This was observed in a Flink 1.20.5 Kubernetes application-mode job using 
ZooKeeper-based high availability and HDFS-backed checkpoint storage. The 
primary failure was in the checkpoint storage path:

{noformat}
CheckpointCoordinator.initializeCheckpointLocation
  -> FsCheckpointStorageAccess.initializeLocationForCheckpoint
  -> HadoopFileSystem.mkdirs
  -> DFSClient.mkdirs
{noformat}

After the 24h deadline, the checkpoint-storage client reported InvalidToken for 
its startup token even though refresh had obtained a new HDFS token and the 
receiver reported success.

Not every Kubernetes application-mode job is affected. The failure is 
timing-dependent: a long-lived Hadoop client must capture one Subject/UGI 
lifecycle, and a later refresh receiver must run under a different one.

h2. Root cause

The delivery bug is in HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver. It targets 
{{UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser()}} of the refresh thread. 
{{getCurrentUser()}} resolves from the thread's effective AccessControlContext 
and is not guaranteed to be the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext or the UGI 
captured by a long-lived checkpoint-storage DFSClient. In the observed failure, 
the checkpoint client's captured UGI had the login/HadoopSecurityContext 
Subject, while the receiver could run under a pooled thread's inherited fresh 
Subject.

h3. Acquisition and refresh phases

Token delivery in the JobManager has three phases. Within each phase, the 
provider and the JM-local receiver run on the same token-manager thread.

* Bootstrap acquisition: {{ClusterEntrypoint.initializeServices()}} calls 
{{DefaultDelegationTokenManager.obtainDelegationTokens()}} on {{main}} before 
BlobServer starts. It updates local receivers for early external filesystem 
access. The receiver runs after {{freshUGI.doAs(...)}} returns, when current is 
login, so this phase is safe.
* ResourceManager startup acquisition: {{ResourceManager.onStart()}} -> 
{{DefaultDelegationTokenManager.start()}} -> {{startTokensUpdate()}} runs on 
{{default-dispatcher}}. This provider call is where the observed ForkJoinPool 
expansion occurs, but the startup receiver itself still runs on 
{{default-dispatcher}} after the provider returns, so it does not target the 
fresh Subject.
* Scheduled refresh: later updates are submitted through {{cluster-io}}. A 
receiver running on a {{cluster-io}} thread that inherited the fresh Subject 
resolves {{getCurrentUser()}} to that Subject and can target the wrong UGI.

TaskManager receivers are invoked by {{TaskExecutor}} token updates, not on 
{{cluster-io}}; the probe in this issue covers the JM-local receiver path only. 
These two startup token acquisitions are separate from the double 
{{SecurityUtils.install}} sequence discussed under Scope and boundaries.

h3. How the fresh Subject reaches a pooled thread

The observed Subject-propagation window is the ResourceManager startup 
acquisition. The provider runs on a ForkJoinWorkerThread. The fresh Subject 
comes from {{KerberosLoginProvider.doLoginAndReturnUGI()}}, which calls 
{{UserGroupInformation.loginUserFromKeytabAndReturnUGI(principal, keytab)}}. 
That creates a new UGI for the same principal and does not replace the process 
login user.

While {{freshUGI.doAs(...)}} is effective, the provider action calls 
{{fs.addDelegationTokens(...)}}; the blocking HDFS RPC in 
{{CompletableFuture.get()}} enters ForkJoinPool's managed-block path. If no 
idle FJP thread is available and the pool has capacity, {{tryCompensate()}} 
creates additional dispatcher threads during the blocked RPC. This compensation 
does not unblock the RPC; it preserves pool capacity for other work. The 
{{Thread}} constructor for each new thread captures the effective 
AccessControlContext returned by {{AccessController.getContext()}} into that 
thread's {{inheritedAccessControlContext}}; this is a stack-derived snapshot, 
not the entire live Java stack, and it includes the Subject active during 
{{doAs}}. After {{doAs}} returns, current on the provider thread resolves to 
login again, but the newly created threads retain the fresh Subject.

The probe block below combines the observed call chain, Subject identities, and 
thread creation. Here HadoopSecurityContext Subject means the Subject of the 
UGI held by the installed HadoopSecurityContext; it matches the login Subject 
in this probe, but that is not guaranteed in general.

{noformat}
provider thread                     = default-dispatcher-12
freshUGI Subject                    = 817147333
login/HadoopSecurityContext Subject = 1333938290

freshUGI.doAs(...)
  -> fs.addDelegationTokens(...)
  -> HDFS RPC blocked in CompletableFuture.get()
  -> ForkJoinPool.managedBlock()
  -> tryCompensate()
  -> createWorker() [when no idle FJP thread and pool capacity remains]
  -> new dispatcher threads inherit the fresh Subject
  -> later, one of them triggers creation of a cluster-io thread

current Subject before doAs         = 1333938290
current Subject inside doAs         = 817147333
current Subject after doAs          = 1333938290

FJP-created dispatcher threads:
  default-dispatcher-13 / 14 / 15, creator=default-dispatcher-12

later cluster-io thread:
  cluster-io-thread-3, creator=default-dispatcher-15
  current Subject / JM-local receiver target (getCurrentUser()) = 817147333
  login/HadoopSecurityContext Subject = 1333938290
{noformat}

{{fs.addDelegationTokens(...)}} is the provider-side acquisition step: it 
obtains the filesystem delegation token or tokens and stores them in a local 
{{Credentials}} object. The receiver later delivers that object to the selected 
UGI.

{{cluster-io}} is a fixed-size executor; its threads are created lazily on task 
submission. In the probe, an FJP-created dispatcher thread later submits a task 
to this executor, which creates a cluster-io thread that copies the submitter's 
inherited ACC and starts with the fresh Subject. This thread creation is not 
the token refresh itself; it only determines the Subject under which the later 
scheduled refresh runs. A receiver invocation on that thread resolves 
{{getCurrentUser()}} to the fresh Subject and writes credentials there, while 
the login and HadoopSecurityContext UGIs remain unchanged and still resolve to 
the login Subject shown above.

This is a per-thread inherited security context, not a global mutation of 
UserGroupInformation. It is a receiver target-selection mismatch, not a 
client-binding error. Clients created under an unrelated transient Subject 
require separate rebinding or recreation and are out of scope.

h2. Proposed change

This issue fixes token delivery for the observed long-lived-client case, 
primarily checkpoint storage.

* Add an accessor for the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext.
* In HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver, select a single target UGI: use the UGI 
held by HadoopSecurityContext when present; otherwise fall back to 
{{UserGroupInformation.getLoginUser()}}. Add refreshed credentials only to that 
UGI. Do not target {{UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser()}}, which may be a 
pooled thread's inherited Subject.
* Add unit tests for the receiver's context-first and login-fallback target 
selection.

The change makes the delivery target deterministic. It does not rebind a client 
already created under a different Subject.

h2. Scope and boundaries

h3. Out of scope

* Preventing HDFS client initialization or blocking RPCs from occurring inside 
{{freshUGI.doAs(...)}} or the provider's ForkJoinPool thread.
* Closing or rebinding FileSystem instances created under a transient fresh 
Subject; this is a separate client-lifecycle cleanup.
* Delivering credentials to clients created under an unrelated transient 
Subject; those clients require separate rebinding or recreation.
* Changing the provider's {{getCurrentUser()}} usage. 
{{HadoopFSDelegationTokenProvider}} already acquires tokens inside 
{{KerberosLoginProvider.doLoginAndReturnUGI()}}; its remaining 
{{getCurrentUser()}} use is a token-required pre-check and renewer-name lookup. 
No provider change is required for the observed receiver mismatch; it remains a 
separate follow-up if provider-side behavior is observed.
* Double security installation and {{SecurityUtils.install}} idempotency. A 
diagnostic build where the second installation was skipped still failed at the 
24h deadline. The early/duplicate installation adds lifecycle complexity, but 
the probe does not establish it as a cause of the receiver mismatch.

h3. YARN

YARN is not a confirmed reproduction. The YARN samples below were collected 
with a Java 8-compatible 1.20.5 probe build; Java 8 remains supported but 
deprecated in the 1.20 source line. Across repeated controlled application-mode 
probes, some provider windows created no dispatcher thread, while one window 
showed a new dispatcher thread during the observation period. However, the FJP 
stack probe did not capture a provider-specific 
{{tryCompensate}}/{{createWorker}} stack; the observed stacks came from 
JobGraph generation and RPC actor paths. The new thread therefore cannot be 
attributed to the token provider from the current evidence. One later sample 
recorded {{futureDone=false}} immediately before the provider RPC future and 
{{true}} after; this shows the future was not yet complete at that point, but 
does not prove that {{CompletableFuture.get()}} entered managed blocking, 
because it may have completed before the wait. No provider-specific FJP stack 
was captured in that sample either. A controlled YARN probe that instrumented 
{{CompletableFuture.waitingGet}} and {{ForkJoinPool.managedBlock}} produced no 
provider stack, while the same agent produced the expected 
waiting-get/managed-block stack in a self-test. That sample therefore did not 
enter the provider wait path. The new thread observed in another run remains 
unattributed, and the per-window FJP state, timing, and concurrent work remain 
unestablished as the explanation.

h3. Versions

Before 1.17, the legacy {{HadoopModule}} path added credentials directly to the 
login user; the {{HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver}} / 
{{UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser()}} path starts with 1.17. 1.18, 1.19, 
and 1.20 share that receiver behavior. 1.18 is not claimed to be immune.

h2. Testing

* Add receiver unit tests for (a) HadoopSecurityContext UGI precedence with 
login/current not updated, (b) login fallback when no HadoopSecurityContext is 
installed, and (c) the inherited current UGI not targeted.
* Trigger multiple post-startup token refreshes in a long-running job and 
verify which executor runs the provider, whether new ForkJoinPool threads are 
created, and which Subject the receiver's current user resolves to.
* Repeat the YARN provider-window probe while instrumenting the provider's 
{{CompletableFuture}} state; the current YARN sample is summarized under Scope 
and boundaries.
* A deployed application-mode job should survive the 24h token deadline and 
continue checkpointing without SecretManager$InvalidToken. Verify that the 
checkpoint-storage DFSClient receives the new token.
* Run a controlled application-mode probe that verifies the receiver updates 
the UGI selected by the new logic rather than a pooled thread's inherited 
current UGI; cover the TaskManager receiver path separately.

h2. Acceptance criteria

* A token refresh updates the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext when present, 
otherwise the login UGI, and does not use a pooled thread's inherited current 
UGI; a checkpoint-storage client bound to the selected UGI receives the new 
token.
* A long-running application-mode job survives the 24h HDFS token deadline.



> Hadoop delegation token refresh can target a different UGI than Hadoop clients
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: FLINK-41435
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/FLINK-41435
>             Project: Flink
>          Issue Type: Bug
>          Components: Runtime / Configuration
>    Affects Versions: 2.0.0, 1.19.0, 1.20.0, 2.1.0, 2.2.0, 2.3.0, 2.4.0
>         Environment: Flink 1.19.0 and later (1.19.x, 1.20.x, 2.0 through 
> 2.4), plus master (2.5-SNAPSHOT); Kubernetes and standalone application mode 
> with Kerberos and HDFS delegation tokens. The mismatch is more likely when 
> FileSystemJobResultStore and the token manager share the cluster-io executor 
> (FLINK-27204).
>            Reporter: LuChengxiang
>            Priority: Major
>
> h2. Summary
> Flink periodically obtains HDFS delegation tokens and distributes them 
> through HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver. The receiver adds refreshed 
> credentials to UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser() of the thread running 
> the refresh. A long-lived Hadoop client, especially a checkpoint-storage 
> DFSClient, may instead use the UGI/Subject captured when that client was 
> created. If those identities differ, the refresh succeeds and the receiver 
> reports success, but the new credentials are not delivered to the client's 
> UGI. The client keeps using its startup token and fails at the 24h HDFS token 
> deadline with SecretManager$InvalidToken.
> The defect is receiver target selection, not token acquisition or client 
> binding. A pooled thread's current UGI can be inherited from a different 
> Subject lifecycle than the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext or the login 
> user. The proposed fix targets the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext, falling 
> back to the login UGI, instead of a pooled thread's current UGI.
> Here "UGI" means the Hadoop UserGroupInformation wrapper and "Subject" means 
> the identity it carries; identity comparisons use Subject identity.
> h2. Observed failure
> This was observed in a Flink 1.20.5 Kubernetes application-mode job using 
> ZooKeeper-based high availability and HDFS-backed checkpoint storage. The 
> primary failure was in the checkpoint storage path:
> {noformat}
> CheckpointCoordinator.initializeCheckpointLocation
>   -> FsCheckpointStorageAccess.initializeLocationForCheckpoint
>   -> HadoopFileSystem.mkdirs
>   -> DFSClient.mkdirs
> {noformat}
> After the 24h deadline, the checkpoint-storage client reported InvalidToken 
> for its startup token even though refresh had obtained a new HDFS token and 
> the receiver reported success.
> Not every application-mode job is affected. The failure is timing-dependent: 
> a long-lived Hadoop client must capture one Subject/UGI lifecycle, and a 
> later refresh receiver must run under a different one.
> h2. Root cause
> HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver targets UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser() 
> of the refresh thread. getCurrentUser() resolves from the thread's effective 
> AccessControlContext and is not guaranteed to be the UGI held by 
> HadoopSecurityContext or the UGI captured by a long-lived checkpoint-storage 
> DFSClient.
> In the observed failure, the checkpoint client's captured UGI had the 
> login/HadoopSecurityContext Subject, while the receiver could run under a 
> pooled thread's inherited Subject.
> h3. How the refresh thread's current UGI can differ
> The provider obtains tokens inside freshUGI.doAs(...). One observed 
> propagation path is ForkJoinPool managed-block compensation:
> {noformat}
> freshUGI.doAs(...)
>   -> fs.addDelegationTokens(...)
>   -> HDFS RPC blocked in CompletableFuture.get()
>   -> ForkJoinPool.managedBlock()
>   -> tryCompensate()
>   -> createWorker()
>   -> new dispatcher worker inherits the fresh Subject
>   -> later, that worker creates a cluster-io worker
>   -> receiver runs on the cluster-io worker with the fresh Subject
> {noformat}
> The Thread constructor copies the effective AccessControlContext into the new 
> thread's inheritedAccessControlContext, so a thread created while 
> freshUGI.doAs(...) is effective can retain the fresh Subject after doAs 
> returns. This is a per-thread inherited security context, not a global 
> mutation of UserGroupInformation.
> A receiver running on such a thread resolves getCurrentUser() to the fresh 
> Subject and writes credentials there, while the login and 
> HadoopSecurityContext UGIs remain unchanged. This is the receiver 
> target-selection mismatch.
> h2. Proposed change
> This issue fixes token delivery for the observed long-lived-client case, 
> primarily checkpoint storage.
> * Add an accessor for the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext.
> * In HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver, select a single target UGI: the UGI held 
> by HadoopSecurityContext when present; otherwise fall back to 
> UserGroupInformation.getLoginUser(). Add refreshed credentials only to that 
> UGI. Do not target UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser().
> * Add unit tests for the receiver's context-first and login-fallback target 
> selection.
> The change makes the delivery target deterministic. It does not rebind a 
> client already created under a different Subject.
> h2. Scope and boundaries
> h3. Out of scope
> * Preventing HDFS client initialization or blocking RPCs from occurring 
> inside freshUGI.doAs(...) or the provider's ForkJoinPool thread.
> * Closing or rebinding FileSystem instances created under a transient 
> Subject; this is a separate client-lifecycle cleanup.
> * Changing the provider's getCurrentUser() usage. The provider already 
> acquires tokens inside KerberosLoginProvider.doLoginAndReturnUGI(); its 
> remaining getCurrentUser() use is a token-required pre-check and renewer-name 
> lookup. A provider change is a separate follow-up if provider-side behavior 
> is observed.
> * Double security installation and SecurityUtils.install idempotency. A 
> diagnostic build where the second installation was skipped still failed at 
> the 24h deadline.
> h3. Deployment scope
> The failure was observed in a Kubernetes application-mode job. Controlled 
> YARN application-mode probes did not reproduce it. This is not a 
> platform-level exemption: the decisive condition is the Subject under which 
> the receiver runs, not the deployment type.
> h3. Versions
> Before 1.17, the legacy HadoopModule path added credentials directly to the 
> login user; the HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver / getCurrentUser() path starts 
> with 1.17. 1.18, 1.19, and 1.20 share that receiver behavior. 1.18 is not 
> claimed to be immune.
> h2. Testing
> * Add receiver unit tests for (a) HadoopSecurityContext UGI precedence, (b) 
> login fallback when no HadoopSecurityContext is installed, and (c) the 
> inherited current UGI not being targeted.
> * A deployed application-mode job should survive the 24h token deadline and 
> continue checkpointing without SecretManager$InvalidToken. Verify that the 
> checkpoint-storage DFSClient receives the new token.
> * Run a controlled application-mode probe that verifies the receiver updates 
> the UGI selected by the new logic rather than a pooled thread's inherited 
> current UGI; cover the TaskManager receiver path separately.
> h2. Acceptance criteria
> * A token refresh updates the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext when present, 
> otherwise the login UGI, and does not use a pooled thread's inherited current 
> UGI; a checkpoint-storage client bound to the selected UGI receives the new 
> token.
> * A long-running application-mode job survives the 24h HDFS token deadline.



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