[ 
https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/GUACAMOLE-880?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=16930124#comment-16930124
 ] 

Nick Couchman commented on GUACAMOLE-880:
-----------------------------------------

The other thing that I would add to what Mike said is that I don't think you 
need this feature in order to implement "defense in depth."  I would say that 
in a standard Guacamole deployment you would (should) implement the following 
layers of security:

* Ability to authenticate to Guacamole in the first place. (= Walking into the 
building with a valid pass.)
* TLS encryption of the data streams ( = Cloak of invisibility while you walk 
:-)
* Ability to authenticate to the remote desktop system (RDP/SSH/etc.; = Walking 
into the 10th floor office with a valid pass.).
* Authorization to access the correct data (access control lists; = The key to 
the file cabinet).
* Accountability for the data they access (auditing; = A camera watching them 
do all of these things, and someone looking at the document they pull from the 
file cabinet and making a record of it.).

I would be shocked if a company were held liable for GDPR violations simply on 
the fact that they used Guacamole and Guacamole did not offer this layer of 
protection against steganographic attacks - my guess is that you would have to 
ignore/violate several of the other layers in order to be held liable for 
something done by a determined insider.

> Obfuscation of guacamole client protocol
> ----------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: GUACAMOLE-880
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/GUACAMOLE-880
>             Project: Guacamole
>          Issue Type: Wish
>          Components: guacamole-client, guacamole-server
>            Reporter: Bolke de Bruin
>            Priority: Major
>              Labels: security
>
> One of the reasons we deploy guacamole is to limit data leakage 
> possibilities. We recently had a audit on our infrastructure and it was shown 
> that it was quite easy to leak out data through the guacamole protocol by 
> creating special images inside the desktop and then using mitmproxy (python) 
> and the guacamole python modules to capture the data inside those images.
> In order to limit the attack surface we would like to have obfuscation of the 
> protocol if configured to do so. Of course this could be done by implementing 
> a custom protocol, but it would be nice if Guacamole would have the 
> facilities (hooks) to do this. One could think of allowing a custom function 
> to encrypt/obfuscate the outgoing stream and attach into the javascript that 
> decrypts the stream.



--
This message was sent by Atlassian Jira
(v8.3.2#803003)

Reply via email to