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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HBASE-7544?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13551604#comment-13551604
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Andrew Purtell commented on HBASE-7544:
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Also, I'm struggling to see how to encrypt WALEdits on a per CF basis with HDFS
level tricks, but sure this could be a separate case.
> Transparent HFile encryption
> ----------------------------
>
> Key: HBASE-7544
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HBASE-7544
> Project: HBase
> Issue Type: New Feature
> Components: HFile, io
> Affects Versions: 0.96.0
> Reporter: Andrew Purtell
> Assignee: Andrew Purtell
>
> Introduce transparent encryption of HBase on disk data.
> Depends on a separate contribution of an encryption codec framework to Hadoop
> core and an AES-NI (native code) codec.
> I have an experimental patch that introduces encryption at the HFile level,
> with all necessary changes propagated up to the HStore level. For the most
> part, the changes are straightforward and mechanical. After HBASE-7414, we
> can introduce specification of an optional encryption codec in the file
> trailer. The work is not ready to go yet because key management and the HBCK
> pieces are TBD.
> Requirements:
> - Transparent encryption at the CF or table level
> - Protect against all data leakage from files at rest
> - Two-tier key architecture for consistency with best practices for this
> feature in the RDBMS world
> - Built-in key management
> - Flexible and non-intrusive key rotation
> - Mechanisms not exposed to or modifiable by users
> - Hardware security module integration (via Java KeyStore)
> - HBCK support for transparently encrypted files (+ plugin architecture for
> HBCK)
> Additional goals:
> - Shell support for administrative functions
> - Avoid performance impact for the null crypto codec case
> - Play nicely with other changes underway: in HFile, block coding, etc.
> We're aiming for rough parity with Oracle's transparent tablespace encryption
> feature, described in
> http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/database/owp-security-advanced-security-11gr-133411.pdf
> as
> {quote}
> “Transparent Data Encryption uses a 2-tier key architecture for flexible and
> non-intrusive key rotation and least operational and performance impact: Each
> application table with at least one encrypted column has its own table key,
> which is applied to all encrypted columns in that table. Equally, each
> encrypted tablespace has its own tablespace key. Table keys are stored in the
> data dictionary of the database, while tablespace keys are stored in the
> header of the tablespace and additionally, the header of each underlying OS
> file that makes up the tablespace. Each of these keys is encrypted with the
> TDE master encryption key, which is stored outside of the database in an
> external security module: either the Oracle Wallet (a PKCS#12 formatted file
> that is encrypted using a passphrase supplied either by the designated
> security administrator or DBA during setup), or a Hardware Security Module
> (HSM) device for higher assurance […]”
> {quote}
> Further design details forthcoming in a design document and patch as soon as
> we have all of the clearances in place.
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