Hugo-WB commented on code in PR #16353:
URL: https://github.com/apache/iceberg/pull/16353#discussion_r4005750655
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core/src/main/java/org/apache/iceberg/TableMetadata.java:
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@@ -1451,6 +1451,7 @@ private Builder rewriteSnapshotsInternal(Collection<Long>
idsToRemove, boolean s
}
removeStatistics(snapshotId);
removePartitionStatistics(snapshotId);
+ removeEncryptionKey(snapshot.keyId());
Review Comment:
Agreed! In the current spec encryption keys are stored at the metadata
layer, similar to schemas/partition specs. I think this makes sense for the
KEK, however for manifest list encryption key, those are per snapshot and not
re-used, so would've been nice to have them per snapshot.
As you mention above having the keys in the snapshot itself would also make
the invariant of 1:1 snapshot <> encryption key more obvious.
Yep! I had this PR open that I was planning on opening up after this one
merged: https://github.com/apache/iceberg/pull/16395/changes which creates the
list of references keys and removes all unreferenced.
Agreed on the invariance, I mentioned it in the PR description. It seems
like things that are 1:1 with snapshot are removed at
`TableMetadata::rewriteSnapshotsInternal` and things that are shared across
snapshots (schemas/partitions etc...)
`RemoveSnapshots::internalApply::cleanExpiredMetadata`.
If we rely on this invariance, which I think people are generally agreed
with relying on this invariant/it holding in the long run (Mentioned it in PR
description and didn't get any disagreements)? I think it makes sense to remove
encryption keys as part of `TableMetadata::rewriteSnapshotsInternal`.
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