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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/IGNITE-28913?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel
]
Anton Vinogradov updated IGNITE-28913:
--------------------------------------
Description:
Since actions/checkout v4.4.0 (released 2026-07-20, a backport of the v7.0.0
"pwn request" protection from the GitHub Changelog on 2026-06-18),
actions/checkout refuses by default to check out fork PR code under
pull_request_target. The floating v4/v6 tags were moved onto this backport, so
actions/checkout@v4/@v6 picked it up automatically. Every fork PR now fails at
the checkout step in commit-check.yml (all 5 jobs) and
check-protected-classes.yml.
Fix, following
https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/securely-using-pull_request_target,
splitting the two workflows by whether they execute the fork's code:
- commit-check.yml -> move back to pull_request. These jobs check out and
execute untrusted PR code (mvn/tox/dotnet) but need no secrets and no write
token, so they do not need the privileged pull_request_target context. On
pull_request the fork code runs with an unprivileged, fork-scoped GITHUB_TOKEN
and the checkout protection does not apply, so no opt-in flag is needed. This
reverts the trigger change of IGNITE-28827; the deliberate cost is that PRs
conflicting with the base branch are no longer checked. persist-credentials:
false is kept on the checkouts as hygiene.
- check-protected-classes.yml -> keep pull_request_target and set
allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true. This job needs issues/pull-requests/checks:
write to comment on and label fork PRs, so it cannot move to pull_request, but
it never executes the fork code (only inspects it via git diff/show/grep plus
trusted github-script) — exactly the case where the guide permits opt-in.
persist-credentials: false added as well.
Note: covering conflicting PRs without executing untrusted code under the
privileged token would require a pull_request build + workflow_run split; that
is out of scope here.
was:
Since actions/checkout v4.4.0 (released 2026-07-20, a backport of the v7.0.0
"pwn request" protection announced in the GitHub Changelog on 2026-06-18),
actions/checkout refuses by default to check out fork PR code in workflows
triggered by pull_request_target. The floating v4/v6 tags were moved onto this
backport, so actions/checkout@v4/@v6 picked it up automatically. The step fails
with:
Refusing to check out fork pull request code from a 'pull_request_target'
workflow. ... To opt in ... set 'allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true' on the
actions/checkout step.
As a result, every fork PR fails at the checkout step in two workflows that
intentionally use pull_request_target (so the checks also run for PRs that
conflict with the base branch):
- .github/workflows/commit-check.yml — all 5 jobs (Check java code on JDK 17,
Check .NET code, Check ducktape on codestyle/py38/py39). First failure: run
29756250450, 2026-07-20 15:40 UTC.
- .github/workflows/check-protected-classes.yml — the Rolling Upgrade check.
Timeline note: the pull_request_target trigger for commit-check.yml
(IGNITE-28827) had worked fine for fork PRs for ~7 days; the breakage was
triggered solely by the actions/checkout v4 re-release on 2026-07-20, not by
the trigger change.
Fix — re-enable the fork checkout and, since that flag knowingly re-opens
execution of untrusted PR code in a privileged context, harden the workflows at
the same time (per https://gh.io/securely-using-pull_request_target):
1. allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true on each actions/checkout step that checks
out the PR head SHA.
2. persist-credentials: false on those same checkouts, so GITHUB_TOKEN is not
written into .git/config where fork build code (mvn/tox/dotnet) could read it.
Matters most for check-protected-classes.yml, whose token has
issues/pull-requests/checks: write.
3. permissions: contents: read on sonar-branch.yml. This push-on-master job
restores a shared Maven/Sonar cache that a pull_request_target fork run can
write into (default-branch cache scope) and then runs ./mvnw install; dropping
the token from write-all to read-only bounds the blast radius of a poisoned
cache. Sonar authenticates via SONARCLOUD_TOKEN, so analysis is unaffected.
commit-check.yml already restricts the token to contents: read with no secrets
exposed, and check-protected-classes.yml never executes the fork code (only
inspects it via git diff/show/grep), so the hardening closes the remaining
abuse paths of a re-enabled fork checkout.
> GitHub Actions: run commit checks under pull_request (not
> pull_request_target), broken by actions/checkout v4.4.0
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: IGNITE-28913
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/IGNITE-28913
> Project: Ignite
> Issue Type: Task
> Reporter: Anton Vinogradov
> Assignee: Anton Vinogradov
> Priority: Major
> Time Spent: 20m
> Remaining Estimate: 0h
>
> Since actions/checkout v4.4.0 (released 2026-07-20, a backport of the v7.0.0
> "pwn request" protection from the GitHub Changelog on 2026-06-18),
> actions/checkout refuses by default to check out fork PR code under
> pull_request_target. The floating v4/v6 tags were moved onto this backport,
> so actions/checkout@v4/@v6 picked it up automatically. Every fork PR now
> fails at the checkout step in commit-check.yml (all 5 jobs) and
> check-protected-classes.yml.
> Fix, following
> https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/securely-using-pull_request_target,
> splitting the two workflows by whether they execute the fork's code:
> - commit-check.yml -> move back to pull_request. These jobs check out and
> execute untrusted PR code (mvn/tox/dotnet) but need no secrets and no write
> token, so they do not need the privileged pull_request_target context. On
> pull_request the fork code runs with an unprivileged, fork-scoped
> GITHUB_TOKEN and the checkout protection does not apply, so no opt-in flag is
> needed. This reverts the trigger change of IGNITE-28827; the deliberate cost
> is that PRs conflicting with the base branch are no longer checked.
> persist-credentials: false is kept on the checkouts as hygiene.
> - check-protected-classes.yml -> keep pull_request_target and set
> allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true. This job needs issues/pull-requests/checks:
> write to comment on and label fork PRs, so it cannot move to pull_request,
> but it never executes the fork code (only inspects it via git diff/show/grep
> plus trusted github-script) — exactly the case where the guide permits
> opt-in. persist-credentials: false added as well.
> Note: covering conflicting PRs without executing untrusted code under the
> privileged token would require a pull_request build + workflow_run split;
> that is out of scope here.
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