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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HDDS-17096?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel
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Siyao Meng updated HDDS-17096:
------------------------------
    Fix Version/s: 2.3.0
       Resolution: Fixed
           Status: Resolved  (was: Patch Available)

> Document GDPR buckets, key name visibility, Datanode replica reports and key 
> owner in THREAT_MODEL.md
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: HDDS-17096
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HDDS-17096
>             Project: Apache Ozone
>          Issue Type: Task
>          Components: documentation, Security
>            Reporter: Siyao Meng
>            Assignee: Siyao Meng
>            Priority: Major
>              Labels: pull-request-available
>             Fix For: 2.3.0
>
>
> THREAT_MODEL.md does not say what a GDPR bucket (created with 
> {{--enforcegdpr}}) guarantees, so findings about it cannot be routed to a §8 
> property or a §9 non-property. The feature is a crypto-erasure aid: the Ozone 
> shell marks keys written into such a bucket with the GDPR flag, the client 
> encrypts them with a random per-key secret that the OM stores in the key 
> metadata (in a TDE bucket the key is encrypted with TDE instead), and on 
> delete the OM removes the secret (and, in a TDE bucket, the encrypted data 
> key). It is not encryption at rest; TDE is (§8 item 6).
> Add a §9 entry stating this, including what it does not cover: the secret is 
> returned to readers of the key and has copies in the Ratis log and RocksDB 
> files until purged or compacted, in OM DB copies (checkpoints, Recon) and in 
> OM snapshots; stored blocks are not authenticated; keys written through the 
> S3 Gateway or ofs/o3fs are not marked, so they are not GDPR encrypted.
> Also add a §11a known non-finding for a recurring report class: key names 
> that are visible, despite a per-key ACL that denies READ, to a principal who 
> can list the bucket or an ancestor directory (for example through listKeys, a 
> recursive listStatus or a snapshot diff). Per-key and prefix ACLs control 
> reading and changing a key, not its visibility in those listings; S3 requests 
> with STS credentials are the exception.
> Also document that outside Ratis, SCM trusts what a Datanode reports about 
> its own replicas (replica state, BCSID, origin Datanode, size, key count), 
> which decide which replicas SCM keeps, replicates or deletes. A compromised 
> Datanode that misreports its own replicas is out of model, like one that 
> forges the data it serves. This adds a sentence to the §7 Byzantine Datanode 
> entry, a §9 entry, a §11a known non-finding ({{OUT-OF-MODEL: 
> adversary-not-in-scope}}, for reports a Datanode makes under its own 
> identity) and the matching §13 wording.
> Also document that the owner of a key, file or directory is informational: OM 
> stores the owner name that the client sends and does not check it against the 
> caller, and access checks use ACLs and the volume or bucket owner (also for 
> Ranger's \{OWNER\}), never the key's own owner. This adds a §9 entry and a 
> §11a known non-finding ({{BY-DESIGN: property-disclaimed}}).



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