venkateshwaracholan opened a new issue, #4769:
URL: https://github.com/apache/polaris/issues/4769
### Describe the bug
## Problem
The CLI currently handles `client_secret` values insecurely in profile
management commands:
* `profiles create` and `profiles update` read secrets using `input()`,
causing the secret to be visible on-screen and potentially stored in terminal
scrollback/history.
* `profiles get` prints the complete profile configuration, including the
raw `client_secret`.
* The Polaris configuration file is written using default file permissions,
which may allow unintended access by other users on the same system.
Affected locations:
* `client/python/apache_polaris/cli/command/profiles.py`
* Lines 66–70
* Lines 75–76
* Lines 124–126
* Lines 168–172
## Expected Behavior
* Secret values should be entered without echoing to the terminal.
* Displayed profile information should mask sensitive fields such as
`client_secret`.
* Configuration files containing secrets should be written with user-only
permissions (0600).
## Proposed Solution
1. Replace `input()` with `getpass.getpass()` when reading `client_secret`.
2. Introduce a helper (e.g., `format_profile_for_display()`) that masks
sensitive fields before printing profile information.
3. Write `~/.polaris/.polaris.json` using an atomic write pattern:
* Create a temporary file.
* Set permissions to `0o600`.
* Replace the existing file using `os.replace()`.
## Impact
This change improves credential security while preserving the existing
configuration schema and CLI behavior.
## Additional Context
The issue affects local credential handling and may expose secrets through
terminal output, logs, screen recordings, shared machines, or improperly
permissioned configuration files.
### To Reproduce
_No response_
### Actual Behavior
_No response_
### Expected Behavior
_No response_
### Additional context
_No response_
### System information
_No response_
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