[
https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SPARK-35132?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel
]
Yang Jie updated SPARK-35132:
-----------------------------
Description:
Three CVE problems were found after netty 4.1.51.Final:
||Name||Description||
|[CVE-2021-21409|https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21409]|Netty
is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for
rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients.
In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.61.Final there is a
vulnerability that enables request smuggling. The content-length header is not
correctly validated if the request only uses a single Http2HeaderFrame with the
endStream set to to true. This could lead to request smuggling if the request
is proxied to a remote peer and translated to HTTP/1.1. This is a followup of
GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj/CVE-2021-21295 which did miss to fix this one case. This
was fixed as part of 4.1.61.Final.|
|[CVE-2021-21295|https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21295]|Netty
is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for
rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients.
In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a
vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is
present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by
`Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the
request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an
HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`,
`HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up
to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1
this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the
content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is
forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the
Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle
requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an
example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if
all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used,
`Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and
these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been
patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by
themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the
`ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.|
|[CVE-2021-21290|https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21290]|Netty
is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for
rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients.
In Netty before version 4.1.59.Final there is a vulnerability on Unix-like
systems involving an insecure temp file. When netty's multipart decoders are
used local information disclosure can occur via the local system temporary
directory if temporary storing uploads on the disk is enabled. On unix-like
systems, the temporary directory is shared between all user. As such, writing
to this directory using APIs that do not explicitly set the file/directory
permissions can lead to information disclosure. Of note, this does not impact
modern MacOS Operating Systems. The method "File.createTempFile" on unix-like
systems creates a random file, but, by default will create this file with the
permissions "-rw-r--r--". Thus, if sensitive information is written to this
file, other local users can read this information. This is the case in netty's
"AbstractDiskHttpData" is vulnerable. This has been fixed in version
4.1.59.Final. As a workaround, one may specify your own "java.io.tmpdir" when
you start the JVM or use "DefaultHttpDataFactory.setBaseDir(...)" to set the
directory to something that is only readable by the current user.|
Upgrade netty version to avoid these potential risks
was:
Three CVE problems were found after netty 4.1.51.Final:
||Name||Description||
|[CVE-2021-21409|https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21409]|Netty
is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for
rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients.
In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.61.Final there is a
vulnerability that enables request smuggling. The content-length header is not
correctly validated if the request only uses a single Http2HeaderFrame with the
endStream set to to true. This could lead to request smuggling if the request
is proxied to a remote peer and translated to HTTP/1.1. This is a followup of
GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj/CVE-2021-21295 which did miss to fix this one case. This
was fixed as part of 4.1.61.Final.|
|[CVE-2021-21295|https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21295]|Netty
is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for
rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients.
In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a
vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is
present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by
`Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the
request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an
HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`,
`HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up
to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1
this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the
content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is
forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the
Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle
requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an
example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if
all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used,
`Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and
these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been
patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by
themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the
`ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.|
|[CVE-2021-21290|https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21290]|Netty
is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for
rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients.
In Netty before version 4.1.59.Final there is a vulnerability on Unix-like
systems involving an insecure temp file. When netty's multipart decoders are
used local information disclosure can occur via the local system temporary
directory if temporary storing uploads on the disk is enabled. On unix-like
systems, the temporary directory is shared between all user. As such, writing
to this directory using APIs that do not explicitly set the file/directory
permissions can lead to information disclosure. Of note, this does not impact
modern MacOS Operating Systems. The method "File.createTempFile" on unix-like
systems creates a random file, but, by default will create this file with the
permissions "-rw-r--r--". Thus, if sensitive information is written to this
file, other local users can read this information. This is the case in netty's
"AbstractDiskHttpData" is vulnerable. This has been fixed in version
4.1.59.Final. As a workaround, one may specify your own "java.io.tmpdir" when
you start the JVM or use "DefaultHttpDataFactory.setBaseDir(...)" to set the
directory to something that is only readable by the current user.|
> Upgrade netty-all to 4.1.61.Final
> ---------------------------------
>
> Key: SPARK-35132
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SPARK-35132
> Project: Spark
> Issue Type: Improvement
> Components: Build
> Affects Versions: 3.2.0
> Reporter: Yang Jie
> Priority: Minor
>
> Three CVE problems were found after netty 4.1.51.Final:
>
> ||Name||Description||
> |[CVE-2021-21409|https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21409]|Netty
> is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework
> for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers &
> clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.61.Final
> there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. The content-length
> header is not correctly validated if the request only uses a single
> Http2HeaderFrame with the endStream set to to true. This could lead to
> request smuggling if the request is proxied to a remote peer and translated
> to HTTP/1.1. This is a followup of GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj/CVE-2021-21295 which
> did miss to fix this one case. This was fixed as part of 4.1.61.Final.|
> |[CVE-2021-21295|https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21295]|Netty
> is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework
> for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers &
> clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final
> there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length
> header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated
> by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as
> the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an
> HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects
> (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec
> `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a
> remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy
> case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not
> the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1
> connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An
> attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from
> HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub
> Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true:
> `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used,
> `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects,
> and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has
> been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation
> by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in
> the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.|
> |[CVE-2021-21290|https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21290]|Netty
> is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework
> for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers &
> clients. In Netty before version 4.1.59.Final there is a vulnerability on
> Unix-like systems involving an insecure temp file. When netty's multipart
> decoders are used local information disclosure can occur via the local system
> temporary directory if temporary storing uploads on the disk is enabled. On
> unix-like systems, the temporary directory is shared between all user. As
> such, writing to this directory using APIs that do not explicitly set the
> file/directory permissions can lead to information disclosure. Of note, this
> does not impact modern MacOS Operating Systems. The method
> "File.createTempFile" on unix-like systems creates a random file, but, by
> default will create this file with the permissions "-rw-r--r--". Thus, if
> sensitive information is written to this file, other local users can read
> this information. This is the case in netty's "AbstractDiskHttpData" is
> vulnerable. This has been fixed in version 4.1.59.Final. As a workaround, one
> may specify your own "java.io.tmpdir" when you start the JVM or use
> "DefaultHttpDataFactory.setBaseDir(...)" to set the directory to something
> that is only readable by the current user.|
>
> Upgrade netty version to avoid these potential risks
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