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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TS-3570?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=14520198#comment-14520198
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Dave Thompson commented on TS-3570:
-----------------------------------

I didn't see expiration time check done at ATS level, because as it turns out, 
it isn't, but rather handled at the openssl level.   

Further, ATS does have a config property proxy.config.ssl.session_cache.timeout 
value, which if set I see the value I see that it gets propagated down to SSL 
layer, and to the client.   
openssl s_client -connect `hostname`:4443 -tls1
will report "TLS session ticket lifetime hint" which is set to what the ATS TLS 
server config property is set to.

Ok, so let's make this ticket a nevermind.  

> Need to implement TLS server side Session ID and Session Ticket expiration 
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: TS-3570
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TS-3570
>             Project: Traffic Server
>          Issue Type: Bug
>          Components: Security, SSL
>            Reporter: Dave Thompson
>            Assignee: Dave Thompson
>
> It appears that ATS does not track session ID/session ticket expiration.  
> This is the responsibility of the TLS server side implementation to not allow 
> resumption of prior negotiated credentials after expiration.    Because 
> time/expiration is not tracked, the upper limit as to how long a bad guy has 
> to compromise prior negotiated keys, may only be limited by cache eviction 
> from heavy traffic flow.   This situation effectively removes various 
> factoring time limits, e.g.  TLS FREAK attacks and others.
> General TLS guidelines (e.g. RFC 5246, Sec F.1.4, and predecessors) suggest 
> upper limits of 24 hours.  NIST has an independent set of guidelines that may 
> be more tailored to cipher suites.   Actual time limit should be out of scope 
> of implementation, and handled by the configuration, however ATS, should 
> honor operator set time limit.     
> First pass would not allow session re-use after time expired of initial 
> negotiations.  Better implementation, would not only not allow, but would 
> zero-out session credentials as soon as expiration time occurs, in stored 
> master/session key.



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