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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TS-4468?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=15506995#comment-15506995
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Susan Hinrichs commented on TS-4468:
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I am concerned that we would be reducing client-side session reuse in HTTP/2
case if we get too aggressive in policing SNI matching host field on new
requests.
Say the client negotiated a new TLS connection with SNI name set to
one.bob.come. It uses HTTP/2 to send a request with HOST set to one.bob.com.
Then it sends a request with HOST field set to two.bob.com. one.bob.com and
two.bob.com resolve to the same address, and the cert is a wildcard for
*.bob.com, so the client is reusing the same HTTP/2 session. If we were
stringent as [~oknet] suggests in bullet 2 we should reject that client
request, which would reduce the utility of HTTP/2.
[~jered]'s patch only adapts our reuse to meet the requirements of upstream
HTTP/1.x servers.
At most, if we decided we needed to be stringent in enforcing SNI/host matching
on client side, I would want the ability to opt out.
> http.server_session_sharing.match = both unsafe with HTTPS
> ----------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: TS-4468
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TS-4468
> Project: Traffic Server
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: HTTP, SSL
> Affects Versions: 6.1.1
> Reporter: Jered Floyd
> Assignee: Susan Hinrichs
> Fix For: 7.0.0
>
> Attachments: TS-4468.patch
>
> Time Spent: 3h 10m
> Remaining Estimate: 0h
>
> proxy.config.http.server_session_sharing.match has a default value of "both",
> which compares IP address, port, and FQDN when determining whether a
> connection can be reused for further user agent requests.
> The "host" (FQDN) matching does not behave safely when ATS is operating as a
> reverse proxy. The compared value is the origin server FQDN after mapping,
> rather than the initial "Host" target.
> If multiple Hosts map to the same origin server and the scheme is HTTPS, ATS
> will attempt to reuse a connection that may have an SNI Host that does not
> match the HTTP Host. With Apache 2.4 origin servers this results in 400 Bad
> Request to the user agent.
> PROBLEM REPRODUCTION:
> You can observe this behavior with two mapping rules such as:
> map https://example.com/ https://origin.example.com/
> map https://www.example.com/ https://origin.example.com/
> Non-caching clients alternately fetching URIs from the two targets will see
> 400 Bad Request responses intermittently.
> WORKAROUND:
> proxy.config.http.server_session_sharing.match should have a default value of
> "none" when proxy.config.reverse_proxy.enabled is "1"
> SUGGESTED FIXES:
> In order of completeness:
> 1) Do not share server sessions on reverse_proxy requests.
> 2) Do not share server sessions on reverse_proxy requests where scheme is
> HTTPS.
> 3) Compare target host (SNI host) rather than replacement host when
> determining if reuse of server session is allowed (when
> server_session_sharing.match is set to "host" or "both").
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