| Perhaps, but it needs to be clarified that such a limit must be implemented in a very specific way. Current implementations of "max stanza size" will likely not prevent this attack from being successful because it is imposed after the stanza is parsed. This attack is targeted at the streaming XML parser. As long as there is the ability to set a limit then this attack can be thwarted. Such a limiting mechanism should be implemented at the transport level, not at the session or presentation layers as currently implemented in most XMPP servers. While it would perhaps be a good idea to allow the server administrator the ability to disable this mechanism, I think that it should be enabled by default--perhaps set to 100k(an absurdly large size for a stanza). All of these recommendations would be enumerated and described in the proposed best-practice JEP. On Mar 27, 2006, at 7:22 AM, Vinod Panicker wrote:
__________________ Robert Quattlebaum Mobile: +1(650) 223-4974 eMail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] WWW: http://www.deepdarc.com/ |
- [jdev] Security-related thought experiment Robert B Quattlebaum, Jr.
- Re: [jdev] Security-related thought experim... Justin Karneges
- Re: [jdev] Security-related thought experim... Pedro Melo
- Re: [jdev] Security-related thought experim... Robert B Quattlebaum, Jr.
- Re: [Standards-JIG] Re: [jdev] Security... Robert B Quattlebaum, Jr.
- Re: [Standards-JIG] Re: [jdev] Secu... Bruce Campbell
- Re: [Standards-JIG] Re: [jdev] ... Peter Saint-Andre
