---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Eric Reeves <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, Feb 25, 2011 at 10:17 PM
Subject: “Senate Should Not Confirm Scott Gration as U.S. Ambassador to Kenya”
To: [email protected]


“Senate Should Not Confirm Scott Gration as U.S. Ambassador to Kenya”

Dissent Magazine, February 25, 2011



Eric Reeves

February 25, 2011



It is time to hold the Obama administration accountable for its
“de-coupling” of Darfur from broader negotiations with the regime in
Khartoum.  The occasion of Scott Gration’s confirmation hearing to be
the next U.S. ambassador to Kenya is especially well-timed: please let
senators know how you assess Gration’s performance, particularly on
the score of ending what the Obama administration continues to call
“genocide” in Darfur.  (See article from Dissent Magazine below or at
http://dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=453 .)



A Congressional directory for the Senate, with some staff names, can
be found at:

http://www.congress.org/congressorg/directory/congdir.tt

It’s a good idea to write to both the senators themselves and their
staff; the Senate “formula” for emails for senators and staffers is:
firstname_lastname@senator’slastname.senate.gov

(e.g., the chief of staff for John Kerry, Chair of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, is: David Wade, [email protected]

**************************************************************

Senate Should Not Confirm Scott Gration as U.S. Ambassador to Kenya

Dissent Magazine (on-line), February 25, 2011

By Eric Reeves



TWO WEEKS ago the Obama administration formally announced the
nomination of Air Force Major General (ret.) Scott Gration to be the
new U.S. ambassador to Kenya. Such a post would give him an important
role in U.S. anti-terrorism efforts, not least because the Kenyan
ambassador helps determine U.S. policy toward Somalia, another country
in the Horn of Africa in need of skilled international diplomatic
assistance.



The choice of Gration would be a major error in conducting foreign
policy in this critical East African nation, and in Africa as a whole.
Gration’s only significant diplomatic experience is his present tenure
as President Obama’s special envoy to Sudan, a position he has held
for almost two years. During that time General Gration has made
numerous serious errors of judgment, has spoken dishonestly about a
range of issues—most conspicuously about the humanitarian situation in
Darfur—and has managed to alienate the political leadership in South
Sudan, along with civil society and rebel leaders and virtually the
entire humanitarian community working in Darfur. Journalists and
researchers working in the region find him bizarrely ill-informed.



The Senate Foreign Relations Committee should not allow this
nomination to go forward.



Early Troubles



Trouble began for Gration as soon as he took office in March 2009,
shortly after Khartoum had expelled from Darfur thirteen of the
world’s most important humanitarian organizations, including the
International Rescue Committee, Save the Children US, and Doctors
Without Borders. These expulsions, along with the shutdown of three
key national humanitarian organizations, cut humanitarian capacity in
Darfur roughly in half. Under Gration’s inexperienced leadership,
there was no meaningful pushback in U.S. policy, but rather claims
that humanitarian capacity had covered, which simply did not square
with facts on the ground.



In his discussions with a brutal, canny, and viciously expedient
regime, Gration displayed an attitude that was naïve in the extreme:
“We’ve got to think about giving out cookies. Kids, countries—they
react to gold stars, smiley faces, handshakes, agreements, talk,
engagement.” Meanwhile, millions of people were denied adequate relief
in Darfur because of Khartoum’s relentless obstruction and harassment
of humanitarian personnel, and its palpable hostility toward all
international actors, including the UN-authorized peacekeeping,
UNAMID.



It is unsurprising that Gration made no progress Khartoum’s
génocidaires, given how accommodating he was determined to be. Nor did
this accommodation cease: before national elections in April
2010—universally regarded as a travesty—Gration had declared that the
elections would be “as free and fair as possible.” This was a lie, and
Gration knew it to be such. Conspicuous evidence of fraud made clear
that elections would not be representative of Sudanese political
aspirations, even in the North—and especially in Darfur. But Khartoum
certainly appreciated Gration’s comment, no doubt using it to assess
what else it could extract from the United States.



A year into his tenure, Gration had clearly begun to grow weary of the
complexities and difficulties of the Darfur peace negotiations. In
March 2010, the month before the national elections, Gration went so
far as to threaten Darfuris, bludgeoning them with the declaration
that if “a full-fledged peace agreement is not reached before Sudan
elections scheduled for mid-April [there] are going to be a lot of
things that are keeping us from focusing on Darfur….In the next two
weeks I think we are going to see a real big focus on the [national]
election. There is not going to be a lot of bandwidth to be doing
Darfur and negotiations.” It is difficult to imagine more
inappropriate diplomatic behavior, given that the regime itself had
wrought such vast human suffering and destruction in Darfur. Even if
Darfuris had coalesced around a unified leadership, there was no real
signal from the regime that it would negotiate in good faith.



Having largely given up on Darfur, in the summer of 2010 Gration
acknowledged that preparations for the January 2011 self-determination
referendum in South Sudan had fallen badly behind the schedule set by
the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Khartoum had
successfully run out almost the entire electoral clock without
allowing for necessary preparations. There was a belated U.S. lurch
into action, with a “surge” in diplomatic capacity late last summer.
Almost miraculously, the referendum for South Sudan took place on
time, though not the one stipulated for Abyei—a threatening flashpoint
that saw dangerous levels of violence before and during the
referendum.



The price for this belatedness is still being measured. Key issues
between the North and South not resolved prior to the referendum pose
a major threat to peace going forward. These include demarcation of
some 20 percent of the highly contested border, oil revenue-sharing
arrangements, citizenship and rights for Southerners in the North, a
military stand-down, the status of the enormous (and unserviceable)
external debt that the northern regime has wracked up over the years
with profligate military spending and self-enrichment, and more. There
remain far too many ways for the peace agreement to unravel before the
official date of secession, July 9, 2011.



The other cost of U.S. belatedness was Darfur. A recent assessment of
the “Darfur Peace Process” by the authoritative Small Arms Survey
reports:



In the “framework negotiations” for post-referendum arrangements that
began in Khartoum in July 2010, the NCP [the ruling National Congress
Party in Khartoum] has made clear that it would set the price of
Southern secession very high, and part of that price would be
limitations on the international community’s role in and access to the
North.



“Access to the North” includes most specifically access to Darfur.
Indeed, Khartoum was quite explicit about the deal it felt had been
struck:



Foreign Minister Ali Karti said on Wednesday [January 26, 2011], “The
Sudanese have fulfilled an essential obligation. As far as world
expectations go, we have delivered and thus our commitment to peace
should never be in question.” “Normalization of relations should not
be held hostage by Darfur.”



The United States, under General Gration, has accepted these terms of
engagement. In August the Obama administration went along with
Gration’s decision to “de-emphsize” Darfur; in November a senior
administration official declared that Darfur was being “de-coupled”
from negotiations with Khartoum about its status as a
terrorism-sponsoring nation. “Negotiating” a country’s removal from
the terrorism-sponsor list sets a terrible precedent, yet this was not
the first time Gration had politicized the terrorism designation: in
his July 2009 testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Gration declared, “There’s no evidence in our intelligence community
that supports [Sudan] being on the state sponsors of terrorism. It’s a
political decision.”



This is not what he would tell Darfuris in September 2009. Rather,
when pressed about his Senate testimony, Gration declared in an
interview with Radio Dabanga (an increasingly important news
clearinghouse for Darfur), “I never said we should remove Sudan from
the terrorist list.” This seems rather disingenuous, given his claim
that Sudan remains on the list only because of a purely “political
decision” that Gration insists is not supported by evidence from “our
intelligence community.”



But is this even true? More consequential than what Gration did say is
what he did not say in his Senate testimony. Notably, the most
recently published State Department assessment of international
terrorism (August 2010) finds that “al-Qa’ida-inspired terrorist
elements as well as elements of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and
HAMAS, remained in Sudan in 2009.” So what to make of Gration’s claim
of July 2009 that there is “no evidence in our intelligence community”
that Khartoum supports terrorism? The presence of these terrorist
organizations certainly required the willingness of the Khartoum
regime. Moreover, as the Guardian reported late last year based on
“Wikileaked” State Department cables,  “In March 2009, Jordan and
Egypt were informed by the U.S. of new Iranian plans to ship a cargo
of ‘lethal military equipment’ to Syria with onward transfer to Sudan
and then to Hamas.”



Hamas is considered a terrorist organization by Canada, the European
Union, Japan, and the United States. So Gration’s testimony was either
deceptive or ignorant. Both are dismaying possibilities.



The Final Betrayal



On February 8, at a joint news conference with Ali Karti, Khartoum’s
foreign minister, Gration offered his overall assessment of the
situation in Darfur. Ali Karti was not an especially auspicious
companion for the occasion: he is a ruthless, hard-line Islamist
within the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime.
During the 1990s, he served as coordinator and leader of the Popular
Defense Forces, “Janjaweed-equivalent” during Khartoum’s jihad against
the South and Nuba.



At the conference, according to a Reuters report,



...Gration praised government cooperation with UN peacekeepers
(UNAMID) in Darfur and defended the Sudanese Humanitarian Aid
Commission’s restrictions on aid agencies. “The Government of Sudan
has taken great steps to lift restrictions on UNAMID,” he said. “We’ve
seen great improvement of access for UNAMID and for the international
NGOs.”



The evidence proves otherwise.



According to another Reuters report, dated February 14, “Workers from
four humanitarian organisations, who asked not to be named, told
Reuters there had been a recent increase in travel restrictions and
worsening security conditions.” The Institute for War and Peace
Reporting, in a study released in Jaunary, wrote that “UN and
diplomatic sources who spoke to IWPR say Khartoum is deliberately
undermining humanitarian efforts.” And in a January 28, 2011 report on
access for humanitarians and UNAMID, Human Rights Watch declared:



Sudan has continued to restrict UN and humanitarian agencies from
accessing conflict-affected areas, including Tabit, the site of the
January 25 clash. The government also still bars access to much of
eastern Jebel Mara where, since early 2010, government forces and
militias have clashed with the SLA faction led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur,
and attacked civilians from the majority Fur ethnicity. Humanitarian
agencies have also been denied access from the Wada'a and Khazan Jedid
areas, between North and South Darfur.... The UN-African Union Mission
in Darfur (UNAMID) was unable to access most of the areas affected by
violence, despite its mandate to protect civilians under imminent
threat of physical violence.



UNAMID itself constantly reports, to no avail, obstructions of its
mission. In a January 30 press release, the peacekeeping force stated,
“Two UNAMID patrols from the Mission’s Graida [South Darfur] team
site, located 100 kilometers south of Nyala, South Darfur, were denied
access yesterday by Sudanese Government Forces at two different check
points.”



Such lack of access has contributed to worsening humanitarian
conditions. According to a not yet released Tufts University study of
humanitarian conditions in Darfur, “international humanitarian
capacities have been seriously eroded and impaired to a point that
leaves Darfuris in a more vulnerable position now than at any other
time since the counterinsurgency operations and forced displacements
in 2003 and early 2004.” IWPR and Radio Dabanga chronicled the
ghastly, if predictable, human consequences:



One camp leader told IWPR and Radio Dabanga, “There is a big shortage
in the food supply, and this is affecting children. Babies who depend
on their mothers breastfeeding are suffering mostly because their
mothers don’t have enough food, and in turn they are not getting
enough milk.” Medical workers in the camps say that clinics for
children have been shut down since the expulsion of NGOs, and that
medical supplies, as well as food, are subject to delays at the hands
of the government. “There were special centres to treat malnourished
children in camps, but they’ve been shut down and there are now
hundreds of children who are malnourished and need urgent help,”
another camp leader said. [Khartoum-based lawyer Salih] Osman said
that inside the camps millions are in severe need. “I’ve been there,
and I can assure you that children and women and elderly people have
started to die due to the absence of basic needs like medicine,” he
said.



In Jebel Marra, a region in central Darfur that Khartoum has denied
humanitarian relief for over a year, a government bombing campaign
initiated in August has “forced tens of thousands of civilians to
flee, mostly to rebel-controlled areas that the government has made
off-limits to UN and humanitarian organisations.” On February 14,
Médecins du Monde, one of the last humanitarian organizations still
serving in Jebel Marra was not simply denied access but formally
expelled from Darfur by Khartoum’s officials. Several days earlier
Radio Dabanga had reported:



At least twelve staff workers of Médecins du Monde working in central
Darfur, have been arrested [by Khartoum officials] today in Nyala. Two
international staff members fled the scene and are in hiding at the
compound of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs. According to a police source, the staff workers are accused
for collaborating with the rebel leader of the Sudan Liberation
Movement (SLM), Abdel Wahid al Nur.



The obstruction of UN agencies has been just as consequential,
according to another Radio Dabanga report:



The World Food Program stopped distribution of monthly food rations to
Hamadiya displaced camp in Zalingei yesterday [February 1] after
receiving threats. Staff received orders from their safety and
security department that gunmen had threatened to attack the WFP
office in Zalingei. Radio Dabanga learnt that staff involved in the
planned distribution were withdrawn. Consequently, the distribution of
relief to the displaced, which began yesterday in Hamidiya Camp, was
stopped. Program staff and officials were prevented [by Khartoum
officials] from going to their offices today in Zalingei. For their
part, displaced people in Zalingei reacted with fear that the World
Food Programme would suddenly halt distribution of food.



Less than a month earlier, according to Radio Dabanga, “An
unidentified armed group...opened heavy fire on the headquarters of a
distribution point of the World Food Programme (WFP) in Darfur.... A
refugee source argued that the attack was linked to the speech of
President Al-Bashir during his visit to Nyala, when he said that
Darfur does not need any camps or relief.”  The regime and its agents
have used such tactics with increasing frequency since the summer of
2010, especially in West Darfur: engineering threats of armed attacks
against relief organizations, forcing them either to shut down of
their own accord or to be expelled for their own “safety.” Catholic
Relief Services, a large and important humanitarian presence in West
Darfur, faced such intimidation:



More than a dozen Catholic Relief Services aid workers were evacuated
from a remote area of Western Darfur to the Sudanese capital of
Khartoum January 21 with the help of the United Nations after
receiving “indications of threats.” In all, 13 international and
national aid workers were escorted out...at the request of Sudanese
officials, John Rivera, CRS director of communications, said from the
agency’s Baltimore headquarters. “We have heard reports of accusations
regarding our work in Darfur,” Rivera said in a statement. “We have
not received an official notification about this from the government
of Sudan.”



There is yet another way in which relief workers are denied: by
blocking the release of essential humanitarian information and
reports. In response to intimidation and threats by Khartoum
officials, the UN has suppressed data and analyses representing
humanitarian conditions in Darfur. These extraordinary actions have
been frankly admitted by Nils Kastberg, head of UNICEF for Darfur:
“Sometimes it is security services that hinder access or delay access,
sometimes it is the humanitarian affairs office that delays the
release of nutritional surveys. Sometimes it is delays in granting
permissions and visas. It is different sections of different
institutions which interfere in our work.” According to the unreleased
Tufts report,



Crucial information about the humanitarian situation is lacking. There
are serious issues with the proper validation of the nutrition survey
reports and their immediate release—without such data neither the
government nor the international community can properly understand the
severity of the humanitarian situation or the efficacy of the
response. (emphasis added)



Ambassador Gration?



Given all this, how could U.S. special envoy Gration, only weeks ago,
declare that “We’ve seen great improvement of access for UNAMID and
for the international NGOs”? The vast chasm between Gration’s words
and the reality in Darfur should give the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee great pause in considering Gration’s nomination for a new
ambassadorial post.



It is not Gration’s responsibility as U.S. special envoy to Sudan to
play the role of the UN Under-secretary for Humanitarian Affairs in
Darfur. But his role must certainly include speaking honestly about
humanitarian realities as they exist, not as is convenient for
obtaining a diplomatic post. In responding to the acute suffering of
innocent civilians, he falls well short of what we have a right to
expect of our representatives abroad. Gration’s consistent missteps,
miscalculations, and disingenuousness make him unfit to be ambassador
to Kenya. The Obama administration should withdraw its nomination. In
the absence of such withdrawal, the Senate should vote against his
confirmation.



[Eric Reeves has published extensively on Sudan, nationally and
internationally, for more than a decade.  He is author of A Long Day’s
Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide.]

_____________________________
Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063

[email protected]
413-585-3326
www.sudanreeves.org

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