Uganda elections: ‘An exercise in shame-faced endorsement’
J. Oloka-Onyango
2011-03-02, Issue 519
http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/71329

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cc D UIs Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni beating the same fateful
path as Ben Ali, Mubarak and Gaddafi? J. Oloka-Onyango analyses
Museveni’s latest election victory.
When the lithe, 42-year-old guerilla leader Yoweri Kaguta Museveni
(‘M7’ or ‘Ssevo’ to his supporters) emerged from a five-year ‘bush’
war to claim the presidency of Uganda in 1986, few observers gave him
much of a chance. Many questioned whether he had the credentials to
lead such a fractious, decimated and demoralised population out of the
doldrums.

Twenty-five years later, Museveni remains at the helm of Ugandan
politics and on 18 February 2011 he received yet another endorsement
in an election that extends his term until 2016. By that time,
Museveni will be 72 years old, and at 30 years in power will have long
since entered the record books as East Africa’s longest-serving
leader, outstripping both the late Julius Kambarage Nyerere of
Tanzania and Kenyan ex-President Daniel arap Moi.

But it will also be the time to ask whether his legacy will be that of
the former Tanzanian president, who left office still revered and
loved, or that of a figure of tragedy and hatred like Moi? Indeed, as
North Africa witnesses the collapse of long-term dictatorships from
Tunisia to Libya, it is necessary to inquire how it is that Museveni
won the 18 February election, and what lessons this has for political
struggle and freedom on the continent.

Drawing on Libya for comparison is particularly apt since Museveni has
long been an ally of President Muammar Abu Minyar al Gaddafi. In one
of many trips to Kampala, the eccentric and now beleaguered leader
urged Museveni to stay in office for life, arguing that
revolutionaries are not like company managing directors.

It is a lesson Museveni took to heart, removing presidential term
limits from the Constitution in 2005, and setting himself well on the
way to a de facto life presidency.

So what explains Museveni’s February victory, especially given that
while largely predicted, the margin by which he won – 68 per cent of
the presidential vote and 75 per cent for his National Resistance
Movement (NRM) in the parliamentary poll - stunned many. This margin
should be compared with the three previous elections in 1996 (when he
won with 75 per cent), in 2001 (69 per cent) and in 2006 (59 per
cent).

According to the pundits, while still popular, dominant and thus
likely to win, the downward trend would continue. Some even predicted
that there would be a run-off because the 50.1 per cent margin would
not be reached in the first round. The other issue of surprise was the
relative calm and lack of violence that attended the election. Most
foreign observers - from the European Union to the US government -
described the vote as generally peaceful, free of bloodshed and (in
the usual parlance of those who have emerged as the guardians of
African electoral politics) largely a ‘free and genuine’ expression of
the wishes of the Ugandan people.[1]

The local media described it as the most boring poll in recent Ugandan
history, lacking as it did much of the drama, intrigue and
confrontation that Ugandans had become accustomed to. It is thus not
surprising that Museveni’s rap song - ‘Give Me My Stick/You Want
Another Rap?’ - garnered more attention than the substantive issues at
stake.

To fully comprehend the outcome of Uganda’s recent poll, it is
necessary to understand a number of basic facts. The first is that
Uganda is yet to become a functioning multiparty democracy. For the
first nineteen years of Museveni rule, the country operated a
‘no-party’ or ‘movement’ system of government, which was little better
than a single-party state. Under that system, government and party
institutions overlapped right from the lowest level of government
(resistance or local councils) through to Parliament. Indeed, in many
respects, Museveni took a leaf from Gaddafi’s popular councils,
creating these ‘LCs’ as supposedly representative of ‘grassroots’
democracy, but essentially a cover for single-party dominance. Today,
many of the no-party structures remain intact and operative. They
function as the main conduits of political mobilisation and for the
channeling of state resources, buttressed by a massive local
bureaucracy of government agents and spies.

Of course the fact of incumbency guarantees Museveni unfettered access
to state coffers, such that the NRM reportedly spent US$350 million in
the campaign, testimony to the benefits that come with office. The
enduring image of the past several months has been the President
handing out brown envelopes stashed with cash for various women, youth
and other types of civic groupings.

The other reason for Museveni’s victory lies in the highly militarised
context within which politics and governance in Uganda is executed.
Following five years of civil war (1981 to 1986), and 20-plus years of
insurgency in the north of the country, Uganda has never been free
from conflict. Unsurprisingly, the idea of peace and security loom
large within the national psyche. For older Ugandans there is fear of
earlier and more chaotic times, while for the younger generation who
have only experienced Museveni, the claim that he has restored peace
has a particular resonance. Ironically, both groups also fear that if
Museveni lost an election, he would never accept the result, and
instead would either return to the bush or cause such instability that
it is not worth it to even think about an alternative candidate. This
explains what to many is the most surprising outcome of the election:
Museveni’s victory in Northern Uganda despite facing two
‘sons-of-the-soil’, ex-diplomat Olara Otunnu and the youthful Norbert
Mao.

The looming presence of the military also explains why the turnout for
the election at 59 per cent was much lower than any of the previous
three polls, where figures were closer to 70 per cent. Many people
simply stayed at home, partly out of apathy, but more on account of
the fact that the streets of Kampala and other parts of the country
were swamped with military personnel. More akin to the army in Libya
than in Egypt, the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force (UPDF) is not reputed
to exercise restraint when dealing with civilian insurrection or
politically-motivated opposition.

Museveni’s performance in the North reflects the other side to the
story, and that is the fact that Museveni is only as good as the
opposition he faces. The dismal performance of the opposition is
attributable to a host of factors, not least of which is the fact that
there are really no opposition parties in Uganda. Rather, there are
only opposition personalities - epitomised by three-time presidential
contender Kizza Besigye of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), who
have constructed around themselves weak or non-existent party
structures that only come to life in the run up to the election.

Uganda’s opposition is also bereft of firm ideological positions, and
while the death of ideology is an ailment affecting the ruling NRM
too, its absence among the opposition has proven particularly harmful
as there is a lack of a central organising message around which the
opposition can translate obvious disgust and support against Museveni
into electoral victory. Thus, at the start of the election season, the
opposition wavered between a united front against Museveni or a
boycott, citing the bias of the Electoral Commission and the un-level
playing field.

Neither option was adopted, and at the end of the day all major
opposition parties decided to field candidates in both the
presidential and parliamentary elections, while decrying the
inequality in the contest. Nevertheless, Besigye assured his
supporters of both victory and of the ability to protect his vote in
the event of an NRM poll-rigging, a show of bravado on which he was
unable to deliver.

However, UPC candidate Olara Otunnu took the cake by failing to show
up to cast his vote on election day in a classic example of the
ailments afflicting the opposition. At the end of the day, while
Museveni’s victory is not much of a surprise, and in the short run
ensures the continued charade of economic and political stability that
has characterised the last two decades, it portends considerable
apprehension for the future of the country.

While the President has dismissed comparisons with the fallen
dictators of North Africa, there are indeed many parallels. The state
in Uganda has assumed what can only be described as a ‘Musevenist’
character, such that an election such as the recent one can only be an
exercise in shame-faced endorsement of the incumbent. That state has
also devolved to a situation in which there is little to distinguish
between the personal and the political, and where it is increasingly
being marked by the growth of family/personal rule. While Museveni has
only one son (in comparison to Gaddafi’s seven), Muhoozi Kainerugaba
is clearly being groomed for greater things. Thus, he has taken charge
of the Special Presidential Brigade, the elite force designed to
guarantee his father’s personal security, and he recently wrote a book
about the bush war to burnish his credentials as an
intellectual-cum-soldier able to fit into his father’s rather large
shoes.

This is clearly the same path that Ben Ali, Mubarak and Gaddafi
pursued, only to find themselves thwarted by the movement of the
people. While it may be true that revolutionaries don’t retire, if
there is no other lesson of the recent Northern African upheavals, it
is that revolutionaries can be forced to resign. It is all simply a
matter of time.

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* Professor J. Oloka-Onyango is director of the Human Rights & Peace
Centre at the Faculty of 
Law, Makerere University.
* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at
Pambazuka News.

NOTES:

[1] To its credit, it was only the African Union (AU) that declined
outright to describe the poll as ‘free and fair.’


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Readers' Comments
Let your voice be heard. Comment on this article.

Ugandans were simply robbed again!!

In Aug. 1985, the NRA rebels looted the Kabale branch of the Bank of
Uganda, with the help of an insider in Bank of Uganda called Joy
Kasirimbi. It was 400million Uganda shillings in cash. The NRA leaders
Salim Saleh and Musa Kigongo, while addressing a public rally in Fort
Portal in Aug. 1985, told the crowd that once they took power, the NRA
would re-fund this 400m shillings to the government of Uganda.We are
still waiting!!

Joseph

Commenting on 'The looming presence of the military also explains why
the turnout for the election at 59 per cent was much lower than any of
the previous three polls..', I do not think Ugandans were scared of
the military per se. They were more afraid of the anticipated post
election violence by goons belonging to various political groups
reminiscent of the September 2009 riots.

Stephen York University

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