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From: Eric Reeves <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, Mar 16, 2011 at 6:36 AM
Subject: In Sudan: Documents released today by the SPLM are clearly authentic
To: [email protected]


In Sudan: Documents released today by the SPLM are clearly authentic



Eric Reeves

March 15, 2011

http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article316.html



The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) this past week formally
suspended talks with the National Islamic Front/National Congress
Party (NIF/NCP) regime in Khartoum.  This creates a highly dangerous
situation, and would not have occurred without extreme provocation.
And in fact, the suspension was precipitated by ongoing
regime-sponsored violence in the South, particularly Jonglei and Upper
Nile States.  The apparent tipping point was very recent violence on
the part of renegade militia leader George Athor, who is responsible
for a series of extremely brutal attacks in Jonglei, and an assault
this past Saturday (March 12) on Malakal, capital of Upper Nile, by
another renegade leader, Commander Olony. Further, the highly reliable
Small Arms Survey (March 13) confirms SPLM claims that the guerilla
leader Gabriel Tang Gatwich, known as Gabriel Tanginya (“Tang”), has
moved from Northern Sudan to Jonglei, in the same general area of
operations as Athor.  The brutal Tang, who has been a Major General in
the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), was twice sent to Malakal by Khartoum as
a deliberate provocation (2006 and 2009), resulting in large-scale
clashes and much loss of life (see Human Rights Watch report).



If there is a larger Southern hand behind these actions, especially
those of the Shilluk Commander Olony, it is Lam Akol—a long-time paid
supporter of Khartoum, and a fully discredited Southern politician,
who continues to trade brazenly on his Shilluk tribal identity.  One
of the documents released today confirms the delivery of weapons and
ammunition to “friendly forces” in the South, and specifically notes
Athor and Akol.  (For a detailed account of Akol’s role in the recent
attack on Malakal, see Sudan Tribune, March 15, 2011.)



This documentary evidence—originating from within Khartoum’s Sudan
Armed Forces (SAF) [1]—clearly reveals the regime’s continuing
military support for such warlords and destructive political elements
during the Interim Period following the signing of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (2005).  The documents (in Arabic) were widely
circulated today and may be readily obtained; all available evidence
dictates that they must be regarded as authentic.  Preeminent within
this body of evidence is the extraordinary record of lies and
dishonored agreements that define the regime’s relations with all
Sudanese parties and with the international community.  It is a record
that now extends over more than twenty years.



During this time the South has been continually victimized by the
regime’s use of proxy military forces.  For despite Khartoum’s regular
denials, the evidence of such actions in aggregate is
overwhelming—despite the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and despite
Khartoum’s professing that it has accepted the virtually unanimous
Southern vote for secession and independence (February 2011).  A
number of examples of demonstrable mendacity are offered below; the
list could be extended almost indefinitely.  The SPLM leadership is
now persuaded that the regime will not negotiate in good faith if it
is both lying about its continuing support for renegade elements like
Athor, as well as lying about its commitment to the Abyei Protocol and
the ruling on Abyei by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (July 2009).



The world has too often responded to situations such as the present
one with what amounts to a disingenuous agnosticism or moral
equivalence—giving equal weight to the statements by Khartoum and by
the SPLM, even when the past argues strongly against crediting any
statement made by the regime in a matter of dispute.  This habitual
agnosticism has encouraged the long history of fully demonstrable
mendacity by the regime, and leaves these brutal men to believe that
they may dismiss the current SPLM documentary evidence as mere
“forgeries.”



But such a claim makes no sense either on its own terms, or in the
present negotiating context, or within the broader history of lies in
which this dismissal takes its place.  Logic alone should settle the
matter: why would the SPLM negotiate with Khartoum by releasing forged
documents, which both they and the regime would know to be forged?
Such an act would make Khartoum less rather than more disposed to
negotiate the outstanding North/South issues that matter most to the
SPLM, and over which the leadership has shown deeply impressive
restraint to date: border demarcation and delineation, external debt,
citizenship for Southerners in the North, oil revenue-sharing, and
above all, Abyei.



These are vital interests for the people of the South and the SPLM;
they simply would not risk the consequences of attempting to use
forged documents as a negotiating ploy with highly doubtful prospects
for any sort of success.  Nor would they risk being discovered as
authors of forgeries: this would squander a reputation for honesty
that, if not perfect, puts them in a position of enormous strength
vis-à-vis the regime.  A good example here is the commitment by the
SPLM to abide by the “final and binding” ruling on Abyei by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (July 2009).  Khartoum of course made
the same commitment but is clearly violating the terms of that ruling,
as well as those of the Abyei Protocol—pushing for yet more territory
in northern Abyei.  Their strategy has been to mobilize the Misseriya
Arabs on the basis of lies about the future of their grazing rights in
the region—rights consistently recognized and guaranteed by the SPLM.
Even more dangerously, the regime is now poised to seize Abyei
militarily as a basis for “re-negotiating” the region’s final status.



Another example is Khartoum’s denial of a bombing attack this past
December on Southern military and civilian targets—an attack that was
subsequently confirmed by UN observers and an Associated Press
journalist (an earlier bombing was acknowledged only as a “mistake,” a
highly dubious claim).  An extraordinarily consequential action—aerial
attack on civilian and military targets in the South during the run-up
to the self-determination referendum—was denied, even as the denial
was a demonstrable lie.



The contents of the documents as reported today comport all too well
with what we know of Khartoum’s history: they are internal memoranda
confirming the regime’s longstanding efforts to de-stabilize the South
by proxy forces.  A couple of examples are particularly telling:



[1]  “One document dated August 2009 and signed by Defense Minister
Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein said that because of leakage of the north’s
alleged involvement with the militias, ‘the armament operations to be
stopped for the time being, for the armament to resume later through
intelligence.’ In response to that message, the head of the military
intelligence sent a document to a military leader in Kosti asking for
weapons and ammunition to be handed to friendly forces ‘in a secretive
and obscure manner’ in Heglig in Southern Kordofan state and Daeen in
South Darfur state.” (Bloomberg, March 15, 2011)



[2]  “Athor first took up arms against the government after he lost a
state election in April.  These documents allegedly show the Sudanese
government started arming Athor in May 2010, a month after he lost the
state election.  ‘Regarding Athor’s agent, the aforementioned was
handed the second shipment of weapons and ammunition,’ reads another
document dated May 2010, from the military in Kosti, the capital of
White Nile, a northern state bordering the south.” (Bloomberg, March
15, 2011)



[3]  “One of the documents appears to be a letter dated May 18, 2010,
and signed by a military commander in the northern city of Kosti that
reports that a delivery of weapons and ammunition had just been given
to an Athor agent. Another, dated Sept. 22, 2010, is from the head of
northern military intelligence requesting permission to arm Lam Akol,
a senior opposition figure, and other ‘friendly forces.’ A
corresponding reply the next day grants the request.” (McClatchy News
[dateline: Khartoum], March 15, 2011)



[4]  “The SPLM also claim that a letter dated November 14, 2009, shows
that the NCP leadership instructed all telecommunication companies
operating in the north to intercept all phone calls of some key SPLM
figures. Their phones numbers were listed in the confidential letter.
Another document, dated August 27, 2009 from the north’s defense
ministry called for the establishment of a ‘security committee’ to
oversee the NCP’s alleged plan to destabilize South Kordofan and Blue
Nile, which are in north Sudan but are home to groups which fought
with the SPLM during the civil war that ended in 2005.” (Sudan
Tribune, March 15, 2011)



Evidence confirming the import of these documents comes from other
sources as well.  For example, last August the Sudan People’s
Liberation Army (SPLA) captured in Upper Nile State a Khartoum-bound
helicopter containing a number of Athor’s men, including his third in
command.  The Sudan Tribune reported (August 10, 2010):



“South Sudan said it has impounded a Khartoum-destined cargo
helicopter carrying men loyal to George Athor, the man behind a
rebellion against the government of the semi-autonomous region. The
ruling party in southern Sudan, SPLM, accused ‘quarters in northern
Sudan of supporting the renegade general in order to destabilize the
south.’”



The dispatch continues:



“Intelligence sources in Jonglei state, speaking on condition of
anonymity to Sudan Tribune, said that ‘the former commissioner of Pigi
county, James Yhor, and other senior Athor’s military men were the
ones found in the helicopter.’ The sources further added that the
detained rebels were wounded and heading for hospital in northern
Sudan to receive medical treatment.”



Predictably, though the incident was also confirmed by U.S. government
intelligence, Khartoum simply dismissed the incident (“false
accusations”) in much the same way it dismissed the documents released
today.



There is also earlier evidence of Khartoum’s moving weapons and
ammunition to the South.  For example, The Telegraph (UK) reported
from Malakal (August 15, 2009):



“The claim of a ‘hidden [Northern] hand’ behind at least some of the
killing is supported by independent evidence. A ship recently arrived
in Malakal having travelled up the Nile from Khartoum. A 30-year-old
man, who saw the vessel being searched, told the Sunday Telegraph that
it contained Kalashnikov assault rifles and ammunition, hidden beneath
a cargo of food. Another 20-year-old man said the national army had
tried to recruit him for a monthly salary of £200. Those who sought to
entice him said they had been ordered to sign up 400 southerners in
Malakal alone.” (The Telegraph [dateline: Malakal], August 15, 2009)



The Khartoum regime for years denied that it supported the maniacal
and brutally destructive Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) of Joseph Kony.
But as the International Crisis Group reported in a January 11, 2006
briefing paper: “Khartoum now admits that the LRA was given sanctuary
and logistical support as part of a destabilization strategy and
scorched earth campaign against Sudanese civilians.”



There is very strong circumstantial evidence that Khartoum continues
to assist the LRA.



IMPLICATIONS



If the international community will simply look honestly at the
evidence in hand and at the record of pronouncements by the SPLM and
the NIF/NCP regime, assessing the authenticity of the documents
released today is hardly a strenuous exercise.  The documents are
clearly authentic; Khartoum’s claim that they are mere forgeries is
yet another expedient lie in an extremely long line.  Insofar as the
international community—including the African Union, the UN, the EU,
and the United States—wishes to aid in negotiations in bringing the
present dangerously tense situation to resolution, it must accept that
there are not two truths being told today—only one.  To accept
Khartoum’s lies as in any way plausible is the surest way to encourage
the regime to believe it can continue without consequence its
mendacity and its concerted and conspicuously well-funded efforts to
de-stabilize the South.



Agnosticism about the source of these documents—given their enormous
implications—is simply not a reasonable diplomatic posture.  If
adopted, it will make renewed war more likely, not less.



**********************

Footnote:



[1]  A highly authoritative source familiar with the documents has
indicated to me that the SAF officers who leaked this information to
the Southern leadership were discovered and subsequently executed by
Khartoum.  This would account for the precipitous end to the
documentation the SPLM has provided. (email received March 15, 2011)



_____________________________
Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063

[email protected]
413-585-3326
www.sudanreeves.org

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