How to defeat South Sudan militias? Article Comments (1) Email PrintSave --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By Steve Paterno April 21, 2011 — It has always been expected that the regime in Khartoum, in one shape or form, will continue to undermine the new emerging nation of South Sudan. Evidences on this are in plenty. One way of Khartoum’s attempts to undermine South Sudan nation is the use of proxy militia forces to wage wars in the South. Some of these militias are already propped up in the Upper Nile region, particularly in Jongolei, Unity and Upper Nile States. The activities of these militias in the region already caused hundreds of death, displacement of populations, and humanitarian catastrophe. There are certain factors related to these militia, which make them deadly and a force to be reckoned with. Their activities can have a long term implications on the survival of South Sudan. Two of the militia groups are led by high ranking military officers who have extensive experience in combat operations. Major Gen. Peter Gadet, who is currently leading the militia in Unity State is arguably among the most skillful fighters in South Sudan. Gadet spent more than a decade leading a parallel war of his own in Unity State, where he constantly switched allegiances between the SPLA and the Khartoum’s armed forces. During the war, he was single handedly responsible for the disruptions of oil productions in the region. The death of the two senior founders of SPLM/A, Kerubino Kwanyin Bol and William Nyuon are linked to him. Lt. Gen. George Athor Deng has also had a successful military career. He spent his time in SPLM/A war of liberation as a zonal commander, fighting both the Khartoum armed forces and the militias in Upper Nile region. He went on to become the deputy chief of staff of SPLA, under the government of South Sudan, until he resigned his post, where he ran as unsuccessful gubernatorial candidate for Jongolei State. There is no doubt that all the militia elements have loyalists, actively serving in the government of South Sudan, both in the military and political arena. The fact that some of the SPLA operations against these militia targets are botched, are indications that messages about these operations might have possibly been relied to the militias from those within the SPLA ranks and files. It is also troubling to see political leadership divided on what measures to take in dealing with this militia menace. Worse yet, some from within the political arena are joining ranks with the militias. And another yet troubling sign is that there are those South Sudanese, not necessary members of the militias, but disapprove of the government of South Sudan performance who are generally sympathizing with the plight of these militias. All of these militias are operating under their tribal areas, where loyalties are very high, which boost the moral as well as serve as recruiting grounds. This also means that the militias will survive longer in these areas. In the long run, the militias will be able to disrupt the lifeline of South Sudan economy, the oil industry, since most of their activities are centered in oil producing areas. This will result into South facing challenges in drilling new oil fields, building its own refineries, or even construct oil transportation route Southwards, as the new nation intends to target East African markets and ports for a new line of exports. Such will create an ideal situation for the regime in Khartoum to rig big benefits from South Sudan oil output, because Khartoum will continue to refine and transport the oil produce in the South, and at a whim, gives South Sudan share of its revenues what Khartoum deems is necessary, perhaps the lowest percentage ever. People in Khartoum will have their work cut out for them cheaply, with the mere activities of few sponsored tribal militias. In order to be successful in its operations against the militias, the SPLA needs to conduct most of its operations in secrecy, with only few people who are in the need-to-know to be informed. Application of intelligence and counter-intelligence must play bigger roles in these operations. The SPLA must adopt a containment strategy, where the militias are confined in certain areas to deny them access to the civil population, cut them of supply routes, and stop them from carrying out successful operations. The differences among these militia groups must be exploited to the fullest extend. For example, the two top militia leaders, Major Gen. Peter Gadet and Lt. Gen. George Athor Deng will likely not collaborate between themselves as much as people think. There are several reasons for this and one of which is that neither one of them will allow himself to be commanded by the other. The leadership in Juba must quickly come up with strong measures in addressing the situation as oppose to them being divided on the issue or being oblivious about it. The prevailing sentiment of sympathy toward the cause of these militias among those South Sudanese who are frustrated with performances of their government will eventually spill trouble, therefore, to reverse the course, there need to be major reforms in the government to address some of the grievances being raised by the South Sudanese citizens. It is time now that the SPLM leadership stop complaining about Khartoum, but rather devise its own strategy in countering the actions of the regime in Khartoum. The SPLM leadership needs to tell Khartoum in no uncertain terms that there are SPLM as well as SPLA in the Northern Sudan, particularly in Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. These veterans can be activated if needs be to carry both political and military wars, directly at Khartoum. There are also the natural allies of SPLM at Darfur and Eastern Sudan, whom the SPLM is capable of supporting to mount a successful political and military wars against the regime in Khartoum. Khartoum should not be allowed a monopoly of waging proxy wars. One of the first international acts, the new nation of South Sudan must undertake is to be a signatory of International Criminal Court (ICC), a body that has no boundaries in prosecuting individuals who commit war atrocities. Along with such international deterrence, South Sudan should not tolerate the notion that if one has grievances within South Sudan, the best option is to pick up arms, kill, and then negotiate. Such move must be considered crime of highest order, treason. Steve Paterno is the author of The Rev. Fr. Saturnino Lohure, A Romain Catholic Priest Turned Rebel. He can be reached at [email protected] -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "JFD info" group. 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