---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: John Ashworth <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, May 10, 2011 at 5:19 PM
Subject: [sudan-john-ashworth] Fwd: When others are grabbing their land
To: Group <[email protected]>


The surge in land deals

When others are grabbing their land

Evidence is piling up against acquisitions of farmland in poor countries

The Economist | May 5th 2011 | from the print edition
http://www.economist.com/node/18648855?story_id=18648855

THE farmers of Makeni, in central Sierra Leone, signed the contract
with their thumbs. In exchange for promises of 2,000 jobs, and
reassurances that the bolis (swamps where rice is grown) would not be
drained, they approved a deal granting a Swiss company a 50-year lease
on 40,000 hectares of land to grow biofuels for Europe. Three years
later 50 new jobs exist, irrigation has damaged the bolis and such
development as there has been has come “at the social, environmental
and economic expense of local communities”, says Elisa Da Vià of
Cornell University.

When deals like this first came to international attention in 2009, it
was unclear whether they were “land grabs or development
opportunities”, to quote a study published that year. Supporters
claimed they would bring seeds, technology and capital to some of the
world’s poorest lands. Critics, such as the director of the UN’s Food
and Agriculture Organisation, dubbed them “neo-colonialist”. But no
one had hard evidence to back up their claims. Now they do. Two years
on, a conference at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) of the
University of Sussex, the biggest of its kind so far, examined over
100 land deals. Most judgments are damning.*

Land grabs have been strikingly popular. Preliminary research by the
International Land Coalition, a non-governmental organisation, reckons
almost 80m hectares have been subject to some sort of negotiation with
a foreign investor, more than half in Africa (see chart). This
estimate is far higher than a previous one, by the World Bank, which
last year said that foreign investors had expressed interest in 57m
hectares. It is higher still than one by the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI) which put the figure in a 2009 study at
15m-20m hectares. It would be wrong to draw a line between these
numbers so as to conclude that land deals have grown fourfold. Since
most are secret, knowing what to count is difficult, and the figures
refer to different periods.

Yet each time someone has looked at the phenomenon, the result has
been a figure roughly twice the earlier estimate. It is also clear
that the overall scope is vast: 80m hectares is more than the area of
farmland of Britain, France, Germany and Italy combined. And land
deals are continuing, possibly even speeding up. Over a tenth of the
farmland of South Sudan has been leased this year—even before the
country has formally got its independence. GRAIN, an advocacy group,
says it has seen proposals that would allow Saudi business groups to
take control of 70% of the rice-growing area of Senegal.

It is not just the size of land deals that remains uncertain. Their
contractual basis often is, too. Few contracts have been made public,
so details are sketchy. But an investigation of 12 that have been, by
Lorenzo Cotula of the International Institute for Environment and
Development, declares many “not to be fit for purpose”. The rights and
obligations of each side, Mr Cotula says, are usually extremely vague,
while traditional land-use rights are frequently ignored. As one
farmer asked when a British company acquired forestry rights in
Tanzania: “How come others are selling our land?”

Even after the contract is signed, there is no guarantee a land deal
will go ahead in accordance with it. A survey by the World Bank†
showed that in the Amhara region of Ethiopia, only 16 of 46 projects
were working as intended (the rest lay fallow or had been rented back
to smallholders). In Mozambique only half the projects were working as
planned.

Still, some conclusions seem warranted. When land deals were first
proposed, they were said to offer the host countries four main
benefits: more jobs, new technology, better infrastructure and extra
tax revenues. None of these promises has been fulfilled.

Locals usually regard jobs as the most important of these. But so far
they have been scarce, and only partly because many projects are not
yet up and running. In Mozambique, the World Bank found, one project
had promised 2,650 jobs and created a mere 35-40 full-time positions.
A survey by Thea Hilhorst of 99 smaller projects in Benin, Burkina
Faso and Niger reported “hardly any” rural job creation. Only one of
the publicly available contracts studied by Mr Cotula even specifies a
number of new jobs to be created. And when there are jobs, foreign
investors often bring in outsiders to staff them, leading to “conflict
or accusations of cheating”, according to the World Bank. The manager
of one project was killed during an argument about jobs.

Evidence of the transfer of technology and skills is mixed. Ms
Hilhorst found almost no impetus towards greater professionalism in
farming, although she concedes that closer links with food processors
and distributors might improve matters. The World Bank’s study argued
that technological improvements in Ukraine and Mexico had helped
reduce rural out-migration (though this was surprising: you might have
expected new labour-saving technologies to encourage underemployed
farmers to leave the land). Mr Cotula’s study of land-deal contracts
found few examples in which the foreign investor was obliged to
exchange materials or ideas with local farmers. At the moment,
land-grabbing foreigners seem to be creating islands for themselves,
cut off from the poverty-stricken countryside.

Grabbing sans giving

Some projects’ operators have done better in building new schools,
clinics and other “social infrastructure”. Madagascar may be a
surprising example as it witnessed what is perhaps the most notorious
land grab of all: a South Korean company was offered half the
country’s arable land—a proposal that fuelled protests which
eventually toppled the government who approved the deal. Two years
later Perrine Burnod of CIRAD, a French research organisation, found
that the number of land deals on the island had fallen by two-thirds.
And those that remained had begun to look more like aid projects, with
investors committing themselves to building schools and clinics. Local
mayors were welcoming them in to help finance projects no longer
supported by the cash-strapped central government.

Yet this is atypical. Most land deals contribute little or nothing to
the public purse. Because markets for land are so ill-developed in
Africa and governments so weak, rents are piffling: $2 per hectare per
year in Ethiopia; $5 in Liberia. Tax and rent holidays are common.
Indeed, it is not unusual for foreign investors to pay less tax than
local smallholders. And upfront compensation to local farmers for use
of their land is derisory: often just a few months of income for
agreeing to a 100-year lease.

“The risks associated with such investments are immense,” concludes
the World Bank. “In many cases public institutions were unable to cope
with the surge in demand…Land acquisitions often deprived local
people, in particular the vulnerable, of their rights…Consultations,
if conducted at all, were superficial…and environmental and social
safeguards were widely neglected.”

So why are land deals popular? That is surprisingly easy to answer:
strong demand and willing suppliers. The big investors tend to be
capital-exporting countries with large worries about feeding their own
people. Their confidence in world markets has been shaken by two
food-price spikes in four years. So they have sought to guarantee food
supplies by buying farmland abroad. China is by far the largest
investor, buying or leasing twice as much as anyone else.

Local elites have also played a vital role in spreading land deals. In
a Tanzanian project described by Martina Locher of the University of
Zurich, “local people who refer to customary law have a very low level
of knowledge [and cannot] defend their land rights.” In contrast, she
writes, “state law is mainly represented by district officials,
who…enjoy a high level of respect by local people.”

Then there is corruption. Many of the west African “land grabbers”
described by Ms Hilhorst are local politicians, civil servants and
other urban elites who bribe local chiefs with gifts of motorbikes.
Madeleine Fairbairn of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, argues
that in Mozambique, an informal division of the spoils has emerged.
Local bigwigs use their influence to get “facilitation fees”, while
national leaders manipulate the law and promote (or obstruct) projects
to their own and their supporters’ advantage.

Many development projects work this way. What makes land grabs unusual
is their combination of high levels of corruption with low levels of
benefit. Ruth Meinzen-Dick, one of the authors of the IFPRI study,
says that in 2009 the balance of costs and benefits was genuinely
unclear. Now, she argues, the burden of evidence has shifted and it is
up to the proponents of land deals to show that they work. At the
moment, they have precious few examples to point to.

* Papers and presentations available at
http://www.future-agricultures.org/index.php †“Rising Global Interest
in Farmland”, World Bank, 2010.

END
______________________
John Ashworth

Sudan Advisor
Sudan Ecumenical Forum

[email protected]

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