Abyei: Predicting the future
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By Tim Flatman
30 April 2011, updated 9 May 2011
Analysts have been reluctant to predict exactly what will unfold in
Abyei over the coming months. On a purely human, individual level,
this is entirely understandable. The region is notoriously
unpredictable. No-one wants to embarrass themselves or jeopardise
their reputation by making forecasts which are quickly proved
inaccurate. More charitably, stakeholders naturally want to project
optimism that a solution can be reached and massive bloodshed averted,
rather than create a self-fulfilling prophecy of impending armageddon.
Even those advocacy groups who are highlighting the dangers of
genocide and/or conflict in Abyei are fairly vague as to the sequence
of events which may unfold, and maintain confidence that intervention
can still result in prevention of widespread violence. Strategically
too, it makes sense to concentrate on CPA fulfilment, an objective
speculation on potential actions outside of the CPA can distract from.
Yet it is pointlessly counter-factual to argue that CPA implementation
can proceed according to the letter of the agreement. The deadline for
the Abyei referendum has, after all, passed. It seems highly unlikely
that a referendum will take place at all. “CPA implementation” has
become a proxy for a consensual agreement on the status of Abyei,
rather than for a mechanism for determining and delivering on the
aspirations of the permanent residents of Abyei. If the latter was the
object, we might conclude that a unilateral process was likely to
adhere more closely to the letter of the CPA.
So too even the most ardent optimist must now admit there is a chance
no agreement will be reached before the CPA end-date of July 9th. A
more realistic assessment might conclude that this is likely. In this
context it would be negligent to rule out public deliberation on what
may happen over the next few months, how key stakeholders are likely
to react and how a range of different external responses could shape
events as they unfold.
This paper aims to make some predictions, based for the most part not
on direct inside information, but on a detailed reading of the
behaviour of key actors over the last few months. The “international
community” is a nebulous phrase, but is used here primarily to refer
to those who have led mediation efforts: the US, UN, AU, to a lesser
extent the UK and other members of the Troika, and those who have a
direct interest in Sudan or who are likely to have a prominent role in
the recognition of South Sudan – China, Uganda, Kenya, Egypt, etc.
Where “international community” is too nebulous a descriptor to be at
all useful, effort will be made to clarify which parts of it are being
referred to. With other actors (NCP, SPLM, Dinka Ngok, Misseriya, etc)
it should be clearer who the referent is.
Diplomats and policy makers seem to have been operating under the
assumption that both NCP and SPLM fundamentally want peace and will
compromise on Abyei in a last-minute deal following brinksmanship from
both sides. They cite the Southern referendum, whose implementation
seemed so unlikely for so long, as evidence of that. If international
mediators facilitate engagement between the two parties, they will
come to an agreement if they want it enough - and if they don’t want
it enough, it isn’t workable, this cavalier approach suggests. The
role of mediators is to bring the parties together, then get out of
the way. The absolute worst thing they could do is to appear to favour
one of the parties. Studious impartiality, supposedly, means treating
and referring to both parties in equal terms – whatever the material
facts of the situation.
Diplomats must quickly wake up to the reality that Abyei is unique,
and a compromise is not inevitable or even likely. There is plenty of
evidence in favour of this assertion. The Republic of South Sudan’s
draft transitional constitution famously includes the definition:
“The territory of the Republic of South Sudan comprises all lands
and air space that constituted the three former Southern Provinces of
Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile in their boundaries as they
stood on January 1, 1956, and the Abyei Area, the territory of the
nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred from Bahr el Ghazal Province to
Kordofan Province in 1905 as defined by the Abyei Arbitration Tribunal
Award of July 2009.”
It might have been hoped that this inclusion would dispel any vestiges
of optimism within the corridors of power in the UN, AU and US
government that the South can accept any further territorial
compromise. Holding out for such an agreement has made the resolution
of Abyei’s status less, rather than more likely. It also relies on the
questionable assumption that the NCP would settle for whatever
territorial compromise was reached, rather than accepting it at first
then pushing for more land, as they have done consistently since 2005.
Sadly the inclusion only resulted in international pressure through
the AU to strike the language from the constitution. Any Southern
acquiescence to this demand will be met by strong resistance from
within South Sudan. If, as the AU suggest, the South do meet this
demand, it should not be seen as a sign they are willing to compromise
on territory, but simply as a desire to halt the escalation of
violence so that conflict over Abyei is delayed, for reasons that
shall be explored later.
President Bashir’s response to the language in the constitution
similarly offered little room for compromise: “I say it and repeat it
for the million times, Abyei is northern and will remain northern". He
went on to threaten war, stating that the movement must submit to the
will of ballot boxes “or else boxes of bullets will decide the
matter.”5 This is decidedly odd rhetoric coming from the person who,
in an arguable design flaw in the Abyei Protocol, had the sole
responsibility for setting up a referendum commission for Abyei, but
failed to do so – followed by the mass displacement of tens of
thousands of Abyei residents from their homes by Northern militias,
making a referendum harder to implement. The events of 1st May in
Tajalei and Todach also suggest Bashir is not serious about resolving
the status of Abyei through democratic means. While a counter-spin
operation by the GoS has so far been successful in persuading the
international community and media not to treat the incident as an act
of Northern aggression, this author has seen evidence to the contrary.
The events deserve a fuller treatment elsewhere, and information is
still coming to light. Suffice to say here it is far more plausible
that this was part of an attempt to get SAF forces and military
hardware to Abyei town under the flimsy cover of being part of an
(unauthorized) JIU operation. The attempt was thwarted by Southern
intelligence and quick reactions. The intent was either to occupy
Abyei town in a surprise attack, or to put well-equipped units in
place for expected conflict in July. These actions are not compatible
with a belief that the status of Abyei can and should be resolved
through democratic means.
Validation of the questionable premise that Bashir’s objections to the
Abyei referendum are based on a pro-democracy outlook requires
acceptance of Misseriya voting rights, or at least acceptance of the
idea that the question of Misseriya voting rights is a legitimate area
of debate within the CPA framework. Bashir relies on the perception of
disengaged outsiders that to argue to the contrary is to treat the
Misseriya as somehow inferior. Yet we should recognize that the claims
Misseriya and the Dinka Ngok are simply not equal and should not be
treated as such. This historical accuracy of this statement was
recognised by both the Abyei Boundaries Commission and the Permanent
Court of Arbitration, but it is also becomes apparent when we look at
how claims have been articulated by the respective communities.
A seemingly obvious, yet often overlooked point is that the claim that
Misseriya should have voting rights is a very recent phenomenon.
No-one suggested seasonal migrants passing through Abyei should be
granted voting rights at the time the Abyei protocol was agreed. The
Abyei Referendum Act, passed by Sudan’s National Assembly, does not
mention the Misseriya.6 The NCP did not attempt to establish a
precedent in the Southern referendum act that seasonal migrants would
be able to vote in the referendum, suggesting they did not expect
voting rights to be the wedge issue in setting up a commission for the
Abyei Referendum Act. The Misseriya demand for voting rights has been
manufactured relatively recently to provide an excuse for
non-implementation of the Abyei Protocol.
Of course, not all Misseriya are seasonal migrants. Some do indeed
live in Abyei. But President Bashir’s assertion is that all Misseriya
should be able to vote in the Abyei referendum, and it is
uncontestable that most are seasonal migrants. Furthermore, there is
no way of discriminating between those who do travel through Abyei
during the dry season, and those who travel through other areas but
might try to vote in a referendum. Bashir knows that Southerners know
this: his condition is an impossiblist demand he knows Southerners
cannot possibly accept as it would allow him to effectively rig the
referendum, with Misseriya who would normally have nothing to do with
Abyei overwhelming the Dinka Ngok vote. (Even when considering the
Misseriya families who are permanent residents of Abyei, the only way
of distinguishing them from other MIsseriya in terms of voting rights
is to have the 9 Dinka Ngok traditional chiefs identify them during a
registration process: something the Dinka Ngok community is happy to
do. While this process hardly seems ideal, no-one has suggested a
viable alternative.)
Some writers will complain that I am conflating the Misseriya with the
NCP in this account. To that accusation I would retort that by
effectively isolating ordinary Misseriya people and preventing any
work to identify their opinions and aspirations, the NCP and Misseriya
leadership have left no other choice. The Dinka Ngok are again
different, their claims as to their community’s demands are
verifiable: it is easy to get access to go and speak to ordinary Dinka
Ngok people and ask them what they want. To the Misseriya there is no
equivalent access, so we cannot simply take the Misseriya leadership’s
claim to speak for the community at face value. Privately, those who
work directly with the Misseriya suggest current Misseriya leadership
reflect an NCP whose patronage they rely on, more than the community
they supposedly represent. Historians recall that the traditional
party of the Misseriya is the Umma, rather than the NIF. Furthermore,
the gap between the youth and leadership is widening, with many youth
desiring a more settled lifestyle where fixed health, education and
social provision can have a greater impact on their lives. Some
suggest that Misseriya leadership, cautious of this growing gulf, have
deliberately isolated their community so that much of it remains
unaware of the SPLM offer of continued migratory, grazing, social and
political rights post-separation, and do not form social networks with
Dinka Ngok youth.
That is not to say that the Misseriya, and even the Misseriya
leadership, do not have their own interests which may diverge from the
NCP from time to time. Their reaction to the Abyei Referendum Act’s
passing in the National Assembly remains the most theatrical
presentation of their autonomy. The Abyei Referendum Act was a
carefully worded document which clearly accepts the verdict of the PCA
as to who could vote in an Abyei referendum, without reinforcing it.
[1] Misseriya representatives walked out of the National Assembly
before the bill was passed in protest. But to suggest those actions
prove voting rights are a demand coming from the grassroots of the
Misseriya community makes two unverifiable assumptions: first, that
Misseriya leadership represents well the feelings of its community –
as we have seen, an assumption that is at best unprovable and at worst
entirely spurious, and second, that voting rights are the only means
to achieve Misseriya aspirations.
The Misseriya had a right to feel betrayed by the NCP-led government
they fought for during the war. Western Kordofan, the state in which
they could be regarded as the majority tribe, was abolished and its
territory merged into the considerably larger and more diverse South
Kordofan state. Misseriya areas remained undeveloped. They were
encouraged to look to Abyei as “their” area, which would be developed
upon taking the land for themselves. Within this context, the
sanctioning of a process which would remove the possibility of Abyei
becoming “their” area too, must have seemed like betrayal indeed. But
the recreation and development of Western Kordofan state, combined
with strong guarantees that the migratory, grazing, social and
political rights promised by the South will be respected, might
satisfy their aspirations (and especially those of the youth who want
to move away from a nomadic lifestyle) without the need to control
Abyei politically. There recreation of Western Kordofan looks more
realistic a proposition than it has for some time: leaders of
Misseriya and Nuba tribes set up a committee in late March to reclaim
Western Kordofan state, and the NCP in South Kordofan recently stated
they had no objection to re-establishing Western Kordofan. Recreation
should be approached with caution: Nuba are split over the issue, SPLM
leadership in South Kordofan against, and much depends on where
boundaries between the two states are drawn. It is also an easy
giveaway from the GoS who will be looking for soft options to
demonstrate they have not entirely ignored the voice of the people
expressed in the upcoming popular consultation in South Kordofan. But
it does suggest that there may be ways of meeting Misseriya
aspirations within a North that does not include Abyei, and that
voting rights, to the extent that they are an autonomous demand from
Misseriya communities, are a demand conditioned by the situation the
NCP have manipulated them into, rather than a demand intrinsic to
their identity. If we conclude that Bashir’s attachment to Misseriya
voting rights is a ploy to prevent the implementation of a referendum
in Abyei, and indeed an agreement on the status of the region, by
setting a condition that cannot possibly be met, we will take a
different view as to the possibility of reaching an agreement on the
status of Abyei before July.
Yet as many have noted, resumption of full-scale war with the South is
hardly in the NCP’s interests. Though a proxy war might be welcomed by
those who see a need to save face with external backers after being
outmanoeuvred into letting the South go, proxy war could easily
develop into full-scale war, and full-scale war could reach Khartoum
and threaten the NCP’s hold on power, when new conflicts in Darfur,
rising discontent in South Kordofan and Blue Nile region, and a more
professionalised and better-equipped SPLA/SSAF than previously existed
are taken into account. This is a risk the NCP seem to be preparing
for by their actions in Darfur: pursuing a strategy of “peace from
within”, exploiting the situation in Libya to decapitate JEM,
increasing attacks on Jebel Marra to weaken a divided SLA, and
offering a referendum on a single region in Darfur to undermine the
ideological basis of support for rebel movements – all textbook
strategies developed during the war with the South. The aim being to
put themselves in a position where they can focus on the southern
frontier come July. But why take the risk at all?
President Bashir’s recent threat at an election rally in South
Kordofan that “If they put Abyei in the constitution of the new state
of south Sudan, we will not recognise the new state” is indicative of
Khartoum’s high-risk strategy on Abyei. The NCP will encourage its
allies to follow suit and hold back recognition, playing on the West’s
desire to achieve consensus and avoid a situation where recognition
and non-recognition of the South splits the world down the middle. If
the NCP can successfully out-manoeuvre the US & UK into holding back
on recognition of the South in July, pressure on the South to accept
further compromise on the lands constituted by Abyei, and on
resource-sharing, will be intensified. This is a continuation of
existing Northern strategy, rather than a bold new gambit. Existing
strategy relies on refusing to enforce existing agreements (constantly
inventing new obstacles to implementation so this position seems less
unreasonable), while utilizing and threatening further military
capability to strengthen its position, and relying on the
international community to put pressure on the South not to intervene.
This strategy has proved successful so far. Local reports of militia
attacks on villages seemed to be confirmed by satellite imagery, yet
were reported by international media as “clashes”, [2] and
international condemnation has often equalized blame on both sides.
South Sudan has not intervened when Southerners have come under attack
in Abyei, and has consistently been the first to respond to
international demands to demilitarize the surrounding areas. The US,
UN and AU have persistently put options on the table which try to
manoeuvre the South into accepting further territorial compromise, [3]
even as Southerners complain this sets a precedent for rewarding
ethnic cleansing with claims to land. [4] The NCP’s calculation that
the threat of non-recognition will force the South to back down on
implementation of the Abyei Protocol seems realistic, if risky, viewed
in the context of recent events.
Yet it is not clear, for a number of reasons, that this decision by
Southern leadership to bow to such pressure is anything more than a
temporary tactic. It is in the interests of the RoSS to allow
preparations for formal separation (including the publication and
acceptance of a new transitional constitution) to get as far underway
as possible before asserting itself in Abyei. Even if President Salva
Kiir and Minister for Peace & CPA Implementation Pagan Amum no longer
believe a negotiated solution is possible on Abyei, like Bashir it is
in their interests to wait and present military engagement in Abyei as
reluctant and a last resort. These are reasons for holding back now
which will expire in July.
There are also positive reasons to suggest Northern calculations that
pressure created by the threat of non-recognition will force the South
to back down are wrong. The fragility of the SPLA has been
persistently highlighted by international media even as forced
displacement in Abyei has gone unreported, not least by a Guardian
interview with Bashir in which he predicted the South would become a
failed state. Regional loyalties can trump operational commands,
especially in emotive cases like Abyei. Dinka Ngok recruits were some
of the first to join the SPLA, shoring up John Garang’s leadership,
and many in the top ranks of the SPLA feel a debt of gratitude. There
is fear in the higher echelons of the SPLM/A that senior officers,
many of whom are Dinka Ngok or have ties to Abyei region, could mutiny
and take their soldiers to fight in Abyei even if the President of
RoSS gave a direct order not to, should the North occupy Abyei when
the South secedes. Individuals from other Dinka sub-tribes threaten to
follow them. We should not assume that, because Salva Kiir is Dinka &
the SPLM/A has often been accused of being dominated by Dinka, the
splintering of the SPLA over Abyei is less likely than in Upper Nile
or Jonglei. As John Luk Jok pointed out, “We [Nuer] have seven
ministers and also the post of the Vice President” and ”The SPLA Chief
of General Staff, James Hoth Mai, is also son of the Nuer community”.
Yet it has not stopped Major General Peter Gatdet appealing to a
narrative of betrayal and marginalization.
Those who believe it will be possible to stop the SPLA responding to a
Northern intervention in Abyei in July should therefore consider
whether Salva Kiir is likely to risk the disintegration of the SPLA,
heralded by some of the communities most loyal to it, over an attempt
to maintain international goodwill. But there are further reasons to
believe the Southern leadership has already made its mind up on how to
approach Abyei in the face of continued Northern intransigence.
The 9 Dinka Ngok Chiefdoms in Abyei are more independent of the SPLM
than is often assumed. Part of the thinking behind the setting up of
Abyei Civil Society following the 2008 attacks on Abyei town was that
the people of Abyei needed organs through which they could express
themselves and exert pressure on the UN, GoSS and GoS in situations
where the national leadership of the SPLM. It is no secret that the
Ngok Dinka Consultative Conference in Juba, held November 15-16,
resolved that “Should the two CPA Parties fail to take positive action
on the Abyei Referendum by November 30th , 2010, wethe Ngok people
reserve our right to exercise self-determination as affirmed under the
principles of International law” [5] and that discussions subsequently
took place amongst the Dinka Ngok people themselves as to how that
process could be managed. Misinterpretations of how self-determination
would be outworked may have laid behind some of the Misseriya attacks
on Dinka Ngok communities around the date of the referendum,
especially since there was a strong desire from the grassroots in
Abyei that self-determination be achieved just before or as the
Southern referendum took place.
The anger and lawlessness which found expression in the events
following the shooting in Abyei market of February 14 was an
expression of the lack of trust civil society groups had in political
leadership and youth had in elders. This author received accounts
which bemoaned the SPLM’s willingness to succumb to international
pressure to redeploy JIUs without solving Abyei’s problems, and which
said “the Kadugli agreements destroyed our hopes”. This thinking is
dissonant to that of some international mediators who seem to regard
the Kadugli agreement as a basis for a wider political agreement
rather than as a short-term means of de-escalating conflict.
The Dinka Ngok have had numerous opportunities to make an attempt to
realize their own self-determination and the organization of the
Consultative Conference and the series of petitions organized by Abyei
Civil Society from 2009-10 suggest they have the organizational
capacity to pull off some kind of self-determination process, even if
it didn’t adhere to the strict process of a referendum. There have
been no public reports of how close local communities have come to
making a decision independent of the national SPLM leadership, but
keen observers know the strength of feeling of local communities.
Dinka Ngok have had Pagan Amum visit and Salva Kiir contact them
directly to reason with them on more than one occasion since the
beginning of 2011, and on each occasion have subsequently stepped back
from the brink. Given the independence and strong feelings of the
Dinka Ngok community, who desire self-determination as soon as
possible, it seems unlikely that some form of reassurances as to
future support were not given in return for a commitment not to act
unilaterally before July. This does not mean that the SPLA will act
pre-emptively in Abyei before July 9, but that if they did not respond
favourably to any assertion made by the Dinka Ngok, and react robustly
to Northern aggression post-July 9, this might be regarded by Dinka
Ngok as a betrayal of any assurances given.
It seems then, we have an international community that fundamentally
misunderstands both sides’ positions and has at least until now been
naively optimistic about the chances of a last-minute deal, an NCP
that thinks it can get away with more than it can by pursuing a
high-risk strategy (based on the success of that strategy thus far),
and a South that cannot meet the demands of the international
community or fail to respond to Northern aggression, but will leave it
‘till the last possible moment to act decisively; a Dinka Ngok
community that will not compromise further and is more independent of
the SPLM than commonly assumed, and a Misseriya community whose
leadership has so effectively isolated its grassroots that no-one can
tell to what extent they are misrepresenting community feeling. This
is a heady mix.
Having analysed the behaviour and interests of key actors, we are now
in a position to make some predictions:
1. Shortly before separation of the South, the Dinka Ngok
community will make it clear that they consider themselves part of the
South, conducting a formal exercise to confirm this.
2. The North will try to disrupt any such process, and give
Misseriya and government-backed militias tacit permission to violently
occupy further stretches of Abyei, driving out the Dinka Ngok.
3. The North will use the ensuing confusion and chaos to persuade
its allies to delay official recognition of the RoSS, and utilize
informal networks to suggest there is still a chance of resolving the
situation through political compromise if key actors like the US hold
back on recognition, rather than divide the world over the issue.
4. The international community will put pressure on the SPLA not
to intervene but to resolve the situation by signing a last-ditch
compromise on Abyei’s borders.
5. Surprising the international community and to a lesser extent
the NCP, the SPLA will reluctantly respond to Dinka Ngok calls to
defend them with full force, without the consent of the international
community, at the first instance up to the borders of the RoSS defined
in the transitional constitution of South Sudan.
6. The international community will condemn both sides.
7. Such condemnation will be privately welcomed by the NCP, who
will use it to reinforce their argument that the RoSS cannot be
officially recognized until Abyei’s status is resolved.
8. Abyei will remain in a state of limbo.
9. ?
Beyond point 8, there are too many possibilities to make realistic
predictions. Full-scale war is one possibility; some kind of deal on
resources & the speeding up of Sudan’s reintegration into the
international community is another; embarrassed withdrawal by Northern
or Southern Sudanese Armed Forces following a recognition that they
have risked too much and are fighting on too many fronts is another.
Much depends on the outcome of initial military engagement in Abyei.
It should, however, be clear that the situation described is
sub-optimal. For anyone who recognizes the analysis above, and the
likelihood of the events described, the questions arises: which of
these outcomes are most changeable, which of the actors is most likely
to change their behaviour, and how can those changes be achieved?
Earlier I claimed that the strategy the international community is
following rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of each side’s
positions and a belief that everything that has taken place in Abyei
(including the burning of villages and displacement of tens of
thousands of people in early March) thus far is brinksmanship,
intended to strengthen the bargaining position of each side before an
inevitable compromise in shortly before the South formally secedes. Is
there, then, some possibility that when it becomes clear that that
conceptual framework is wrong, the international community will shift
its position? Could the international community press ahead with
recognition of the South over and above the objections of Khartoum,
take pressure off the South not to intervene, and refuse to condemn
the South when it does so? Could such actions strip the North of the
efficacy of its strategy and force it to come to a hasty deal allowing
the transfer of Abyei (as defined by the PCA) to the South? Would they
cause the NCP to re-evaluate the risks and rewards of their strategy?
Such a course of action would require a sudden conceptual shift, and
places a lot of trust in the so-called “international community” with
competing, conflicting interests. Neither is it in their interests to
admit past mistakes.
Another approach would be to ask what direct solidarity work
interested groups and individuals could do on the ground. To counter
the public relations work that presents ethnic cleansing as clashes,
and equalizes blame where actions are not equal would take continuous
footage and reporting from the ground. The satellite images provided
by the likes of the Sudan Sentinel Project are welcome, but not
sufficient to achieve this kind of aim. But if it was achieved, it
might be possible to make military occupation of Abyei a public
relations disaster for the GoS, to the extent which it conflicted with
its goal of reintegration into the international community and
hastened withdrawal.
Another approach (none of these approaches necessarily conflict,
although they might appeal to different kinds of people) might be to
be bolder in getting a message through to Misseriya communities that
conflict is not in their interests. How would they react if they
believed that their being involved in a Northern violent occupation of
Abyei would precipitate SPLA action to secure the area, that the South
have the muscle to do so, and that it is likely to affect their future
migratory and grazing rights – currently guaranteed? What if that
threat was accompanied by the promise of development in a new state of
Western Kordofan, guaranteed by access rights on which the
reintegration of Sudan into the international community were
dependent? Would the Misseriya prioritise relations with a regime
whose internal divisions are showing more by the day and which surely
cannot last forever, or a community who they will always live next to,
if they are provided with the means of self-reliance, politically,
socially, culturally and economically?
The scope of this paper is already arguably over-ambitious, and there
will be those who argue it contains too much speculation and
supposition. It would be foolish to try and answer all of these
questions. But if it achieves nothing else, it is to be hoped it
illustrates the necessity of a public discourse over the questions of
what the outcomes will be if there is no agreement before July 9,
which outcomes are changeable and how.
The author is an independent campaigner based in the UK. He has
previously worked for the British Labour Party and on a wide range of
campaigns, especially trade union, migrant rights and solidarity
campaigns. Tim’s interest in Sudan stretches back over 15 years and he
has travelled extensively through South Sudan and areas bordering
Northern & Southern Sudan.
*
16 May 02:59, by mohammed ali
Why do you want to pretend that you are neutral while you are
article is full of hatred to the people of north Sudan!You are hiding
your hatred behind your dislike to Basheer and the NCP.
Your article is full of lies and misleading judgments.Atypical
example is this:
(((Even when considering the Misseriya families who are
permanent residents of Abyei, the only way of distinguishing them from
other MIsseriya in terms of voting rights is to have the 9 Dinka Ngok
traditional chiefs identify them during a registration process:
something the Dinka Ngok community is happy to do. While this process
hardly seems ideal, no-one has suggested a viable alternative.)
Yeah, the messeria who got the right to vote would be determined
by the Dinka Ngok! So they will be happy with it!Sure they will happy
when you give them the right to vote and the right to choose those who
will vote.Trying to be intelligent, but in fact it is a very stupid
way to conceal your hatred towards the misseria!
Another example((Any Southern acquiescence to this demand will
be met by strong resistance from within South Sudan. If, as the AU
suggest, the South do meet this demand, it should not be seen as a
sign they are willing to compromise on territory, but simply as a
desire to halt the escalation of violence so that conflict over Abyei
is delayed, for reasons that shall be explored later.))Are you talking
in the name of southerners or trying to ignite war and instigate
hatred among the messeria and the dinka ? and what benifit you will
get?!
You are lying when you say that the SAF attacked Abeyei first ,
while in fact the SPLA did this behind the back of its leadership and
this why Silva Kiir removed Eduard Lino from Abyei who masteredmineded
the attack of Abeyei
Third example:((The events deserve a fuller treatment elsewhere,
and information is still coming to light. Suffice to say here it is
far more plausible that this was part of an attempt to get SAF forces
and military hardware to Abyei town under the flimsy cover of being
part of an (unauthorized) JIU operation. The attempt was thwarted by
Southern intelligence and quick reactions. The intent was either to
occupy Abyei town in a surprise attack, or to put well-equipped units
in place for expected conflict in July. These actions are not
compatible with a belief that the status of Abyei can and should be
resolved through democratic means.))All the information is avaliable
to the UN and other international comunity observers, but your hatred
blinded you or you are simply an addictive lier
Who said it is "unauthorized" It was fully authorized by both
governments and the UN.The "Kadugli" agreement stipulated that JIU
should be stated in Abeyei area.This is a fact and what you said is
the lie.I can see your jubillation for what you called the "reaction"
when the SPLA cowardly abushed 11 SAF members of the JIU. If the SAF
is willing to escalate and take revenge they could and they are quite
capable of doing that.Fortunately this coward "reaction" which is
celeberated and instigated by people like you was condemned by the UN
and the troika!I donnot know to where hatred is driving you?
Misseria and they Dinka were living in peace and harmoney for
centuries ,to the extent that Dr.Francis Deng ,the son of the
historical leader described it as the "mellting pot" of Sudan.People
like you with their viscious hatred spoiled this unique human
relationship.
It wont be for very long when the majority of southerners will
discover that you have malaiciously sow the seeds of hatred among the
people of Sudan, for your own benifit.Fortunately there are still
hundreds of thousands living in the north in peace, they will continue
to so, hundreds of students are still in the north and thousands are
comming back.They saw the reasults of the hatred which you sow is
burning the south and they are sure to find peace and security among
their brothers in the north!The dawn of the truth will come very soon!
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Footnotes
[1] Part 2, 24, on voter eligibility refers directly to the Dinka Ngok
and other Sudanese who meet residency critera; Part 1, 14, (1) states
that a commission shall determine residency criteria in accordance
with the Abyei Protocol, which itself refers to “permanent residents”.
Abyei Referendum Act 2009
[2] A good example can be found at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-afr... Accounts given by the GoS and
Abyei Area Administration on the events of 1st May were also given
equal weight in a report by Reuters available at:
http://af.reuters.com/article/sudan... despite a large discrepancy in
plausibility between the two accounts. The GoS account fails to give a
reason for the simultaneous attack on Tajalei, or explain why the SAF
contingent had no documentation/authorization from Abyei town itself,
yet is treated in the same way as the more plausible Abyei Area
Administration account. This approach assists the GoS, allowing them
to shroud events in confusion, and avoid responsibility for their
aggression. It also reduces international sympathy for the South if
the North can, by fair means or foul, equalize blame between both
sides for any violent incidents.
[3] See Douglas Johnson’s account in The Road Back From Abyei,
available at: http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editoria... However, in some
more recent statements, international institutions have explicitly
recognized the PCA verdict on the borders of Abyei, for example UN
Security Council Presidential Statement SC/10231, available at:
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//... This is to be welcomed.
[4] SPLM Press Release on Abyei, January 2011
[5] Resolution 10, Resolutions of the Abyei Ngok Dinka Consultative
Conference, Juba, Southern Sudan, November 15-16, 2010
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