Harnessing Collective Responsibility, National Security, and National Interest In A New State "It is true that individuals who have access to political and security personalities of an emerging state may influence the manner in which the internal and more so foreign policy makers of the new state go about formulating the strategic objectives of their strategic policies." 16 May 2011
(Part One) By John G Nyuot Yoh, PhD In a recent piece entitled “The Republic as a Responsibility” Stephen Par Kuol raised some important points that deserve some analysis. Firstly, what does it mean to be an independent country in the world that has become so close to itself, where a country cannot hide its shortcomings? The essence of becoming part of international community in the twenty first century is that a nation is expected to behave like everybody else in terms of universal value systems; and not only to behave as such, but to be seen to be observing everything that the rest of the world are practicing and implementing. It means that, weak as South Sudan institutions are, new in the game as it is, unskilled as its people are, inexperienced as they are, everybody that interact with masters and PhD holders inside and outside South Sudan and numerous exposed expatriates, would definitely take it for granted that South Sudan must do what others are doing in the twenty first century. In other words, a country, young as it is, led by highly educated people, who compose only 2% of the population whose 98% are living in rural environment, is expected to move fast and leap into future and do things like those who live in the twenty first century would do. This is called in post modern literature as “good governance culture”. To those non-South Sudanese who live in the South, observing inappropriate practices in administration and financial management, having uneducated warlords and generals roaming around, recruiting young energetic youth, who are freelance fighters willing to adopt any cause that makes sense to them and pays well, would be a rocket science that required Diop, Hawkings and Einstein to decipher. The world expects the new Republic of South Sudan to act as if it has been in existence for a long time and that is a difficult task, only super humans can do that. While it is appropriate to appreciate and manage the expectations of the international community of the193rd state, South Sudanese and their leadership must pause and ask the rest of the world, do they really know the true potential of South Sudan and do they appreciate the damage that 191 years of subjugation caused and are they really serious to expect the South to take off as if everything was normal? It goes without saying, however, that there is the need for people of South Sudan to do their best, even when they know it is hard to push harder. This is done through the responsibility to lead and act as determined people, because it would not be proper to build a nation and become a sovereign state without taking full charge of responsibility to protect the security and the interests of the citizens and the land. In the old world order, the state protection was paramount to the protection of the citizenry. That meant that what was regarded as security was in fact a state security and not human security. Other aspects that were related to citizens’ rights such food security, service delivery and the rights to object and oppose, were deemed to be crimes against the state that deserve severe punishment to the level of death. The state’s inability to manage people’s expectations was therefore camouflage as people’s inability to be patient with the state. On the other hand, collective responsibility is a historical right of people to demand from its leadership to recognise that every people must hold their leadership to their promises. The decision by the forefathers of South Sudanese, who were joined later by their counterparts from the rest of Sudan to lead the struggle based on the promises of attaining freedom, justice, equality and prosperity to all, was a political contract that was taken seriously by the populace of the South (New Sudan) and as such they took part and worked hard to see to it that the struggle is brought to its logical conclusion. The rest of the world, who supported the cause of the struggle, did not have any obligation to insure the success of the revolution, it acted within the parameters of goals and objectives that were set by the people and their leadership. Upon the success of the revolution, the world does not owe the people of the South anything except good luck for their new project of building a country that is supposed to meet their expectations and promises. The failure and success of the independence is therefore not linked to what others think of South Sudanese, rather on what those who fought for it can gain from and out of it. The neighbours and others far beyond would not mind sharing the dividends of the success with the people of the South. What differentiates Southerners and others beyond borders is whether Southerners take their individual and collective responsibilities seriously. For those who survived the war, it is easy to be satisfied with what they see or get, while for those who are in power now, it is much easier to forget the bitter days of struggle because the new dawn brought with it elements of life which were not even in their wildest dreams. As for those who have died during the struggle and their loved ones who have survived, it is very hard to forget and their world does not go beyond their immediate needs, unlike those alive whose new fortunes are directly linked beyond borders, or what is sometimes referred to as “the new partners in richness”. Here lie the boundaries of responsibility towards the people and the building of the new state: the collective responsibility that is selfless, accommodating all, caring and visionary, it goes beyond the expectations of those who are alive. It is the state that is built on the basis of revolutionary promises that accepts and takes seriously it responsibilities. The definition and identification of national security of any country falls within the heart matter of national strategic planning based of course on the principles of collective responsibility and responsibility to protect. A revolutionary nation is expected to transform it revolutionary vision into concrete strategic planning process that would assist in identifying its national security objectives. National security by its essence is a multi-faceted vision that allows each nation to work towards achieving its short and long terms objectives. Only the country concerned can identify its national security objectives. Depending on the vision, the national priorities and security needs of the nation are identified as crucial for the development of the country. The Republic of South Sudan may opt to identify justice, freedom, poverty, education, health, food, tribalism as national security priorities. The objectives of the struggle may thus end up being the national security objectives. The most important aspect of defining national security objectives is that only the country and its leadership can define national security objectives, even the closest friends may not be preview to the national planning process for identifying national security of objectives. Relating to the above is the necessity of identifying the national interest of South Sudan. Any country must have its national interest at heart, in the same way that it must have clear understanding of what are its national security priorities. Well-defined national interest assists countries to plan their domestic and external relations priorities. Unless the country clearly has defined its national interests, actors inside and outside its borders will intervene to define interests that benefit them. National interest must always be linked to the strategic needs and survival basis of the society that forms the country. These interests may be internally or externally based. If the country is land lock for example, its national interests must put into consideration that because it is land lock, it must behave like a land lock country. A country may also define its national interest on its historical challenges such as the necessity to promote national unity, ethnic cohesion, multi-partism etc. National interest objectives also may differ from one generation to another and depending on the circumstances that are prevailing when they were set. It is therefore important to emphasise that no country in the world can survive without well-defined national interest in politics, economics and socially. Identifying national interest is a prerogative of the people and the leadership of the country concerned and there cannot be any compromise to involve non-nationals in defining them. How should the new baby state of South Sudan interact with the rest of the world then? Firstly, the geopolitics of the post July 9th, 2011 regional politics must be rationally managed by the leadership of the new republic. There are friends of people of South Sudan, who truly are committed to friendship, although friendships between states are not sometimes like friendships between human beings. Geography, resources, human capital, ideology, national security and national interests tend to take precedent over other types of relationships. The role of political personalities, new realities and ideological linkages may have far reaching consequences in particular time frames; however they may not necessarily be important in other times under different managements. Secondly, the neighbourhood and proximity can be detrimental in defining quality relationship between a country and its neighbours, although some neighbours may have closer links, either in expense of or in favour of others. Either way, it is important to know that some neighbours may have weaknesses that are opportunities to others or strengths that may be weaknesses to other neighbours, and detecting both is essential for managing strategic relations with neighbours. Thirdly, monitoring major domestic transformations, socially, ethnically, economically or politically in neighbouring countries is a good strategic tool to determine the level of engagement with neighbours in strategic cooperation and alliances at regional or continental levels. Fourthly, the management of strategic geopolitics of international relations is another tool that a new independent state like South Sudan must take seriously. It is true that individuals who have access to political and security personalities of an emerging state may influence the manner in which the internal and more so foreign policy makers of the new state go about formulating the strategic objectives of their strategic policies. If that happens, it means that the new country is penetrated to the core and cannot claim to have independent foreign or domestic policies and free from outside influence. In case of South Sudan, the principle that should guard its foreign policy should be: those who stood with the revolution have the priority in exchanging experiences and benefits. The policy of openness to all, and selective approach in options should inform the foreign policy of any revolutionary movement-led government. There were those who were there in difficult times, and there are those who joined in when the victory was certain. The abilities in terms of possession of resources and capability may differ from the late comers and the original supporters, and in terms of true revolutionary ethos, the quality of support should not distort the reality of the timing and the necessity of the support. Selling oneself/country cheap, either through distorting facts (“you do not need to think, we already have plans/solutions/resources for you, just hire us: consultants/NGOs” or “we will make you rich if you approve for us this or that service”). All these are methodologies that are used by external actors to derail national planning strategies, hence making the leadership of the new country to concentrate on personal and not on the national interests. >From the above perspective, it seems that defining national security and interest, promoting collective responsibility and responsibility to protect are important instruments in strategic planning of priorities of any new nation. In the second and the third part of this commentary we will ask how did the Government of Southern Sudan/SPLM performed during the past six years and half and what is expected from the new Republic of South Sudan. 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