---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Eric Reeves <[email protected]> Date: Mon, May 23, 2011 at 7:44 AM Subject: ABYEI BLOG: A TRUE RUNNING BLOG ON EVENTS IN ABYEI To: Eric Reeves <[email protected]>
ABYEI BLOG: A TRUE RUNNING BLOG ON EVENTS IN ABYEI Updated daily (or more frequently)---Khartoum's march to war, the response of the SPLM/A to repeated diplomatic and military provocations, and developments in the now all-out assault by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) on Abyei (at http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article326.html ) Eric Reeves May 22, 2011, 9:30pm "‘Abyei is located in north Sudan and will remain in north Sudan,’ President Omar al-Bashir, while campaigning for fellow war criminal Ahmed Haroun in South Kordofan State.” (Reuters [dateline: Khartoum], April 27, 2011) Why has the international community failed to take seriously this declaration by the head of the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime? How could the meaning of these words be unclear in the context of a massive, exceedingly well-documented offensive military buildup in recent months, just north of Abyei and within Abyei itself? This buildup has been fully evident and clearly pointed to the resumption of major military hostilities in Abyei; that these hostilities happened to begin on May 19, 2011 is simply fortuitous; we have had many indications of Khartoum’s military ambition in the region going back over a year (see references below). Whatever happened on May 19, 2011 to initiate hostilities, this spark of an event---however imperfectly we can know it at this moment---has been insufficiently considered by those so quick to condemn the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The result has been to encourage Khartoum to believe that its version of these events will be taken as accurate and a credible casus belli. Certainly Khartoum is at war in Abyei, and has no hesitation in declaring as much: “Sadiq Amir, the highest military spokesperson of the Sudanese Armed Forces announced at a press conference today that Abyei officially is a war-zone. ‘The war is on full fledged, there are casualties, wounded, refugees and fires. If you want me to say, Abyei is a holiday destination, I will say, Abyei is a holiday destination. ***But the reality is that it is a war zone and it has to be a war zone***.” (Radio Dabanga, May 22, 2011; emphasis added) Reports so far are incomplete but indicate that an SPLA unit was stationed near Dokura (also Dokra)---about 10 kilometers north of Abyei town---and that a single soldier from this unit fired his weapon (an AK-47?) on a unit of some 200 Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) personnel while under escort by the feckless UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMIS). This was not a unit command or decision, nor did it reflect an order from further up the chain of command. We don’t know the motive of this one soldier: mental or emotional imbalance? was he confused, or perhaps deranged in pursuit of vengeance against those who killed his family members? working as a paid provocateur for Khartoum? The latter is certainly well within the realm of possibility, especially given the immediate intensity of the SAF armed response: reports so far indicate repeated firing of powerful RPG-7s (an anti-tank weapon), which reportedly killed a number of civilians. The initial UNMIS report suggested two SAF wounded and one UNMIS personnel wounded. Khartoum instantly claimed that the real figure was 22 SAF troops killed, a figure sufficiently large that it could be used to define a threshold for military intervention in Abyei. More reliable sources suggest between 10 and 20 casualties on each side; this may change if UNMIS investigates promptly, but it has already been three days since the event, and whatever access to Abyei and South Kordofan UNMIS might have had has disappeared entirely. Khartoum has virtually total military control of the entire region, including Abyei town, which is being patrolled by 15 main battle tanks (probably among those reported earlier by the Satellite Sentinel Project at Kharassana and elsewhere very near the border between Abyei and South Kordofan). Significantly, results for the race for governor of South Kordofan were also announced last week, and the election of indicted war criminal Ahmed Haroun was expertly managed by the regime’s “National Election Commission” (the head of the South Kordofan State High Commission on Elections reportedly fled to the UN, given the nature of the vote rigging). Shamefully, the result was promptly and incompetently ratified by the Carter Center (Atlanta). The Carter Center Report (CCR) proved itself uninformed in critical areas and failed to answer key questions about the tabulation of the final vote, which initially showed the SPLM/A candidate (Abdel Aziz el-Hilu) up by more than 15,000 votes---a comfortable margin, given the turnout. Even more seriously, the political background to the election within the report was negligible, even as the election was deeply politicized, particularly by Khartoum with its revealing choice of Haroun. The CCR is even less adequate in characterizing the military realities of South Kordofan and Abyei. (See my May 20, 2011 critique of the CCR at http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article325.html .) It is still possible that Khartoum has taken these military actions in order to strengthen its final bargaining position on Abyei’s boundaries and other key unresolved North/South issues (external debt, sharing of oil revenues, and other border disputes, involving nearly 20 percent of the 2,100-kilometer border). But the SPLA has been pushed militarily as far as it can go, and indeed beyond. If the international community doesn’t recognize the foolishness of its rush to judgment about the meaning of the May 19 clash, if it doesn’t see how brazenly Khartoum has taken military advantage of this incident to mount a long-planned offensive, the Southern leadership will have little choice but to consider how it may best defend itself. UNMIS has proved worthless. Moreover, if we are to consider provocations, which Khartoum would have the world believe are all on the side of the SPLA, let’s recall what was reported—and confirmed—just over two months ago about the actions of the SAF and its PDF and Misseriya militia allies: Doctors Without Borders (MSF) and other humanitarian organizations reported that “tens of thousands” of Ngok Dinka civilians (primarily women and children) had fled southward from Abyei town in the wake of widespread killings and the destruction of Ngok villages (http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfm?id=5079&cat=press-release ). Serious fighting occurred in Todach on February 27 – 28, in which many were killed (Todach is approximately 15 kilometers north of Abyei town). Maker Abior was also attacked by militia forces, and at least 33 Southern police (“Juba Police”) were killed on March 2. There was been fighting in Noong as well. Altogether, more than 100 civilians and police had been killed by the end of March. Satellite imagery at the time confirmed the complete destruction of Todach (February 28/March 1), Maker Abior (March 3) to the northwest of Abyei down, and still later the larger village of Tagelei to the northeast (March 5)—all burned to the ground (http://www.satsentinel.org/ ). (For a scalable and highly detailed map of Abyei, see http://avidpdf.com/ebook/agany-pdf.html .) These military assaults and provocations should be considered in light of the repeated, confirmed aerial attacks on South Sudan in the run-up to the Southern self-determination referendum (January 9, 2011). Attacks in Western and Northern Bahr el Ghazal were reported on November 11, 12, and 24, 2010; December 6 and 8, 2010; and January 10, 2011. Attacks were by both Antonov bombers and MiG jet air-to-ground combat aircraft. [For a complete account, see the data spreadsheet in my recent report: (www.sudanbombing.org ] One thing we may be sure of: that while the international community dithers, disingenuously suggests equal responsibility lies with both parties, issues condemnations without consequences, and makes “demands” that Khartoum regards with unmitigated contempt, the military crisis in Abyei deepens. The status quo is unsustainable, and full-scale war is virtually upon South Sudan, less than two months before its independence. REFERENCES: For the best account of Abyei’s recent political history, see Douglas Johnson’s exceedingly well-informed, “The Road Back from Abyei,” January 15, 2011 (http://www.scribd.com/doc/47326561/The-Road-Back-from-Abyei-link ) For the most comprehensive accounts of Khartoum’s military build-up in Abyei and South Kordofan, including the Nuba Mountains, see: [1] Julie Flint, “The Nuba Mountains: Central to Sudan’s Stability” (Pax Christi, January 2011; at http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=24931 ) This extremely useful report is based on extensive recent interviews in the region and provides an excellent history of the Nuba, particularly in the period following the signing of the CPA in January 2005 (including the fate of “popular consultations”). [2] Small Arms Survey: numerous highly authoritative publications on military developments in Abyei and South Kordofan (http://goo.gl/D5iTK ) [3] Satellite Sentinel Project: several key reports, based on satellite photography, revealing Khartoum’s developing military offensive (http://www.satsentinel.org/ ) Eric Reeves, previous analyses of Abyei, largely based on the above reports: [a] “Khartoum’s Language on Abyei Becomes More Insistent, More Threatening,” South Sudan News Agency, May 3, 2011 http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/opinion/analyses/khartoums-language-on-abyei-becomes-more-insistent-more-threatening [b] “Obama Weak on the Rapidly Escalating Crisis in Abyei (Sudan),” Dissent Magazine (on-line), March 9, 2011 http://dissentmagazine.org/atw.php?id=396 [c] “Abyei in Flames: Prospects for Peace Endangered by Diplomatic Incompetence,” South Sudan News Agency, March 8, 2011 http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/opinion/analyses/abyei-in-flames-prospects-for-peace-endangered-by-diplomatic-incompetence [d] "Celebrate Independence for South Sudan! But Remain Vigilant on Abyei,” South Sudan News Agency, January 14, 2011 http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/opinion/analyses/celebrate-independence-for-south-sudan-but-remain-vigilant-on-abyei [e] “Encouraging Khartoum: South Sudan Victimized by ‘Moral Equivalence,’” The Sudan Tribune, December 21, 2010 http://www.sudantribune.com/Encouraging-Khartoum-South-Sudan,37360 [f] "Compromising with Khartoum: Abyei and the Perils of Accommodation,” Dissent Magazine (on-line), November 26, 2010 http://www.dissentmagazine.org/atw.php?id=318 also: The Sudan Tribune, November 26, 2010 http://www.sudantribune.com/Abyei-and-the-Perils-of.html South Sudan News Agency, November 26, 2010 http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/opinion/analyses/compromising-with-khartoum-abyei-and-the-perils-of-accommodation _____________________________ Eric Reeves Smith College Northampton, MA 01063 [email protected] 413-585-3326 www.sudanreeves.org -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "JFD info" group. 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