---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Eric Reeves <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, Jun 28, 2011 at 9:08 PM
Subject: "International Crimes and Threats to Peace in Sudan are
Mounting Rapidly"
To: [email protected]
"International Crimes and Threats to Peace in Sudan are Mounting Rapidly"
Eric Reeves
June 28, 2011
After so many years of work on Sudan, I thought myself fully braced
for the worst the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party
regime might do. As so often before, I was wrong. The litany of
egregious violations of international humanitarian and human rights
law over the past five weeks is simply overwhelming---in South
Kordofan, in Abyei, but in other areas along the North/South border as
well. Just in the past two weeks, the regime's Sudan Armed Forces
(SAF) and militia allies in South Kordofan have: threatened to shoot
down UN humanitarian aircraft in the region; shot, tortured, and
arrested national members of the UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan
(UNMIS) in Kadugli, capital of South Kordofan; denied freedom of
movement to UNMIS personnel in nearly all locations; deployed
intelligence officers in Kadugli, disguised as Red Crescent workers,
to compel the removal of displaced civilians who had taken refuge at
the UNMIS headquarters in Kadugli; denied UN and nongovernmental
relief organizations use of the Kadugli airport, thus creating a vast
and growing humanitarian crisis; engaged in house-to-house searches
for Nuba civilians, arresting or summarily executing all thought to
have "southern sympathies"; and engaged in what Amnesty International
has called "indiscriminate attacks, bombing from high altitudes with
imprecise bombs in areas which include civilians." These bombing
attacks have extended to territories in South Sudan.
The SAF has also, in violation of international law, laid
anti-personnel land mines in areas around Kadugli to control movement
in and out of the town, and Military Intelligence has set up numerous
checkpoints that are used to arrest Nuba civilians and restrict UN
movements. Reports of mass graves and the use of chemical weapons
against civilians are as yet unconfirmed, but continue to emerge with
increasing insistence from those on the ground and in the region. As
a recent and compelling article by Dan Morrison in Foreign Policy
reminds us, the use of chemical weapons was part of the genocide in
the Nuba Mountains during the 1990s. Doctors Without Borders/Médecins
Sans Frontières (MSF) has also documented Khartoum’s use of chemical
weapons against civilians in the South:
"The increase of the bombings on the civilian population and civilian
targets in 1999 was accompanied by the use of cluster bombs and
weapons containing chemical products. On 23 July 1999, the towns of
Lainya and Loka (Yei County) were bombed with chemical products. At
the time of this bombing, the usual subsequent results (i.e. shrapnel,
destruction to the immediate environment, impact, etc.) did not take
place. [Rather], the aftermath of this bombing resulted in a
nauseating, thick cloud of smoke, and later symptoms such as children
and adults vomiting blood and pregnant women having miscarriages were
reported."
“These symptoms of the victims leave no doubt as to the nature of the
weapons used. Two field staff of the World Food Program (WFP) who went
back to Lainya, three days after the bombing, had to be evacuated on
the 27th of July. They were suffering of nausea, vomiting, eye and
skin burns, loss of balance and headaches.”
("Living under aerial bombardments: Report of an investigation in the
Province of Equatoria, Southern Sudan," February 2000)
MSF rightly "deplored" the fact that no nation demanded an
investigation by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons---not one government in the world community made the single
request that could have set in motion an investigation. This tells us
all too much about the international response to current atrocity
crimes in Sudan, committed by the same regime that has used chemical
weapons in the Nuba and in South Sudan.
[See also my lengthy archive/report on bombing in South Sudan, Darfur,
and South Kordofan over the past twelve years: www.sudanbombing.org ]
Elsewhere SAF attacks have been recorded in every state in the South
that borders North Sudan. It has repeatedly bombed the Jau area of
Pariang County in Unity State, creating thousands of newly displaced
civilians; it has fired artillery at the civilians and UN personnel in
the town of Agok, to which so many fled following the May 20 invasion
of Abyei; it has massed forces in the remote region where (northern)
South Kordofan and White Nile State meet (southern) Upper Nile State
(Upper Nile, with Unity, is the great oil production region in South
Sudan); it has organized and supported potent militias that have as
their sole objective destabilizing the South as much as possible
before and after the July 9 independence of the Republic of South
Sudan; it has attempted to move troops south of the River Kiir, which
separates the forces of the SAF and Sudan People's Liberation Army
(SPLA); it has shelled Banton Bridge, the major route from Abyei to
Warrab State (and thus essential for any potential returns). And on
June 26 the regime allowed its Misseriya Arab militia allies to attack
a train carrying people returning to their homeland in the South; the
attack killed at least one and wounded four according to an UNMIS
spokeswoman. Such an attack could not have occurred unless
countenanced by the SAF or Military Intelligence.
This list is not complete, but it is authoritative, based on numerous
newswire dispatches, human rights reports, many scores of accounts
from Nuba who have escaped to the South, and internal UN internal
documents that have been reported by several news organizations. And
astonishingly, in the midst of a news blackout throughout South
Kordofan and a shutdown of cellular phone service---with only very
limited Internet access---there are many reports, even photographs
that have made their way out of the Nuba Mountains and are compelling
in their brutal details. The credibility of a number of sources has
been authoritatively confirmed.
But without a humanitarian presence, and without accounts from the
now-paralyzed UNMIS, information about Khartoum's actions in South
Kordofan will rapidly diminish, rendering a vast and accelerating
humanitarian crisis invisible. For now, the US and its allies, as
well as all Security Council members who wish to know what is
occurring, have access to more than enough intelligence to make
informed assessments.
It is difficult to focus on a single atrocity crime amidst such
massive violence and abuse, but I believe the most telling violation
of international law was Khartoum’s use of security personnel in
Kadugli, disguised as Red Crescent workers, to compel the movement of
displaced civilians who had taken shelter within the UNMIS protective
perimeter. Some 7,000 Nuba civilians (estimates vary) gathered within
the protective custody of the UN following Khartoum's initial military
onslaught and ethnically targeted killings (June 5). But Associated
Press reports (June 23) on actions taken by Khartoum on June 20:
"Sudanese intelligence agents posed as Red Crescent workers and
ordered refugees to leave a UN-protected camp in a region where
Sudan's Arab military has been targeting a black ethnic minority,
according to an internal UN report obtained Thursday [June 23]. The
report said agents from the National Security Service donned Red
Crescent aprons at a camp in Kadugli, South Kordofan and told the
refugees to go to a stadium for an address by the governor and for
humanitarian aid. The refugees were threatened with forced removal
from the camp if they did not comply.
"The report…does not say what happened to the camp residents after
their forced removal on Monday. The report did not say how many
refugees were forced to leave the camp. "
These actions violate international humanitarian law on so many counts
it requires an analysis unto itself. But the brutal cynicism that
pervades the intelligence and security services in Khartoum, the
contempt for the lives of African Sudanese civilians, and the utter
disregard for the UN---which learned only indirectly where these
people had been taken---seem astounding, though not so astounding,
evidently, as to generate a meaningful response. Despite this public
report there was no direct response from any international actor of
consequence, including the UN Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs,
Valerie Amos. Small wonder that Khartoum believes it may do what it
wants with impunity.
And this leaves us to draw the most ominous conclusions about the fate
of the hundreds (or thousands) who were led to Kadugli Stadium: their
has not been reported because UNMIS is now completely restricted in
movement. Only on June 28 (eight days later) did the UN make its
concerns---and its ignorance---known:
"The United Nations has voiced concern at the fate of 7,000 Sudanese
civilians last seen being forced by authorities to leave the
protection of a UN compound in the tense border region between the
North and South. A UN spokeswoman says the global body has asked north
Sudan authorities for access to the civilians who are believed to have
been taken to the nearby town of Kadugli in South Kordofan province
last week. Spokeswoman Corinne Momal-Vanian told reporters in Geneva
on Tuesday that so far authorities have denied the request."
(Associated Press, June 28; emphasis added)
Indeed, the SAF has over the past two weeks made clear its intention
to end freedom of movement for UNMIS, despite the guarantees of the
"Status of Forces Agreement" Khartoum signed in 2005. UNMIS patrols
have been told by SAF officers that their mission is over, and only
SAF-supervised administrative movements may take place. To make sure
that UNMIS got this message, another utterly shocking episode is
reported by The New York Times (June 21):
"Sudan's forces detained four United Nations peacekeepers and
subjected them to 'a mock firing squad,' the organization said Monday
[June 20, 2011], calling the intimidation part of a strategy to make
it nearly impossible for aid agencies and monitors to work in the
region."
And in its strategy Khartoum has almost completely succeeded. The
humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate rapidly; hundreds of
thousands are now cut off from relief aid; and the total displaced
population may be greater than 400,000. But again no international
voice was raised to report this extraordinary detention, thereby
encouraging further intimidation of UNMIS by SAF and security
officers, even as military observation is critical: SAF continues to
pour large quantities of weapons, armor, ammunition, and troops into
Kadugli and Dilling; military checkpoints continue to target Nuba
civilians; atrocities of the most brutal sort continue to be reported
in and around Kadugli; and aerial attacks on the Nuba Mountains are
unrelenting. Just two days ago sixteen people, including eight women
and children, were killed during a bombing attack on three Nuba
villages near Kurchi.
Nor is UNMIS encouraged to be vigorous in challenging Khartoum's
restrictions on their guaranteed freedom of movement. In fact, the UN
peacekeepers are deliberately being threatened with military assault:
SAF artillery and aircraft have attacked extremely close to UNMIS
bases in several locations. On June 17 the SAF launched an intensive
artillery attack on the town of Agok, where so many of the more than
110,000 refugees from Abyei have fled; some shells fell as close as
200 meters from the UN compound. Again on June 17, SAF attack
aircraft bombed near Kadugli, with some bombs coming less that a
kilometer away from UN headquarters. The same was true on June 14,
when SAF bombing runs came extremely close to the UN compound in
Kauda. Photographs of the attack, which targeted the airstrip
critical for humanitarian transport, show just how close this attack
came. One purpose of these attacks so near to UN personnel is clear:
intimidation. For sooner or later, as the UN well knows, one of the
bombs or shells will land on a compound. The SAF is simply incapable
of targeting with sufficient precision so close to UN sites. In
short, the goal is to force withdrawal.
For Khartoum's largest ambition is to control the civilian populations
in South Kordofan and Abyei without the interference of either UNMIS
or a humanitarian presence. The Ethiopian brigade to be deployed to
Abyei was authorized by the UN Security Council only on June 27; and
despite its robust protection mandate, there are grave doubts about
its ability to reverse the ethnic clearances that have already
occurred or to create sufficient security for the Ngok Dinka who fled
the region to be able to return to their lands and homes. Troublingly,
the mission has no human rights mandate, as is typical for UN
peacekeeping missions---a clear concession to Khartoum (and Beijing).
UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Kyung-wha Kang, who has
recently returned from Abyei, declared in Khartoum that there "was
'utter devastation' in the territory and called for a thorough human
rights investigation both there and in South Kordofan." In South
Kordofan, Amnesty International rightly finds that civilians are being
"coerced to return by the Sudanese authorities to places where their
lives and safety could be at risk." But all evidence suggests that
the appropriate phrase is not "could be at risk" but "face the clear
and imminent threat of ethnically targeted destruction, much of which
is already in evidence."
Terrifying accounts have come from relief workers, a few necessarily
anonymous diplomatic sources, and of course the Nuba people
themselves: "Yusef" from Kadugli told Agence France-Presse that he had
been informed by a member of the notorious Popular Defense Forces
(PDF) that they had been provided with plenty of weapons and
ammunition, and a standing order: "He said that they had clear
instructions: 'just sweep away the rubbish. If you see a Nuba, just
clean it up.' He told me he saw two trucks of people with their hands
tied and blindfolded, driving out to where diggers were making holes
for graves on the edge of town." Nuba are being executed in gruesome
ways at the hands of the SAF and militia groups, often by having their
throats slit. A church source reports that Nuba are being hunted "like
animals" by helicopter gunships. These African peoples, trapped by
geography in North Sudan, are haunted by their terrible history and
are right to be fearful. As one aid worker has predicted, "if the
ground offensive commences, 'absolute carnage'… could ensue." This
ground offensive could come at any time.
There can be no plea of ignorance about the nature of realities on the
ground, such as Obama's special envoy Princeton Lyman has attempted to
make. Indeed, an American government official told the New York Times
last week that, "This is going to spread like wildfire," adding that,
without mediation, "you're going to have massive destruction and death
in central Sudan, and no one seems able to do anything about it." "No
one seems able to do anything about it"? Able? … or willing?
To be sure, the emphasis by the Obama administration has been on its
"inability"; and in any event, a negotiated solution is certainly the
only long-term answer to the present crisis and the viability of Nuba
life. News from Addis Ababa today (June 28) indicates a “framework
agreement” will be signed, preparing the way for negotiations between
Khartoum and Juba on the future of South Kordofan and southern Blue
Nile. But there is good reason to believe that this decision by
Khartoum is just for diplomatic appearances, and will change nothing
on the ground. Thabo Mbeki, who announced the "agreement," has a
well-deserved reputation for overselling his diplomatic achievements.
And if the agreement fails---as all the regime's agreements with
Sudanese parties in the past have failed (think Abyei, for
example)---does anyone really doubt that there is a good deal more
economic leverage to be wielded in compelling Khartoum to halt its
military actions and obstruction of humanitarian relief, especially if
the Obama administration convinces our European allies join the
effort? The Northern economy is in desperate shape, and the NIF/NCP
regime extremely vulnerable in what will be a very difficult economic
future.
There is also military leverage.
A No Fly Zone has been called for by many, including many Nuba, as
Khartoum's military aircraft continue to pound away at civilian and
humanitarian targets. The Enough Project has called for deployment to
South Sudan of an unspecified "medium-range surface-to-air missile
system." But as I have argued previously, a NFZ is completely
impracticable without the devotion of inordinate resources. A missile
battery in South Sudan might eventually be of use, but not for the
Nuba Mountains now. The third generation of Patriot Missile, for
example, is an amazing military engineering achievement; but its range
is only about ten miles, and its radar extends only about 60 miles.
These distances are completely inadequate for coverage of South
Kordofan from South Sudan.
But with real political will, the Obama administration could threaten
to destroy on the ground those military aircraft implicated in attacks
on civilians or humanitarians (a dwindling population). This would
minimize the chances for casualties and collateral damage. But the
administration could not merely threaten: it must be prepared to
follow up, starting with the destruction of the most expensive and
terrifying weapon in Khartoum’s air force, its MiG-29s (there are
about 20, each costing roughly $30 million for complete outfitting and
maintenance). Such destruction would create a de facto NFZ. As it
is, these supersonic aircraft are continually upon the people of the
Nuba before they can be heard, dropping their ordnance and screaming
away with a sound that is utterly terrifying. The demands that should
be made of Khartoum are clear: halt these aerial attacks on civilians,
allow humanitarian access---or watch your air force be destroyed
seriatim by cruise missiles or drone attack planes.
An overextended and war-weary America might persuade Obama that the
politics of this military effort are too costly. This seems the
overwhelmingly likely decision, given comments by Secretary of State
Clinton and Obama's special envoy Lyman. If so, Obama needs to be
prepared to live with voices such as that of Andudu Adam el Nail, the
Episcopal bishop of Kadugli and the Nuba Mountains: "Once again we are
facing the nightmare of genocide of our people in a final attempt to
erase our culture and society from the face of the earth." Given the
genocidal jihad of the 1990s, this nightmare seems all too real. A
correspondent for Time reported last week an interview with a relief
worker who had escaped to Juba, South Sudan: "You can see it in all
their eyes. They are scared. They see this as a fight for survival."
Is President Obama really prepared to see the Nuba people lose this
fight?
_____________________________
Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
[email protected]
413-585-3326
www.sudanreeves.org
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