Sudan after the South's Independence
Sudan After the South's Independence
1. The Current Situation
i. Abyei
ii. Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile
iii. The North-South Border
iv. North
v. South
2. Crisis Group Resources
Photo: Members of Southern Sudanese security forces prepare for a
rehearsal of the upcoming independence day celebrations in Juba
(REUTERS, 8 July 2011)
Updated 9 July 2011
1. The Current Situation
On 9 July 2011, Africa’s largest country split in two, formalising the
long-awaited independence of South Sudan following decades of war and
acrimony between North and South. While the January 2011 referendum on
Southern self-determination passed relatively peacefully, under close
international scrutiny, tensions mounted in months leading up to the
South’s independence. Much remains to be done to achieve peace in the
transitional areas and negotiate a foundation for future North-South
relations. Meanwhile, both states also face enormous domestic
challenges in the months ahead.
Khartoum’s army recently invaded the long-disputed Abyei area and
triggered conflict in South Kordofan – both regions could remain
contentious for the foreseeable future. Mounting militarization on
both sides of the disputed North-South border remains cause for
concern. In the North, ICC indictee President Omar al-Bashir is facing
a growing economic crisis, as well as dissension within his own party
the NCP. Southern Sudanese are jubilant, but the South will be born
one of the world’s most underdeveloped states. It also faces a
significant political challenge in building a genuine multi-party
democracy.
This page summarises the current situation in the two Sudans, and
links to a wealth of Crisis Group resources.
Abyei
The dispute over Abyei -- a territory geographically, ethnically and
politically caught between North and South -- is one of the most
intractable in Sudan. The region was given special status in the 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and,its own referendum (a choice
to join the new South or remain a special administrative territory
within the North), but this did not take place in part because of
heated disputes over who was eligible to vote. Ngok Dinka constituents
are overwhelmingly in favour of joining the South, while Misseriya
communities fear annexation could prevent migration and thus threaten
their way of life. But the Abyei dispute has also assumed broader
political dimensions, and been used as a bargaining chip between North
and South. Despite common perceptions, the dispute is not primarily
about oil, as the fields currently in Abyei constitute a very small
percentage of Sudan’s total production.
Following months of recurring incidents, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)
in May 2011 took control of Abyei, citing an alleged attack by
Southern Sudanese police forces on a UN convoy carrying SAF troops.
Tens of thousands have since been displaced, and the UN has reported
at least 100 civilian casualties. The Government of South Sudan (GoSS)
declared the invasion an “act of war”, but has showed significant
restraint and vowed to not retaliate.
Bashir and South Sudan President Salva Kiir reached an agreement on 12
June that all SAF troops will be withdrawn by 9 July and replaced by
the Ethiopian-led UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA),
approved by the UN Security Council in late June. This will ideally
facilitate the return of Abyei’s residents and result in improved
security and civilian protection, but otherwise only maintain an
unstable status quo. With no clear path to a resolution of final
status, Abyei could remain a flashpoint for the foreseeable future.
For background, see Crisis Group’s statement “Abyei at a Dangerous
Tipping Point” (8 May 2011); and report Negotiating Sudan’s
North-South Future (23 November 2010).
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile
Both Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile were heavily contested during
civil war between North and South, and will likely be areas of
continued instability and insecurity well beyond the South’s
independence. Instead of having their own referendum, both areas were
granted more vague popular consultations—to decide whether or not the
CPA had met the aspirations of the people, but the findings placed
little or no obligation on the central government in Khartoum. The
consultations were supposed to be completed by 9 July 2011, but will
now be extended.
Violence in South Kordofan intensified ahead of the gubernatorial and
state assembly elections, held on 2 May. The NCP candidate Abdul Aziz
al-Hilu narrowly beat the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)
candidate, but the SPLM alleged the voting was rigged. Tensions
mounted, and fighting ultimately commenced in early June when SAF
moved into South Kordofan’s capital Kadugli and initiated aerial
attacks, triggering clashes with Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)
units in the region and mass displacement.
As Crisis Group has argued, the SPLA-SAF outbreak of hostilities was
predictable. Over the last few months, the North announced its intent
to redeploy its army to the 1956 border, while Salva Kiir asked to
delay until a new security arrangement could be negotiated. As Abyei
escalated, Bashir gave the army the green light to deploy in all
areas, thus giving the SPLA in the two areas just two choices: either
to disarm or relocate its forces—who come from these territorities--
south of the border.
After weeks of fighting and negotiation, the two sides finally came to
an agreement on political and security issues in Southern Kordofan and
Blue Nile. The Two Areas Framework Agreement, signed on 28 June, was a
promising development, which recognizes the concerns of the northern
SPLM leaders and the SPLA units they control. However, it was a basic
agreement on which to build, and commitment from Khartoum was soon
withdrawn.
For background, see Crisis group’s report Sudan’s Southern Kordofan
Problem: The Next Darfur? (21 October 2008).
The North-South Border
Sections of the 2,100 km border remain hotly contested. Mounting
militarization on both sides makes it highly unstable. As such, the
two parties have tentatively resolved to create a 10km demilitarized
zone along the border. The new border security agreement also calls
for troops to be drawn from UNISFA to provide protection for the
monitoring teams in the demilitarized zone.
This arrangement may indeed be necessary to help avoid renewed
North-South hostilities, but a predominantly military operation (and
oversight mechanism) will, on its own, struggle to cultivate an
environment of mutual trust and confidence in border localities.
Deterring encroachment of unauthorized armed actors is critical, but a
complement of civilian monitors is necessary to support cross-border
initiatives, dispute resolution, local border management, and
effective and transparent information gathering and reporting. Lessons
may be drawn from previous successful mechanisms employed in Sudan and
beyond, which are often as much about building confidence, cultivating
community relations, and supporting mutually-agreed arrangements as
they are about verifying legal obligations or military movements.
Care must also be taken that prevent initiatives that inadvertently
harden the border, which would be disastrous for local communities.
Too firm a barrier could intensify land and resource pressure,
threaten pastoralist livelihoods, create hardships for Southerners who
rely on goods and services from the North, and unnecessarily restrict
communities which enjoy the benefits of joint cross-border initiatives
and interaction.
Lastly, the interim nature of both the border agreement and the force
manning Abyei and the demilitarized zone must be just that, “interim”.
These arrangements cannot remain indefinitely—particularly if the
border remains undefined—lest they simply incubate the disputes and
effectively inhibit final resolution and demarcation of the border.
For background, see Crisis Group’s report Defining the North-South
Border (2 September 2010).
North
The North’s problems will change little with Southern independence.
Bashir’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP) has not addressed the
root causes of Sudan’s chronic conflicts, and is facing multiple
security, political and economic challenges. The party’s hardliners
are determined to solve these issues militarily, and has effectively
ended debate on Sudan’s diversity, remaining committed to an
Arab-Islamic identity for all Sudanese and is ready to sub-divide key
states to accommodate political barons. At the same time, NCP rank and
file is increasingly discontent with its leadership and its approach
to dealing with the current situation.
Despite austerity measures, the government is facing a serious budget
deficit and spiralling inflation. Government revenue is low and it is
not able to pay salaries. Food, fuel and other commodity prices are on
the rise, and development projects and activities in periphery states
are almost stopped. The opposition parties are trying to position
themselves for post July 2011, but are weakened by the decision of
some of the traditional parties to enter into unilateral negotiations
with the NCP. Unless the opposition parties present a more unified
front, it is quite likely that the NCP will continue to stymie
attempts to reform the government.
For background, see Crisis Group’s report Divisions in Sudan’s Ruling
Party and the Threat to the Country’s Stability (4 May 2011).
South
With independence from the North formalised, focus in the South must
now shift to the political agenda at home. A new transitional
government will preside over a fixed term from 9 July 2011, during
which a broadly consultative review process should yield a permanent
constitution. Two factors will shape the coming transition more than
any others: the degree to which the ruling SPLM will allow a genuinely
multi-party system to take hold, and how much internal democratic
reform will be allowed within the SPLM. There are already worrying
authoritarian tendencies with the SPLM that threaten to suppress the
opposition and undo much of the goodwill created by a political
parties conference in 2010. In the coming transition period, a more
inclusive process is needed to complete a permanent constitution and
regain the confidence of all Southerners.
The international community must recalibrate its relationship with the
SPLM, and position itself as a supportive, but impartial, partner to
the people of South Sudan and its new government. This includes
continued support in development of infrastructure, professionalizing
the security services, and diversification of the economy. It also
includes holding the SPLM/SPLA accountable for abuses, and encouraging
the ruling party to open up political space. The SPLM must recognise
the a genuine multi-party system is not a threat to its power, but a
long-term investment in stability, in particular as the new state will
continue to grapple with internal security issues for some time.
For background, see Crisis Group’s report Politics and Transition in
the New South Sudan (4 April 2011).
2. Crisis Group Resources
Recent Crisis Group reports on Sudan
*
Divisions in Sudan’s Ruling Party and the Threat to the
Country’s Stability , Africa Report N°174, 4 May 2011
*
Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan , Africa Report
N°172, 4 Apr 2011
*
Negotiating Sudan’s North-South Future , Africa Briefing N°76, 23 Nov 2010
*
Sudan: Defining the North-South Border , Africa Briefing N°75, 2 Sep 2010
*
Sudan: Regional Perspectives on the Prospect of Southern
Independence , Africa Report Nº159, 6 May 2010
*
Rigged Elections in Darfur and the Consequences of a Probable
NCP Victory in Sudan , Africa Briefing Nº72, 30 Mar 2010
*
Jonglei's Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan
, Africa Report N°154, 23 December 2009
*
Sudan: Preventing Implosion , Africa Briefing N°68, 17 December 2009
*
Sudan: Justice, Peace and the ICC , Africa Report N°152, 17 July 2009
*
Sudan’s Southern Kordofan Problem: The Next Darfur? , Africa
Report N°145, 21 October 2008
*
Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis ,
Africa Briefing N°50, 13 March 2008
*
Darfur’s New Security Reality , Africa Report N°134, 26 November 2007
*
Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock , Africa Briefing N°47, 12 October 2007
*
A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in Sudan , Africa Report
N°130, 26 July 2007
Click here to access all Crisis Group reports on Sudan.
Recent Crisis Group commentary on Sudan
*
"As Sudan breaks in two, more than oil will fuel economies",
Zach Vertin and Aly Verjee, The National, 8 July 2011
*
"New Countries, Old Problems", Louise Arbour, International
Herald Tribune, 8 July 2011
*
"Two Sudans: Managing the World’s Newest Border Demands Careful
Planning", Zach Vertin, Reuters AlertNet, 8 July 2011
*
"Abyei Is Burning: Immediate SAF Withdrawal Critical", Zach
Vertin, On the African Peacebuilding Agenda, 13 June 2011
*
"Naissance du Sud-Soudan : le véritable défi commence", Zach
Vertin, Rue 89, 8 February 2011
*
"Now the Real Work Begins in Sudan", Zach Vertin, The Huffington
Post, 24 January 2011
*
"Naissance du Sud-Soudan : le véritable défi commence", Zach
Vertin, Rue 89, 8 February 2011
*
"Look beyond January for Sudan", Zach Vertin, GlobalPost, 29 October 2010
*
"Sudan: The right terms for a wrong engagement", Alain Délétroz,
European Voice, 11 February 2010
*
"Sudan: Preparing for a peaceful southern secession", comment by
Francois Grignon in Reuters The Great Debate, 17 December 2009
*
"Orchestrating Sudan's Next Fateful Step", comment by Fouad
Hikmat and Donald Steinberg in The Boston Globe, 10 December 2009
Recent Crisis Group podcasts on Sudan
*
Two Sudans: the Challenges Ahead, EJ Hogendoorn (Horn of Africa
Project Director), 9 July 2011.
*
Sudan: The Struggle for Abyei, Zach Vertin (Horn of Africa
Analyst), 26 May 2011.
*
Sudan: Divisions in the Ruling Party, EJ Hogendoorn (Horn of
Africa Project Director), 4 May 2011.
*
The Referendum in Sudan, Fouad Hikmat (African Union and Sudan
Special Advisor), 13 January 2011.
Video: Post-Referendum Scenarios in Sudan and the Way Forward. Crisis
Group's Africa Program Director, Comfort Ero, and AU and Sudan Special
Advisor, Fouad Hikmat, discusses the current post-referendum
challenges, the regional leadership response, and expectations for the
final six months of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. At the Center
for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, 10 January
2011.
Other Crisis Group Resources
For more information on the ICC and the indictment against President
Omar al-Bashir, visit our Peace and Justice page.
For a monthly summary of events in the two countries sicne September
2003, visit the CrisisWatch Database: Sudan (North) and South Sudan.
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