What Now for Darfur?
Posted by Laura Jones on Jul 18, 2011
Late last week, the Sudanese government and the Liberty and Justice
Movement, or LJM, agreed to adopt the Doha Document for Peace in
Darfur, as well as a separate protocol on LJM’s political
participation and the integration of its limited forces into the
national army. While the signing of these documents could in many ways
be considered progress, there is little hope that they will lead to
any sort of comprehensive and sustainable peace for Darfur.
There have been numerous indications that the results of Doha will, in
fact, be little more than a blip on the radar screen, particularly for
those still in Darfur. The first and most frequently discussed flaw is
the lack of inclusion of key rebel groups in the agreement, including
the Justice and Equality Movement, or JEM, and the factions of the
Sudan Liberation Army, SLA-Minni Minnawi and SLA-Abdel Wahid. These
groups are still engaged in military operations on the ground while
the Sudanese Armed Forces continue to aerial bomb their suspected
locations. Further, unlike these other groups, LJM was in many ways
the creation of international mediators involved in the Doha process
keen on unifying the many rebel factions in Darfur into a single
entity that would negotiate with the government on behalf of the
people of Darfur. The real result was a rebel group with limited
political or military influence on the ground and little support from
Darfuris. The All Darfur Stakeholder Conference which was meant to
gain popular support for the LJM-negotiated agreement was itself
defective in that participation was in many respects controlled and
those present at the conference never actually reviewed the document.
The ability of LJM to actually assist in the attainment of peace in
the region is therefore highly in doubt.
The international community’s enthusiasm for the outcome of the
two-year process was well-reflected in the attendance at the signing
ceremony on July 14. While a number of African dignitaries, including
the presidents of Chad, Eritrea, and Sudan itself were present at the
event, high-ranking western diplomats were conspicuously absent. The
implication, of course, is that none of the western countries involved
in the negotiations felt this event significant enough to attend – a
poor indication of how successful they feel this agreement is likely
to be.
Unfortunately, the outcome of the Doha process may be worse than just
ineffectual; there is a very real possibility that it will negatively
impact future negotiations and processes. After the signing of the
LJM-government deal, the government’s representative told JEM that any
further negotiations would be limited to the status of combatants and
participation in government, despite the fact that JEM had earlier
provided significant changes to the draft text of the main peace
document. JEM was also informed that it had three months to make the
decision to sign on to the LJM agreement. True to form, the government
is thus removing the possibility of meaningful negotiations with a
group whose buy-in is necessary for ending conflict in Darfur, while
claiming that it is genuinely seeking peace.
The outcome documents from Doha also allow the government to push for
a domesticated process, which it has been anxious to launch since the
introduction of its New Strategy for Darfur late last year. By
claiming that it legitimately engaged in the Doha process and signed a
peace document, the government will likely feel it has legitimate
grounds to push for the ‘next phase,’ which is engagement in Darfur.
This approach has gotten some degree of support from the likes of
Ibrahim Gambari, the African Union-United Nations Joint Special
Representative for Darfur and the new interim joint mediator, who is
pushing a similar move known at the Darfur Political Process, or DPP.
Yet moving the peace process inside Darfur only facilitates government
manipulation and avoids any sort of international oversight or
criticism. The opening for a new internal process that the signing
provides could therefore work against the prospects for long-term
peace and stability.
While any document that speaks of a move toward peace should be
recognized as a positive development, it is important that the
international community recognizes the potential for the situation to
deteriorate as a result. Moving forward, it is essential that that the
international community isn’t hoodwinked yet again. If we’ve learned
anything from our engagement with the Sudanese government, it’s that
‘progress’ in Sudan generally comes at a price that is paid by its
people.
Photo: Liberty and Justice Movement representatives at the signing of
the Doha peace agreement (UNAMID)
* Darfur and Southern Sudan
* Peace
* Sudan Now
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