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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/KAFKA-21239?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=18124885#comment-18124885
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Gergely Harmadás commented on KAFKA-21239:
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Hi [~krishnachidrawar], trunk already updated to 2.22.3 in KAFKA-21157
> [CVE-2026-68497] [CVE-2026-91776] [jackson-databind]
> ----------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: KAFKA-21239
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/KAFKA-21239
> Project: Kafka
> Issue Type: Bug
> Reporter: Krishna Chidrawar
> Priority: Major
>
> *Aqua Description :* jackson-databind binds a JSON string to a
> javax.xml.datatype.Duration or javax.xml.datatype.XMLGregorianCalendar field
> by passing the raw string verbatim to DatatypeFactory.newDuration(value) or
> newXMLGregorianCalendar(value) in CoreXMLDeserializers.Std._deserialize.
> These deserializers are registered by default with no opt-in, so a plain
> ObjectMapper or JsonMapper with no polymorphic typing and no special
> configuration reaches this path. The XML Schema lexical grammar permits
> numeric components of arbitrary length, which the JDK materializes through
> the native BigInteger(String) and BigDecimal(String) constructors, both
> quadratic in digit count. Because the digits sit inside a JSON string token
> rather than a JSON number token, jackson-core's
> StreamReadConstraints.maxNumberLength guard never applies; jackson's own
> NumberDeserializers call validateIntegerLength or validateFPLength before
> parsing a stringified number, but the XML datatype deserializer omits that
> pre-check. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore submit a single request
> of a few megabytes, such as a Duration value consisting of the letter P
> followed by several million digits and the letter Y, and force tens of
> seconds to several minutes of single-threaded CPU work; a handful of
> concurrent requests can saturate a server's worker threads. This affects
> com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 2.0.0 before 2.18.10, from
> 2.19.0 before 2.21.6, and from 2.22.0 before 2.22.2, and
> tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 3.0.0 before 3.1.6 and from 3.2.0
> before 3.2.2. Users should upgrade to 2.18.10, 2.21.6, 2.22.2, 3.1.6, or
> 3.2.2.
> *Vendor Statement :* null
> *Vendor URL :* null
> *NVD URL :* [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68497]
> *Fix Version :* 2.18.10, 2.21.6, 2.22.2
>
> *Aqua Description :* TypeDeserializerBase._findDeserializer() in FasterXML
> jackson-databind caches the resolved deserializer under the raw,
> attacker-supplied type ID. When name-based polymorphism is configured with a
> fallback, for example @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.NAME, defaultImpl = ...), every
> distinct unrecognized type ID resolves to the same fallback deserializer but
> is retained as its own key in the _deserializers map. That map has no
> configurable bound and lives for the lifetime of the type deserializer, so an
> attacker who can repeatedly supply fresh unknown type IDs causes monotonic
> memory retention across requests. The reporter observed 10,000 retained
> entries from 10,000 distinct unknown IDs, against a single entry for a
> control that repeated one unknown ID the same number of times, isolating
> attacker-controlled key cardinality from request volume. Exploitation
> requires an application that enables name-based polymorphism with a
> defaultImpl or equivalent fallback, accepts attacker-influenced type IDs, and
> reuses a long-lived ObjectMapper across requests. The fix stops caching
> fallback resolutions for unrecognized IDs and bounds both the number of
> cached entries and the length of a cacheable type ID.
> *Vendor Statement :* null
> *Vendor URL :* null
> *NVD URL :* [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-91776]
> *Fix Version :* 2.18.11, 2.21.7, 2.22.3
>
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