Thanks Axel. Nice to know the implementation I am working on is not the only one.
Do you know what algorithm is being used for signing and encrypting in deployments? The implementation I am working on passes the token using a custom scheme in iOS and Android. I am concerned about the token size, but don't know the limits. -- Dick On Nov 5, 2012, at 6:57 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > A OpenID Connect self-issued token is a signed and then encrypted id_token > using JWS then JWE. > Because the audience is part of the id_token the re-encryption issue is not > valid in this case. > The signed-and-encrypted JWT is then transported to the RP as a URL fragment. > > I have not hit any url length limits on Android but saving some bytes through > a combined signend-and-encrypted-format would be good. > > -----Original Message----- > From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Dick > Hardt > Sent: Sunday, November 04, 2012 8:56 PM > To: Jim Schaad > Cc: 'Mike Jones'; [email protected]; 'Dick Hardt' > Subject: Re: [jose] encrypting AND signing a token > > Thanks Jim. An interesting historical reference. > > In my use case, who signed or who the token is for is not a secret. The > payload needs to be kept a secret. > > Does no one sign and encrypt SAML tokens? > Is this not a common use case? > > If it does need to be solved, it would seem to me that a standards body would > be the place to have lots of eyes look at how to sign and encrypt a token so > that people do not do naive sign and encrypt. > > Q: does anyone else need to sign and encrypt? > > -- Dick > > On Nov 4, 2012, at 10:24 AM, "Jim Schaad" <[email protected]> wrote: > >> <personal> >> >> I would note that the original PKCS#7 specifications had a mode that >> provided a similar sign and encrypt as a single operation mode. When >> the >> PKCS#7 specifications where adopted by the IETF as part of the CMS >> work, this mode was discussed and very deliberately dropped because of >> numerous security problems that had been found. These included (but >> are not limited >> to) the fact that it was signed or who signed it was sometimes a >> security leak. Also there were attacks where the signed and encrypted >> mode could be converted to just an encrypted mode. >> >> I would think that there would be a need for a very detailed security >> analysis that we are not prepared to do in order to support a signed >> and encrypted mode. >> >> Jim >> >> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf >>> Of Dick Hardt >>> Sent: Friday, November 02, 2012 12:30 PM >>> To: Mike Jones >>> Cc: [email protected] >>> Subject: Re: [jose] encrypting AND signing a token >>> >>> Not only is my original token increasing in size by 4/3, I am also >>> adding another header, payload and signature. >>> >>> One of the objectives of JWT was to enabled compact tokens. It would >>> seem that we should be able to support both signing and encryption of >>> the same token. >>> >>> All the encryption use cases I can think of involving asymmetric keys >> would >>> also require signing with the senders private key. >>> >>> My suggestion is to be explicit in what the algorithm etc. is used for: >>> >>> Rather than "alg" and "enc", we have: >>> >>> "algs" - algorithm for token signing >>> "algk" - algorithm for content management key encryption "alge" - >> algorithm >>> for payload encryption >>> >>> Similiarly, >>> >>> "kids" - key id for signing >>> "kidk" - key id for content managment key encryption >>> >>> We could probably make these three or even two letter codes if you >>> want to save a couple bytes. >>> >>> -- Dick >>> >>> On Nov 2, 2012, at 8:46 AM, Mike Jones <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> The way you put it brings one straightforward solution to mind. >>>> Solve >> 1-3 >>> with a JWE. Solve 4-5 by signing the JWE as a JWS payload. Done. >>>> >>>> I do understand that the 4/3 space blowup-of double base64url >>>> encoding >>> the JWE motivates your earlier proposal about nested signing. (See >>> Dick's >>> 10/29/12 message "[jose] signing an existing JWT".) I also >>> understand >> that if >>> you could do integrity with the asymmetric signature then the >>> integrity provided by the JWE itself may be redundant. I don't have >>> a specific >> proposal >>> on how to do that. >>>> >>>> -- Mike >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf >>>> Of Dick Hardt >>>> Sent: Friday, November 02, 2012 8:22 AM >>>> To: [email protected] >>>> Subject: [jose] encrypting AND signing a token >>>> >>>> I am trying to figure out how to implement JWT/JWS/JWE to solve a >>>> real >>> world problem. >>>> >>>> 1) Bob sends a token to Charlie via Alice. (Alice gets token from >>>> Bob and then Alice gives token to Charlie) >>>> 2) Alice must be prevented from reading the token. (token needs to >>>> be >>>> encrypted) >>>> 3) Bob and Charlie can share a symmetric key. >>>> >>>> I can solve this with JWE. >>>> >>>> Now let's add another condition. >>>> >>>> 4) Charlie wants non-repuditation that Bob created the token. >>>> 5) Bob has a private key and a public key >>>> >>>> I don't see how to do this using JWE. It seems I have to sign the >>>> same >> token >>> I had previously with JWS. This seems inefficient since I should be >>> able >> to >>> replace the JWE integrity computation done with the symmetric key >>> with the private key -- but the "alg" parameter is the same in both >>> encrypting and signing. >>>> >>>> Now let's expand this to replacing the symmetric key with a >> public/private >>> key pair for encryption. Bob encrypts with Charlies public key and >>> signs >> with >>> Bob's private key (we also need to make sure we are not doing naive >>> encryption and signing here, would be a really useful to specify what >> needs >>> to be done there). Now we need to have parameters for both >>> public/private key pairs in the header. >>>> >>>> Am I missing something here? >>>> >>>> Seems like we can do this if we change the header parameters to >>>> specify >> if >>> they ("alg", "kid", et.c) are for token signing, payload encryption >>> or >> content >>> key encryption. >>>> >>>> -- Dick >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> jose mailing list >>>> [email protected] >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> jose mailing list >>> [email protected] >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose >> > > _______________________________________________ > jose mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose _______________________________________________ jose mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
