I think that is largely the effect of making the proposed change. The remaining question if we do it is if we want to take a dependency on draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2 or incorporate it.
If it is a ID taking a dependency on it is problematic proceduraly. I am personally in favour of sending the concatenation of the two values rather than use a KDF. I think it will reduce interoperability issues. What we call it needs to be determined. John B. On 2012-11-11, at 7:23 PM, "Manger, James H" <[email protected]> wrote: >> So I’d like to explicitly ask the working group. Do you want us to: >> >> (1) Use the concatenation of random CEK and CIK values as the CMK for AES >> CBC, resulting in a longer CMK? >> (2) Continue to use a KDF to generate the CEK and CIK from a shorter CMK? > > > 1. Use draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2 > > -- > James Manger > _______________________________________________ > jose mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose _______________________________________________ jose mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
