Yes, I believe the spec wording does forbid “zip” in a JWS, because it’s not a
field with a defined meaning in that context – just as “epk” has no defined
meaning with “alg”:”RSA-OAEP”. I agree that more explicit wording to that
effect can and probably should be added. If you’d like to suggest some, please
have at it.
One would define “zip” in a JWS in the normal way that extensions are made to
IETF specs – you’d write a spec defining the meaning for it and register the
“zip” value in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters
registry for JWS usage.
Best wishes,
-- Mike
From: Manger, James H [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2012 2:42 PM
To: Mike Jones; [email protected]
Subject: RE: [jose] Whether implementations must understand all JOSE header
fields
Mike,
Could you at least expand a bit on how you expect a “MUST understand or reject”
rule will work in practice?
For instance, does the spec wording forbid “zip” in a JWS? “epk” when
“alg”:”RSA-OAEP”? “x5u”:7? “x5u”:”hello world”? Will implementations be
consistent?
Perhaps you have an implementation of this rule already and can tell us what it
does?
I would also appreciate your thoughts on whether someone can extend JWS by
specifying: when the “zip” field is present in a JWS the content is compressed.
That looks legitimate with the current “MUST understand or reject” rule. I
think it is likely, however, that such an extension will cause security
problems. Some implementations will confirm that “zip” is on the list of known
standard fields, but will ignore it in the JWS processing code.
--
James Manger
From: Mike Jones [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, 19 December 2012 9:04 AM
To: Manger, James H; [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
Subject: RE: [jose] Whether implementations must understand all JOSE header
fields
Hi James,
Per the response I just sent to Axel, when we discussed this issue in the past,
only one person was in favor of a must-ignore-by-default behavior, and yet
that’s what you’re advocating below. See
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01216.html. Of course,
it’s always possible you could change minds, but I suspect that if you want to
influence the outcome of this issue, the highest-payoff strategy would be to
discuss syntax options that require people to take special action to ignore a
not-understood field, rather than the other way around.
My two cents
worth…
-- Mike
From: Manger, James H [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2012 4:59 AM
To: Mike Jones; [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
Subject: RE: [jose] Whether implementations must understand all JOSE header
fields
My comments in red.
Currently the JOSE specs contain the following language declaring that all
header (and some other) fields must be understood: “Implementations MUST
understand the entire contents of the header; otherwise, the … MUST be
rejected.” There's currently an open issue about whether all header fields
should be required to be understood by implementations using them or whether to
relax this requirement in some circumstances. We would like the working group
to consider the following potential resolutions to the issue.
1. Maintain the current requirement that all header fields must be understood
by implementations using them.
PRO: This is a simple rule…
It is not as simple as ignoring unknown fields, which all code will do
naturally.
Are the “MUST understand or reject” rules well defined? Obviously if a totally
unknown field is present the JOSE message must be rejected.
How about if a defined field is in an unexpected place, eg “zip” in a JWE
header? Presumably that has to be rejected so it is not sufficient for code to
check any JOSE messages against one list.
How about a JWE with an “epk” field when “alg”:”RSA-OAEP”? Presumably that also
has to be rejected so checking against a static list of JWE fields is not
sufficient.
Does the type or value of a field need to be checked if an implementation
doesn’t need to use it? For example, does an implementation that already has a
given cert (so it doesn’t need to use a “x5u” value) need to confirm that the
“x5u” value is a string, or is a valid URI, or actually resolves to the same
cert? Probably not. I assume it is sufficient to understand that a field can be
ignored, without actually understanding its actual syntax or value is a
specific message.
…designed to result in secure implementations.
Secure in what way? Is this aimed specifically at preventing new fields being
ignored in case they change the semantics of existing fields?
PRO: New fields are allowed to change the semantics of existing fields because
implementations not understanding the changed semantics will fail-safe due to
seeing an unknown field.
(or is this a CON for encouraging dangerous extensions?)
…Representations of existing JWS & JWE objects are unchanged.
CON: Extensibility is limited to cases where all participating parties
understand new fields that are introduced.
CON: Because code can successfully process JOSE message without implementing
the “MUST understand or reject” rule it is hard to have confidence that it is
implemented (or implemented well).
2A. Take an alternative approach where, by default, all fields must be
understood, but where an explicit list of fields can be designated as “may be
ignored if not understood”. For instance, an “ign” (may be ignored) member
could be defined whose value is an array listing the member names that may be
safely ignored if not understood. An example using this field in a JWS header
is:
{"alg":"ES256",
"ign":["notes"],
"notes":"This signature need not be checked when the moon is full"
}
(Obviously, the "ign" field MUST NOT contain the value "ign".)
PRO: This would enable adding non-critical header fields without breaking
implementations. It would maintain the current semantics, while allowing
explicit exceptions to be made in cases where the fields are not
security-critical and the structure has a meaningful interpretation without
them. Representations of existing JWS & JWE objects are unchanged.
CON: Requires coordination of field names and may-be-ignored list, adding some
implementation complexity.
2B. Take an alternative approach where instead of one header object, there
would be two header objects. Implementations would be required to understand
all fields in the first header object. Implementations would be allowed to
ignore fields in the second header object if not understood. An example of
this approach, adding the second header object after the first in a JWS, would
be:
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
.
eyJub3RlcyI6IlRoaXMgc2lnbmF0dXJlIG5lZWQgbm90IGJlIGNoZWNrZWQgd2hlbiB0aGUgbW9vbiBpcyBmdWxsIn0
.
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
.
dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk
The first, third, and fourth fields are from the example JWS in the current
spec. The new second field is the base64url encoded representation of the
string '{"notes":"This signature need not be checked when the moon is full"}'.
PRO: May-be-ignored fields are easily distinguishable from must-be-understood
fields.
CON: Implementations must consult/merge two sets of headers to understand the
meaning/structure of the object, adding some implementation complexity.
Existing JWS & JWE object representations would become invalid.
3. Have a field that indicates the semantics of the JOSE message. For instance
the field could be called “!” and defined values could be “sig”, “mac”, “enc”…
for signed-with-an-asymmetric-key, MACed-with-a-shared-secret,
encrypted-(AEAD)-with-shared-secret…. The definition of a value for the “!”
field indicates the other fields it uses. Recipients MUST ignore any
unrecognized fields. Originators adding a new field that changes the semantics
of a message MUST use a new value for the “!” field.
PRO: Code will implement this rule naturally, simply by switching on the “!”
field value.
PRO: It is extensible. Extra fields can be defined and deployed without
requiring originators and recipients to be upgraded simultaneously.
CON: Arbitrary extra data of a originator’s choosing can be included as unknown
fields in messages that recipients will accept. Though this is true even with a
“MUST understand or reject” rule (eg whitespace in the JSON header, junk in a
“x5u” URI fragment…).
After a discussion period, we believe that it would be useful for the chairs to
make two formal consensus calls of the following kind:
FIRST POLL: Should all header fields be critical for implementations to
understand?
YES – All header fields must continue to be understood by implementations or
the input must be rejected.
NO – A means of listing that specific header fields may be safely ignored
should be defined.
ALTERNATIVE FIRST POLL FOR EXISTING IMPLEMENTORS: Have you implemented the
“MUST understand or reject” rule? Which situations do you reject (eg “foo”;
“zip” in JWS; “epk” when “alg”:”RSA-OAEP”; “jku”:<non-string>; “jku”:”<invalid
URI>”; …?
ALTERNATIVE SECOND POLL: How real is the risk that future groups will
deliberately design & deploy new fields that change the semantics of JOSE
messages depending on whether or not the new field is understood, without
realizing the security consequences?
ALTERNATIVE THIRD POLL: Is JOSE so complete and stable that extensions are
unlikely to be needed?
SECOND POLL: Should the result of the first poll be "NO", which syntax would
you prefer for designating the header fields that may be ignored if not
understood?
A – Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be safely
ignored if not understood.
B – Introduce a second header, where implementations must understand all fields
in the first but they may ignore not-understood fields in the second.
Thanks for considering these
questions,
Richard Barnes, John Bradley,
Mike Jones
--
James Manger
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