Ok, that sort of makes sense.  

Note that in that case, there's no point to sending a cert chain ('x5c'), since 
it's the recipient's cert you're talking about.  Even 'x5u' is kind of 
overkill; all you really need is 'x5t'.




On Jan 25, 2013, at 12:43 PM, Mike Jones <[email protected]> wrote:

> They're there exactly to let the recipient known which private key to use for 
> decryption.  Hardly useless...
> 
>                               -- Mike
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of 
> Richard Barnes
> Sent: Friday, January 25, 2013 8:36 AM
> To: Brian Campbell
> Cc: [email protected]
> Subject: Re: [jose] How would x5u really be used with JWE?
> 
> AFAICT, the X.509 fields in JWE are pretty useless.
> 
> If you're using key transport (i.e., wrapping the symmetric key in a public 
> key), then you would use the "jwk" or "jku" fields to reference the key pair 
> you used to do the wrapping.  The only function of the public key crypto 
> fields in a JWE is to let the recipient know which private key to use for 
> decryption.  The recipient already needs to have the private key, since it 
> obviously won't be in the message.
> 
> The question of how the encrypting party figures out which public key to use 
> for a given recipient (and in particular, roll-over), is an application-layer 
> question, not something that JWE would address.  See the XMPP end-to-end 
> security doc for an example; they use a separate exchange to associate a JWK 
> with an XMPP ID.
> <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-xmpp-e2e>
> 
> --Richard
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Jan 22, 2013, at 1:10 PM, Brian Campbell <[email protected]> 
> wrote:
> 
>> Is there a concrete use case for this that someone could explain to me?
>> 
>> How does an encrypting party know what URL to use to get the key to encrypt? 
>> I assume some out-of-band exchange. How would key rolling work then? An an 
>> encrypting party would need to a priori know all potential x5u's of the 
>> decrypting party? Which seems dubious. And how would the decrypting party 
>> signal a desired change of keys?  
>> 
>> Am I missing something obvious here?  
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
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