Stephen,
How does rfc6920 help when the key is a jwk? Like sub_jwk below.
-Axel
{
"iss": "https://self-issued.me";,
"sub": "NzbLsXh8uDCcd-6MNwXF4W_7noWXFZAfHkxZsRGC9Xs",
"aud": "https://client.example.org/cb";,
"nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
"exp": 1311281970,
"iat": 1311280970,
"sub_jwk": {
"kty":"RSA",
"n": "0vx7agoebGcQSuuPiLJXZptN9nndrQmbXEps2aiAFbWhM78LhWx
4cbbfAAtVT86zwu1RK7aPFFxuhDR1L6tSoc_BJECPebWKRXjBZCiFV4n3oknjhMs
tn64tZ_2W-5JsGY4Hc5n9yBXArwl93lqt7_RN5w6Cf0h4QyQ5v-65YGjQR0_FDW2
QvzqY368QQMicAtaSqzs8KJZgnYb9c7d0zgdAZHzu6qMQvRL5hajrn1n91CbOpbI
SD08qNLyrdkt-bFTWhAI4vMQFh6WeZu0fM4lFd2NcRwr3XPksINHaQ-G_xBniIqb
w0Ls1jF44-csFCur-kEgU8awapJzKnqDKgw",
"e":"AQAB"
}
}
-----Original Message-----
From: jose [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Stephen Farrell
Sent: Friday, January 23, 2015 1:39 PM
To: Jim Schaad; [email protected]
Subject: Re: [jose] Working Group last call on draft-ietf-jose-jwk-thumbprint
I just had a quick look and it seems fine for asymmetric keys assuming there's
a need for it and a justification for including things like '{"e":' in the hash
input, which I don't see.
The reason I looked at this is that there's some overlap here with RFC6920,
(I'm an author of
that) and DANE and maybe other specs that say how to hash a public key.
It does seem a shame to have so many ways to hash public keys, but 6920 is
compatible with DANE and others that hash a SPKI (even if that's artificially
created just as a hash input), so I wonder if the benefit of the running code
here is really worth being different from other specs that hash a SPKI.
So, other than that someone has some code, what is the benefit of being
incompatible with other specs here?
The downside is that I could not determine that one of these does/doesn't map
to the same public key as some DANE RRs for example.
Seems a bit odd to me to want to accept that downside unless there's an upside.
Only other thing is for symmetric keys I think you should add an optional salt,
in case you need the thumbprint of a low-entropy secret, which is quite likely
to happen, and quite likely to get exposed somehow. And I'd argue to recommend
that a long salt always be used for potentially low-entropy secret keys.
Apologies if the WG discussed these before but I missed it;-)
S.
PS: These are just random-punter comments with no hats.
On 23/01/15 01:56, Jim Schaad wrote:
> This starts a two week last call on draft-ietf-jose-jwk-thumbprint.
> Last call will end on February 2, 2015.
>
>
>
> Due to the general lack of activity on the list. General silence will
> be considered as a vote to park the document and either have it done
> via the ISE or with an AD shepherd rather than having group consensus.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>
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