On 2015-04-17 14:59, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:
Anders,
On Fri, Apr 17, 2015 at 2:33 AM, Anders Rundgren <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 2015-04-14 15:17, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:
Kathleen,
This feature (the ability to communicate to the "native" layer from a
Web-page),
is currently used by thousands of different applications including remote
diagnostics
by major PC-vendors.
The browser vendors took the decision to remove support for ActiveX and
NPAPI
but never considered a replacement.
I wouldn't try to mix this with any other "security project"
SAMC and NEA are IETF working groups, not a little project off somewhere.
> NEA is closed, but SACM is accepting proposals for end point assessment.
> Your endpoint could be a web server. The work doesn't have to stay in SACM,
but I think that's a better starting point.
If you have a proposed solution for this scoped to detection of untrusted code
in web transactions,
This may sound awfully strange but the proposed scheme doesn't detect untrusted
code.
It is simply a way to let a locally trusted sub-system talk with (and through),
potentially
malicious web-code while shielding the platform and user from various attacks.
As you may know "Secure AND Convenient Web Payments" have effectively gone
*backward*
since we began using credit-cards on the Web some 20 years ago.
If you do a search you will probably not find a single paper from any major
vendors' R&D
department dealing with this topic either. It is obviously "The stepchild of the
Web" :-)
> I'm just saying that it is a better fit than JOSE for that work (which I hope
to close soon).
That OK, I justed wanted to see if there where any folks out there that also
could
consider dealing with awkward and "forgotten" problems.
> I'm fully aware of the problems with untrusted code, malware, etc. being
downloaded to end users
> through firewalls, etc. Current solutions are proxy firewalls that block
access to domains, URLs,
> and IPs that have been found to be problematic (threat discovered).
> It would be nice to have something that worked end-to-end.
The locally trusted applications and their associates in the other end deal
with E2ES but
in a completely application-specific manner. This may seem a bit short-sighted
but the
needs are quite different so it is not possible doing otherwise: A payment
protocol
shouldn't leak user data to the RP (merchant), while authentication is about
establishing an authenticated user ID.
Anyway, thanx for the comments!
Anders
See the use cases Samuel shared, especially the last one, but a few of the
other ones have enough similarities to SACM for that to be a starting point.
I'm specifically avoiding the webcrypto use cases, which may be of more
interest to you.
Kathleen
because the Web is
pretty unique: Untrusted code is transiently downloaded into the client
platform.
Anders
Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 14, 2015, at 1:36 AM, Anders Rundgren <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 2015-04-14 05:20, Nat Sakimura wrote:
I think this is an interesting idea.
One of the disappointment of webcrypto, if I am not mistaken,
is that they confined themselves
too narrowly that it did not define the APIs that can leverage,
for example, a secure element.
There are many ways of expressing why it didn't work out as
anticipated. IMO, if existing
applications had been "decomposed", it had been more obvious that
they work because they
don't expose sensitive cryptographic APIs to arbitrary Web code.
I.e. there's a reason why
we after 20 years with secure payment cards still can't use them on
the Web!
I'm thinking about a system where locally "Trusted Applications" are
"talking" with
untrusted Web pages:
https://cyberphone.github.io/openkeystore/resources/docs/web2native-bridge.pdf
A predecessor is already available in the Chrome browser.
It turned out that the very same concept could probably also be
applied to devices
connected with NFC/Bluetooth:
https://cyberphone.github.io/openkeystore/resources/docs/webnfc--web2device-bridge.pdf
Anders
If a discussion here at IETF would stimulate the discussion
there as well, it would benefit the community, IMHO.
Nat
2015-04-11 19:03 GMT+09:00 Samuel Erdtman <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>>:
Hi,
I think this could be interesting, don´t know if a
standards for this should be written under IETF or somewhere else, but I can
share a few use cases we have at neXus where we need to use platform specific
capabilities. And a bit on how we currently solve it.
* Smart Card signatures
In e.g bank transactions signatures are desired. We
develop a middleware with this support (has been used for the Swedish eID for
many years), we have historically created plugins to the comunication between
the browser and the middleware. But as NPAPI is going away we have now created
a new architecture that relies on server component that makes it possible to
open up a communication channel between the browser and the middleware.
* RFID coding
This is kind of like printing, when creating cards for
physical access systems (PACS) some data has to be coded in the card or read
from it as it is printed (Mifare Desfire etc.), for this we have a
SDK/application that runs locally but the card management system runs in the
browser. The communication is currently done with a socket connection to
localhost, it works well but has some clear drawbacks e.g. TLS.
* Signature pad
* Fingerprint recording
* Document scanning
When doing identity management we collect data about the
user when enrolling. Once again it is not possible to collect all this data
from a browser i.e. we need something running locally, and we need to
communicate with it. Currently we do a connection to localhost.
* End point integrity
We have a client application that is loaded to validate
that that platform (OS, antivirus etc.) is updated before allowing the user to
connect to the corporate network. And when the user is logged out it helps the
user to clean upp downloaded files so that sensitive data gets minimal
exposure. (this solution relies on java applet and activeX)
This is similar to what NEA and SACM are working on, but their
definition of end point is not scoped to just a browser or application. For
this interested in this question, please take a look at SACM and proposed
solutions can be reviewed there. They have an open call for proposals and
recognize that different solutions will be needed depending on re platform
being assessed.
Best regards,
Kathleen
All of these use cases would benefit form a standardised
way of communicating from the web browser (JavaScript) with a locally installed
application.
Best Regards
Samuel Erdtman
On Fri, Mar 20, 2015 at 8:30 AM, Hannes Tschofenig <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>> wrote:
I like the proposal Anders put forward.
Doing some work in the IETF in that area might not be
a bad idea to
stimulate discussions.
Ciao
Hannes
On 03/20/2015 06:49 AM, Anders Rundgren wrote:
> On 2015-03-19 19:15, John Bradley wrote:
>> It sounds like WebCrypto or something more related
to it.
>> http://www.w3.org/2012/webcrypto/
>
> I would rather characterize this as the opposite to
WebCrypto since the
> referred schemes
> all are based on the idea that "The Web is not
enough".
>
> That is, the Web needs (as proven any number of
times), to be extended
> with its more
> powerful native/platform companion for a lot of
reasons including access
> to platform-
> resident keys as well as breaking away from the
crippling SOP notion.
>
> The W3C does not appear to be a suitable home for
such an effort, they
> rather prefer
> continuing the so far pretty unsuccessful efforts
DUPLICATING the native
> level into
> the Web [1], instead of recognizing the power of
COMBINING these worlds.
>
> Cheers,
> Anders
>
> 1]
https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-sysapps/2014Dec/0000.html
>
>>
>>
>>> On Mar 19, 2015, at 3:05 PM, Jim Schaad <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
>>> <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
<mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> To me this sounds more like a W3C activity than
an IETF activity.
>>> Jim
>>> *From:*jose [mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>]*On Behalf Of*Anders Rundgren
>>> *Sent:*Wednesday, March 18, 2015 10:41 PM
>>> *To:*[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>>
>>> *Subject:*[jose] Charter Proposal: "Trusted Code"
for the Web
>>> Trusted Code for the Web
>>>
>>>
>>> Existing security-related applications like
authentication, payments,
>>> etc. are all based on that a core-part is
executed by statically
>>> installed software that is supposed to be TRUSTED.
>>>
>>> Since web-based applications are transiently
downloaded, unsigned and
>>> come from any number of more or less unknown
sources, such
>>> applications are by definition UNTRUSTED.
>>>
>>> To compensate for this, web-based security
applications currently
>>> rely on a hodge-podge of non-standard methods [1]
where trusted code
>>> resides (and executes) somewhere outside of the
actual web application.
>>>
>>> However, because each browser-vendor have their
own idea on what is
>>> secure and useful [2], interoperability has
proven to be a major
>>> hassle. In addition, the ongoing quest for
locking down browsers (in
>>> order to make them more secure), tends to break
applications after
>>> browser updates.
>>>
>>> Although security applications are interesting,
they haven't proved
>>> to be a driver. Fortunately it has turned out
that the desired
>>> capability ("Trusted Code"), is also used by
massively popular music
>>> streaming services, cloud-based storage systems,
on-line gaming sites
>>> and open source collaboration networks.
>>>
>>> The goal for the proposed effort would be to
define a vendor- and
>>> device-neutral solution for dealing with trusted
code on the Web.
>>>
>>>
>>> *References
>>> *
>>> 1] An non-exhaustive list include:
>>> - Custom protocol handlers. Primarily used on
Android and iOS.
>>> GitHub also uses it on Windows
>>> - Local web services on 127.0.0.1. Used by lots
of services, from
>>> Spotify to digital signatures
>>> - Browser plugins like NPAPI/ActiveX. Used (for
example) by millions
>>> of people in Korea for PKI support but is now
being deprecated
>>> - Chrome native messaging. Fairly recent
solution which enables
>>> Native <=> Web communication
>>>
>>>
2]https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=378566
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> jose mailing list
>>> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>>
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>
>
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--
Nat Sakimura (=nat)
Chairman, OpenID Foundation
http://nat.sakimura.org/
@_nat_en
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Best regards,
Kathleen
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