Yes, thank you.
Kathleen 

Sent from my iPhone

> On Jun 22, 2015, at 9:18 PM, Mike Jones <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> I’d be glad to add the explanation below to the draft and to also include an 
> IANA considerations section that states we are updating the expert review 
> instructions for a registry, as Jim Schaad had suggested.  Chairs and 
> Kathleen, do you want Nat and I to proceed to publish an updated draft?
>  
>                                                                 -- Mike
>  
> From: Adam W. Montville [mailto:[email protected]] 
> Sent: Friday, June 12, 2015 5:07 AM
> To: Mike Jones
> Cc: The IESG; [email protected]; [email protected]; 
> [email protected]
> Subject: Re: sector review of draft-ietf-jose-jwk-thumbprint-05
>  
>  
> On Jun 11, 2015, at 4:25 PM, Mike Jones <[email protected]> wrote:
>  
> Hi Adam,
> 
> Thanks for the secdir review.
> 
> 
> From: Adam W. Montville [mailto:[email protected]]
> Sent: Monday, June 08, 2015 8:46 AM
> To: The IESG; [email protected]; [email protected]
> Subject: sector review of draft-ietf-jose-jwk-thumbprint-05
> 
> 
> Hi,
> 
> 
> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing 
> effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These 
> comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area 
> directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just 
> like any other last call comments.
> 
> I believe the document is ready with (potential) issues.  The “with issues” 
> might be due to ignorance on my part.  The draft does a very good job of 
> explaining the canonical form of a JSON Web Key that can be used for 
> establishing a thumbprint under varying circumstances, complete with what I 
> found to be helpful examples.
> 
> The primary issue I have is that it’s unclear how relying parties are going 
> to know which hash algorithm has been used.  The examples use SHA-256, but 
> I’m not seeing where SHA-256 might be specified as a MUST or even a SHOULD.  
> Moreover, the example output ultimately shows only the Base-64 encoding of 
> the resulting hash, which says nothing about the algorithm used to identify a 
> key.
> 
> Earlier drafts had included fields whose names were intended to communicate 
> the information about the hash function used - see the "jkt" field 
> definitions in 
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-jwk-thumbprint-01#section-4 - but 
> several working group reviewers suggested that these fields were unnecessary 
> and that the typical usage would be as "kid" (key ID) field values.  With 
> that removal, it falls onto the application to specify the hash algorithm for 
> its particular usage.
> 
> This isn't as bad as you might think, however, because typically the consumer 
> of the "kid" doesn't need to know the algorithm because it won't be 
> reproducing the computation.  It just relies on the fact that a unique key ID 
> value was generated for the key and compares "kid" values as opaque strings 
> to find the appropriate key.  In this usage, the producer of the key is the 
> only party that needs to know the hash algorithm that it is using.  I hope 
> this helps.
>  
> Yes, this does help, thank you.  It seems like something that could be easily 
> added to the draft to explain why the generating algorithm needn’t be 
> disclosed so that slow folk like myself get the picture straight away.
>  
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Additionally, in Section 4, “JSON and Unicode Considerations” some “should”s 
> are used, but I’m not reading them as SHOULDs. Should they be SHOULDs?  For 
> example, the start of the third paragraph in that section: “if new JWK 
> members are defined that use non-ASCII member names, their definitions should 
> specify the exact Unicode code point sequences used to represent them.”  It’s 
> not clear to me whether this is a strong statement or just a recommendation - 
> it seems that this draft could help the future by making stronger statements 
> to encourage future interoperability.
> 
> For the other JOSE specifications, our chair Jim Schaad took the position 
> that RFC 2119 keywords should be reserved for testable protocol behaviors and 
> that other uses of the English word "should" should not use "SHOULD".  The 
> authors followed that convention in this document.  I do understand that 
> other authors and working groups have taken different positions in this 
> regard.  If there are particular uses that you still feel should be changed 
> to use RFC 2119 keywords, please call them out.
>  
> This is all good, too.  I was simply pointing out that there are “should”s 
> around that may need to be considered as “SHOULD”s. I also see Jim’s (and 
> others’) subsequent notes on the subject, so this is good from my perspective.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Kind regards,
> Adam
> 
>                                                                 Thanks again!
>                                                                 -- Mike
>  
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