-----Original Message----- From: jose [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Sergey Beryozkin Sent: Friday, May 12, 2017 9:04 AM To: Ilari Liusvaara <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Subject: Re: [jose] JWS Signing of HTTP attachments
Thanks for the initial feedback. I'm not following at the moment how any of these attacks can affect it. Perhaps I'll need to work on making it more obvious how it is all implemented. It is simply a concrete implementation of JWS with Detached Content. The content is written out and by the time it's finished the JWS payload will be finished and will accompany this content. On the receiving end the verification provider will be instantiated (with the proper care, example, the server will not support the dynamic verification provider selection process - i.e - will be expected to process only RSA or HMAC etc signatures). Once this provider is available it will then get all the data which is being read passing through the verification process and finally compare the signatures [JLS] To be clear here, the question that is being asked is - are we going to show content to the user, and perhaps start executing script, before we have finished verifying the signature. This is normal for browsers as they do incremental display as things are processed. And then, what happens to the display if the signature fails to verify. Cheers, Sergey On 12/05/17 16:52, Ilari Liusvaara wrote: > On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 01:59:21PM +0100, Sergey Beryozkin wrote: >> Hi All, >> >> I've experimented in our project with having HTTP attachment parts >> protected using JWS with Detached Content and Unencoded Payload options [1]. >> >> This approach appears to be quite effective to me. It also appears to >> me that the data as shown in the example at [1], can, in principle, >> be produced and processed by any HTTP stack that can work with >> multiparts, assuming a JOSE library supporting the detached and >> unencoded content is also available. >> >> I'd appreciate if the experts could comment on 1) do you see some >> weaknesses in the proposed approach and 2) can someone see a point in >> drafting some text around it (I can contribute if it is of interest) ? > > It look from the text that the implementation can produce output > before the entiere signature (or tag in case of encryption) has been verified. > This is very dangerous if so. > > > Then there are the standard attacks against JOSE (the JOSE library > must not be vulernable to these): > > - The JWS HMAC versus signature confusion > - The JWE ECDH-ES invalid curve attack. > > > -Ilari > _______________________________________________ jose mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose _______________________________________________ jose mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
