*shrug*
-- Justin On 7/27/2017 5:19 PM, Phil Hunt wrote:
We have the use case in SECEVENTS where a logout event (e.g. OIDF backchannel logout) is extremely close to an ID_TOKEN.Older relying parties who are do not yet support logout could be tricked into accepting a logout assertion as an ID_TOKEN since they are too similar, and because a valid ID_TOKEN parser is in theory allowed to ignore claims it does not understand (e.g. “events”) - leading to a possible erroneous acceptance of the logout event AS and ID_TOKEN.Because of this the issue of distinguishing classes or types of JWTs emerged.We discussed a number of differentiators like “aud”, “typ”, “crit", etc that would help. But that really lead to the idea there there should be some best practices in the JWT BCP covering the issue(s).Phil Oracle Corporation, Identity Cloud Services Architect & Standards @independentid www.independentid.com <http://www.independentid.com> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>On Jul 27, 2017, at 2:00 PM, Nathaniel McCallum <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:Even after reading the whole section, I still don't understand the problem. Yes, a class of attack could exist where an attacker substitutes a valid JWT from one security context into another context. But isn't this resolved by audience validation? On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 3:34 PM, Brian Campbell <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:The draft describes it inhttps://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dsheffer-2Doauth-2Djwt-2Dbcp-2D01-23section-2D2.7&d=DwICAg&c=RoP1YumCXCgaWHvlZYR8PQcxBKCX5YTpkKY057SbK10&r=JBm5biRrKugCH0FkITSeGJxPEivzjWwlNKe4C_lLIGk&m=02yWnzzFGNlefgVregxSncXu0b9sbh5pTrtBfQsC52A&s=9GmPCouCMXE4enC48gfq0l0yc7ZlIxvEBAnQCVja_kY&e=On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 1:30 PM, Nathaniel McCallum <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>wrote:What class of attacks is this trying to prevent? I frankly don't see a problem with confusing different types of JWT. But I may just be ignorant. On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 2:49 PM, Brian Campbell <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:During the first WG meeting last week I asked if use of the JOSE "crit" (Critical) Header Parameter had been considered as a recommendation forpreventing confusion of one kind of JWT for another. Time was running shortin the meeting so there wasn't much discussion and it was requested thatI take the question to the list. And so here on the list is that. Section 3.9 of the JWT BCP draft now recommends explicit typing using the "typ" JWS/JWE header parameter but does concede that 'the use of explicit typing may not achieve disambiguation from existing kinds of JWTs, as the validation rules for existing kinds JWTs often do not use the "typ" header parameter value.' And the recommendations for how to use the Type HeaderParameter in JWT strongly suggest that it's not currently being used forany validation. Alternatively using the JWS/JWE "crit" (Critical) Header Parameter to signal the type/intent/profile/application of a JWT could achieve disambiguationeven in validation of existing kinds of JWTs. The critical header lists other headers which must be understood and processed by the receiver and that the JWS/JWE is invalid if those listed aren't understood. So a new type/profile of JWT that uses the "crit" header would produce JWTs that would be rejected even by existing applications of JWT validation (thatactually implement "crit" properly anyway). The JWT BCP could suggest the use of "crit" in conjunction with aprofile/application/type specific header. Or it could provide a bit moreofa framework like defining a registering a new JOSE header "p" (strawmanof pas a very short name for profile) and create a registry for its values.A JWT header using that approach might look like the following where the value 1 is registered as some cool new JWT profile/application. The consumer of such a JWT would have to understand and process the "p" header, which would mean checking that it had the value expected. { "alg":"ES256", "crit":["p"], "p":1 }A JOSE compliant JWT validator would reject such a JWT even for an OAuthaccess token or OIDC id_token because the "p" header isn't known or understood but is marked as critical.To me, that seems like an approach to preventing confusion that has more teeth than the "typ" header. Which is why I asked about it last week andam now bringing it to the list. CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and privilegedmaterial for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use,distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments from your computer. 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