It would make sense for JOSE to add the same tests that are in COSE where the key type is required to be checked before the key value is used. However, if one is only checking for trust based on the public key value, then one has more of a problem than this. One should also be checking that the key type and exponent are also correct.
I would be more than happy to shepherd through a draft which deprecates the signature value of none if somebody wants to write it. > -----Original Message----- > From: jose <[email protected]> On Behalf Of Neil Madden > Sent: Monday, April 23, 2018 9:43 AM > To: David Adrian <[email protected]> > Cc: Carsten Bormann <[email protected]>; [email protected]; Mike Jones > <[email protected]>; [email protected] > Subject: Re: [jose] [Cfrg] RFC Draft: PASETO - Platform-Agnotic SEcurity > TOkens > > > > On 23 Apr 2018, at 14:44, David Adrian <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > If we have to invent a new standard each time an existing standard is > implemented with a security flaw, we have a lot of work to do. > > > > You fundamentally cannot fix a standard with unusable to the point of > broken negotiation by extending the negotiation. If you don't want PASETO > to be a new standard, call it JOSEv3. > > I don’t believe that PASETO is actually fundamentally different from JOSE in > this respect. Is there a meaningful distinction between v1.local.<token> and > {“alg”:”v1.local”}.<token> ? > > One of the critical vulnerabilities historically in JOSE implementations was > [1], > whereby if an implementation was using RSA signed JWTs an attacker could > get the server’s public key and use it as if it was a HMAC key to produce a > forged JWT with {“alg”:”HS256”} in the header. If the JWT library just > provided a verify(String jwt, Key key) function then it might be tricked into > using the attacker’s choice of algorithm (HS256) with the server’s RSA public > key and the JWT would validate. Oops! > > This flaw has been rightly criticised, including by the authors of PASETO. > Don’t > let the attacker chose the algorithm! > > But wait, aren’t PASETO implementations potentially vulnerable to *exactly > the same vulnerability*?! If my server is set up to use v2.public (Ed25519) > signed PASETO tokens, what is to stop an attacker grabbing my Ed25519 > public key (which is a 32 byte value) and using it to create a PASETO token > using v2.local? Recall that v2.local takes a 32 byte symmetric key. If the > PASETO library just has a function verify(String paseto, Key key) and looks at > the header to decide how to process the token, then it will have exactly the > same vulnerability that those JOSE libraries had. So how does PASETO the > spec make this vulnerability less likely? > > Looking at the reference implementation [2], it seems that if the library user > didn’t set an allowed purpose then the only thing stopping this is a type > check on the public key class. In other words, the implementor took extra > safe-guards beyond those documented in the specification. Phew! > > Am I missing something here? As far as I can tell, the PASETO docs and draft > RFC don’t even mention this as a consideration. How is this better than JOSE? > > [1] https://auth0.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-json-web-token- > libraries/ > [2] https://github.com/paragonie/paseto/blob/master/src/Parser.php#L159 > > Neil > _______________________________________________ > jose mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose _______________________________________________ jose mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
