The datatracker is closed now until after IETF 119 (which I am also unable to 
attend), but I have created a draft for deprecating these algorithms that I 
intend to submit when it re-opens.

Working draft: 
https://neilmadden.github.io/jose-deprecate-none-rsa1_5/draft-madden-jose-deprecate-none-rsa15.html
 
<https://neilmadden.github.io/jose-deprecate-none-rsa1_5/draft-madden-jose-deprecate-none-rsa15.html>
Git repo: https://github.com/NeilMadden/jose-deprecate-none-rsa1_5 
<https://github.com/NeilMadden/jose-deprecate-none-rsa1_5>

-- Neil

> On 5 Mar 2024, at 15:56, Neil Madden <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> Hi all,
> 
> Leaving aside all the exciting work on shiny new algorithms to *add* to JOSE, 
> I would like to raise the prospect of deprecating some existing algorithms 
> that have passed their best. Before I start work on writing the drafts for 
> these, I'd like to gauge if there is some support or this is likely to be 
> wasted effort. The algorithms I think that should be deprecated are:
> 
> RSA1_5 - currently marked as Recommended- in the IANA registry. PKCS#1 v1.5 
> padding for encryption has been a source of repeated vulnerabilities over the 
> years, and they keep cropping up. I believe the main reason this exists at 
> all was to allow continued use of legacy hardware, in particular where FIPS 
> approval was required. However, PKCS#1 v1.5 padding has been forbidden by 
> FIPS (for encryption) since the end of this 2023 [1]. If someone is really 
> stuck with a hardware device that only supports this encryption mode then 
> they can use it to encrypt local files containing keys for other algorithms 
> rather than using it directly.
> 
> none - I know this one is more controversial in some quarters, but alg=none 
> has been responsible for a steady stream of serious security vulnerabilities, 
> and even spawned its own website: 
> https://www.howmanydayssinceajwtalgnonevuln.com 
> <https://www.howmanydayssinceajwtalgnonevuln.com/>. I'm not sure there has 
> actually been a year where this algorithm *hasn't* caused a vulnerability. 
> I've yet to see a genuine use-case for it in the wild. The pain:gain ratio on 
> this algorithm is extremely high.
> 
> I would also like to write a draft (either combined with the above or 
> separate) that establishes some baseline security properties for future 
> algorithm registrations:
> 
> * All signature algorithms MUST achieve unforgeability under chosen message 
> attack (EUF-CMA).
> * All encryption algorithms MUST achieve at least IND-CCA2.
> 
> [1]: 
> https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf 
> <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf>
>  (see table 5 on page 15)
> 
> Thoughts?
> 
> -- Neil

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