On Tue, Jan 08, 2002 at 09:05:21AM +0800, Kent Tong wrote:
> Nico,
> 
> Thanks for the reply.

[...]

> Suppose that the lifetime of TGT1 is 2 hours and it is renewed before
> it is expired and thus becomes TGT2. If it takes a hacker 3 hours to find 
> out the session key in TGT1 and he captures all the packets on the network, 
> then the hacker can decrypt the TGS exchange for the renewal and find out 
> the session key in TGT2? Then he can impersonate as Paul for the remaining 
> lifetime (1 hour) of TGT2 and get the next new session key when it is 
> renewed again?

Well, yes. Similar problems arise in, for example, Kerberos
password/key changing.

This is a general problem in cryptography :)

The best you can do is use algorythms that provide perfect forward
security (PFS), throw away expired key material as soon as possible,
re-key often and lookout for intruders.

Neither the KDC exchanges nor the AP exchange provide PFS. For that the
protocol would have to add, say, a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, which
is not far fetched for the KDC exchanges (it's been discussed before),
where DH can be retrofitted as a new pre-authentication type, but it
can't be added to the AP exchange easily since all Kerberos apps today
expect a single round-trip AP exchange.

Adding PFS to the KDC exchanges would certainly improve the situation,
and so would mixed key pre-auth types, but, in the end, if a hacker
breaks root on some box, she's got access to all of that box, plus
anything that users on that box do, plus the ability to snoop and work
around PFS by finding the relevant key material before it's thrown
away. Hey, security is difficult :)

Cheers,

Nico
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