[Removing subversion and adding comp.protocols.kerberos.]
--On Friday, July 22, 2005 11:30 AM +0100 Joe Orton
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
There is some discussion of this issue in the neon list archive;
the issue is AIUI that mod_auth_kerb *does* canonicalize the
hostname but neon does not. neon doesn't canonicalize the server
hostname in general because doing so would break name-based
vhosting; I guess it could do so solely for use in the Kerberos
principal, but that seems a bit dubious.
Yeah, this is a messy, long-standing, and unresolved issue in
kerberos. In theory canonicalization introduces a potential MITM
attack which essentially undermines mutual authentication; in
practice, everyone does it. This is apparently to be addressed in
future protocol mods, but it's unclear what to do in software that
actually needs to work today. Read on for details. Maybe this could
update the kerberos FAQ?
The question is: should an application canonicalize a hostname
entered by a user when forming the SPN?
Defining terms:
SPN = serviceName/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
eg HTTP/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
where SPN is the Service Principle Name, the name of the
kerberos principle that the service uses to
authenticate itself to the client (so called
"mutual auth").
serviceName (eg HTTP) is the (case sensitive[1]) protocol
specific service name established by convention.
HOST (eg proteomics.mayo.edu) is the host name of the
machine the service is running on. This is the
part we're wondering about.
REALM (eg MFAD.MFROOT.ORG) is the name of the kerberos
realm and is often implicit.
Canonicalization is essentially gethostbyaddr(gethostbyname(host))
where host is the name provided by the user.
I've done some googling on this issue and the clearest statement I
can yet find comes at the end of section 1.3 in RFC4120, which states:
Implementations of Kerberos and protocols based on Kerberos MUST
NOT use insecure DNS queries to canonicalize the hostname
components of the service principal names (i.e., they MUST NOT
use insecure DNS queries to map one name to another to determine
the host part of the principal name with which one is to
communicate).
[...]
Implementation note: Many current implementations do some degree
of canonicalization of the provided service name, often using DNS
even though it creates security problems. However, there is no
consistency among implementations as to whether the service name
is case folded to lowercase or whether reverse resolution is
used. To maximize interoperability and security, applications
SHOULD provide security mechanisms with names that result from
folding the user- entered name to lowercase without performing
any other modifications or canonicalization.
Clear as mud? So it seems like we're left with a choice between
interoperability and correctness. Almost all other discussion I find
of this issue seem to indicate that canonicalization is performed in
practice. Firefox and IE definitely do it. See also question 2.14
in the Kerberos FAQ:
<http://www.cmf.nrl.navy.mil/CCS/people/kenh/kerberos-faq.html#kerbdns>,
and numerous previous discussions on comp.protocols.kerberos such as
this thread on load balancing and kerberos:
<http://mailman.mit.edu/pipermail/kerberos/2004-April/005102.html>.
Samba seems to work around this problem by creating a skillion
different keytab entries like:
3 HTTP/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
3 HTTP/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
3 HTTP/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
3 HTTP/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
3 HTTP/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
3 HTTP/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
and many more besides these (with different salts?). See
<http://lists.samba.org/archive/samba-technical/2004-November/038234.html>.
There's an additional problem with samba, active directory validated
writes, and disjoint namespaces that I'll save for another time.
It seems to my uneducated eye that really GSSAPI should be such that
we simply hand it "HTTP" along with the host name entered by the user
and it figures out the rest. Alas, it is not so. What to do is
anyone's guess.
Anyone care to jump in here?
-c
[1] Services names are supposed to be lower case; other examples
include "host" and "imap". "HTTP" is apparently a happy gift from
microsoft.
--
[ Christopher Mason MPRC Bioinformatics http://proteomics ]
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