Kerberos referrals have been implemented in Heimdal and MIT (with a patch from UMich) and, of course, Windows.
My understanding is that Kerberos referrals are used to permit cross-realm authentication against remote realms that are not explicitly configured in the client's configuration. Of particular interest to me is that the MIT implementation permits referral of requests for unknown realms to a "default" KDC, with the assumption that this other KDC knows what to do with the request. I believe that the purpose of this is to enable the construction of a multiple-level hierarchy of KDCs, with a root KDC at the top from which all realms are reachable. This is well and good, but in a typical environment the clients (W2K clients) will only talk in the first instance to a W2K KDC, and these KDCs do not permit the configuration referral to a "default" KDC in the event that the realm of the server principal is unknown. Therefore, in order to permit referral of clients to a "default" KDC and the construction of an arbitrary multi-level hierarchy, it would appear necessary to intercept and service the application ticket request from the client *before* it reaches the Windows KDC (because it will simply return an error). This implies a "kerberos proxy" agent, which is transparent for local realm requests, but catches non-local realm requests and forwards them to the KDC which handles these remote realms. Does this make sense? Is it feasible? Or have I completely lost my marbles? I'm aware that there are some significant practical difficulties with this approach (ie. how does the proxy agent retrieve the user's secret from the Windows KDC to generate a valid referral?). If anyone can point out any more pitfalls, I would be very grateful so I can stop wasting my time on this :-) Many thanks, josh. ________________________________________________ Kerberos mailing list [email protected] https://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/kerberos
