On Fri, Mar 31, 2006 at 05:17:10PM -0500, Ken Hornstein wrote: > >Which attacks are we talking about? Attacks on the /tmp/krb5cc_<uid> > >scheme? Yes, that's weak. But it is absolutely not the case that all > >user-land schemes are inherently subject to that sort of attack; in > >fact, modern architectures and operating systems provide lots of > >facilities, beginning with MMUs and virtual memory, and including lots > >of access controls. > > I agree that you can design a user-land scheme that's a lot better than > a simple file, but there are enough tools available for grovelling through > a user-level daemon's memory that I would prefer to have something better. > Again, it's not 100%, but it's all a matter of degree.
One tool name: DTrace. Ok, two: kmdb. Well, let's make it three and stop there: Xen. Sorry, I don't buy this line of argument. Nico -- ________________________________________________ Kerberos mailing list [email protected] https://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/kerberos
