I guess we could special case this for DES enctypes but as that checksum is 
unkeyed, it's not really desirable to use in the general case. Otherwise an 
attacker can change the impersonated principal name.

-- Luke

On 13/05/2011, at 2:07 AM, Richard Silverman wrote:

> Hello,
> 
> configuration
> -------------
>  client: MIT Kerberos 1.9.1 on Solaris-10
>     KDC: Windows 2003 domain controller
> 
> 
> Using the supplied t_s4u.c test program, S4U2Self fails with
> KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED (41).  The TGS_REQ uses a checksum of type
> CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5_DES(8) in the PA-S4U2SELF(129) field.  However, if I
> apply this patch to force CKSUMTYPE_CRC32(1) instead:
> 
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> --- src/lib/krb5/krb/s4u_creds.c.orig   2010-04-22 23:29:40.000000000 +0000
> +++ src/lib/krb5/krb/s4u_creds.c        2011-05-12 23:55:48.504446000 +0000
> @@ -181,7 +181,7 @@
>         return code;
>     }
> 
> -    code = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, cksumtype, key,
> +    code = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, CKSUMTYPE_CRC32, key,
>                                 KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM, &data,
>                                 cksum);
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> ... then the S4U2Self request succeeds.  I thought to do this because I
> already had it working with Heimdal, and it uses the CRC checksum.
> 
> I have attached network traces of the failing and working transactions.
> The principal impersonator/[email protected] is authorized on the Windows
> KDC for constrained delegation with protocol transition; this transaction
> asks for a S4U2Self ticket issued to [email protected] for
> impersonator/[email protected].
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> - Richard Silverman
>  [email protected]________________________________________________
> Kerberos mailing list           [email protected]
> https://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/kerberos


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