On 11/8/23 09:23, JianJun Li wrote:
In fact, principle "host/[email protected]" exists. By Wireshark I can
see Windows sends "host/[email protected]" as sname, KDC converts the
sname to host\/[email protected].
I have a look at the code but find no parameters or setting can change this
behavior.
I can give a detailed but ultimately not very helpful answer:
As Ken explained in part, the wire representation of principals in
Kerberos is the ASN.1 DER encoding of a name-type and a sequence of
strings. Microsoft created a name type NT-ENTERPRISE which puts an
email-address-like string in the first string element. When you see
"host\/..." in your log, that is the MIT krb5 library's string
representation of an NT-ENTERPRISE principal.
RFC 6806 section 5 describes this name type as conveying alias names, to
be used in the client field of an AS-REQ to a KDC with a directory
service that can map email addresses to canonical principal names.
However, Microsoft's implementation now also uses this type in server
names during under some circumstances, including some S4U operations.
[MS-KILE] 3.3.5.1.1 defines semantics for server name lookup of
NT-ENTERPRISE principals (in terms of underlying facilities specific to
Active Directory); [MS-SFU] unfortunately does not seem to say precisely
when they are used. I had thought they were only used for cross-realm
S4U2Self operations where it is necessary to communicate the requesting
service's realm to the client realm, but based on your log it sounds
like they are also used for same-realm S4U2Self requests made by Windows
clients.
Although MIT krb5 has S4U2Self and S4U2Proxy logic in the KDC code, it
does not implement NT-ENTERPRISE lookup. The translation from
NT-ENTERPRISE {"host/[email protected]"} to NT-PRINCIPAL
{"host", "win11client.mylab.com"} currently has to be done within the
KDB layer, either by using an encompassing piece of software with a KDB
module (such as Samba), or by setting up an explicit alias in the LDAP
KDB module (the BDB and LMDB modules do not support aliases). I believe
the situation could be improved by performing this translation within
the KDC for TGS service lookups, but that improvement, although simple
in concept, would require careful testing.
The digitally signed Privilege Attribute Certificate (PAC) that contains the
authorization information for client user in realm MYLAB.COM could not be
validated.
This error is usually caused by domain trust failures; Contact your system
administrator.
I don't know exactly what is causing this error on the Windows side,
especially if it only happens some of the time. I will note that when
used with any of the built-in KDB modules (BDB, LMDB, or LDAP), MIT
krb5's KDC includes a minimal PAC with no SID or group information.
Encompassing software such as Samba is required to supply a complete PAC
within issued tickets. This limitation may be unrelated to the error
given that the error does not always occur.
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