*) SUMMARY:

In between the old and new QEMU, changed results for the mitigations
checker was:

#### DIFF between old QEMU and this new one

Hardware check

* Hardware support (CPU microcode) for mitigation techniques

  * Enhanced IBRS (IBRS_ALL)
    * CPU indicates ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR availability:  YES
    * ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR advertises IBRS_ALL capability:  YES

  * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Meltdown/L1TF
(RDCL_NO):  YES

  * CPU/Hypervisor indicates L1D flushing is not necessary on this
system:  NO

--------

* CPU vulnerability to the speculative execution attack variants


  * Vulnerable to CVE-2017-5754 (Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load):  
NO
  * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3620 (Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault):  NO
  * Vulnerable to CVE-2018-3646 (Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault):  NO 

--------

## CVE-2017-5715 aka 'Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection'

OLD QEMU:

* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: Full generic 
retpoline, IBPB: conditional, IBRS_FW, STIBP: disabled, RSB filling)
* Mitigation 1
  * Kernel is compiled with IBRS support:  YES
    * IBRS enabled and active:  YES  (for firmware code only)
  * Kernel is compiled with IBPB support:  YES
    * IBPB enabled and active:  YES
* Mitigation 2
  * Kernel has branch predictor hardening (arm):  NO
  * Kernel compiled with retpoline option:  YES
    * Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler:  YES  (kernel reports 
full retpoline compilation)
  * Kernel supports RSB filling:  YES

> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (Full retpoline + IBPB are mitigating the
vulnerability)

NEW QEMU:

* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS, 
IBPB: conditional, RSB filling)
* Mitigation 1
  * Kernel is compiled with IBRS support:  YES
    * IBRS enabled and active:  YES
  * Kernel is compiled with IBPB support:  YES
    * IBPB enabled and active:  YES
* Mitigation 2
  * Kernel has branch predictor hardening (arm):  NO
  * Kernel compiled with retpoline option:  YES
  * Kernel supports RSB filling:  YES

> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (IBRS + IBPB are mitigating the
vulnerability)

--

## CVE-2017-5754 aka 'Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load'

OLD QEMU:

* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: PTI)
* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI):  YES
  * PTI enabled and active:  YES
  * Reduced performance impact of PTI:  YES  (CPU supports INVPCID, performance 
impact of PTI will be greatly reduced)
* Running as a Xen PV DomU:  NO

> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (Mitigation: PTI)

NEW QEMU:

* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Not affected)
* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI):  YES
  * PTI enabled and active:  NO
  * Reduced performance impact of PTI:  YES  (CPU supports INVPCID, performance 
impact of PTI will be greatly reduced)
* Running as a Xen PV DomU:  NO

> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as
not vulnerable)

--

OLD QEMU:


## CVE-2018-3620 aka 'Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault'

* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: PTE Inversion; 
VMX: conditional cache flushes, SMT disabled)
* Kernel supports PTE inversion:  YES  (found in kernel image)
* PTE inversion enabled and active:  YES

> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (Mitigation: PTE Inversion; VMX: conditional
cache flushes, SMT disabled)

NEW QEMU:

## CVE-2018-3615 aka 'Foreshadow (SGX), L1 terminal fault'

* CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability:  N/A

> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as
not vulnerable)

--

OLD QEMU:

## CVE-2018-3646 aka 'Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault'

* Information from the /sys interface: Mitigation: PTE Inversion; VMX: 
conditional cache flushes, SMT disabled
* This system is a host running a hypervisor:  NO
* Mitigation 1 (KVM)
  * EPT is disabled:  NO
* Mitigation 2
  * L1D flush is supported by kernel:  YES  (found flush_l1d in kernel image)
  * L1D flush enabled:  YES  (conditional flushes)
  * Hardware-backed L1D flush supported:  NO  (flush will be done in software, 
this is slower)
  * Hyper-Threading (SMT) is enabled:  NO

> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (this system is not running a hypervisor)

## CVE-2018-3646 aka 'Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault'

* Information from the /sys interface: Not affected
* This system is a host running a hypervisor:  NO
* Mitigation 1 (KVM)
  * EPT is disabled:  NO
* Mitigation 2
  * L1D flush is supported by kernel:  YES  (found flush_l1d in kernel image)
  * L1D flush enabled:  NO
  * Hardware-backed L1D flush supported:  NO  (flush will be done in software, 
this is slower)
  * Hyper-Threading (SMT) is enabled:  NO

> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as
not vulnerable)

-- 
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Kernel
Packages, which is subscribed to linux in Ubuntu.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1828495

Title:
  [KVM][CLX] CPUID_7_0_EDX_ARCH_CAPABILITIES is not enabled in VM.

Status in intel:
  New
Status in linux package in Ubuntu:
  Confirmed
Status in qemu package in Ubuntu:
  Confirmed
Status in linux source package in Bionic:
  New
Status in qemu source package in Bionic:
  Confirmed
Status in linux source package in Cosmic:
  New
Status in qemu source package in Cosmic:
  Confirmed
Status in linux source package in Disco:
  New
Status in qemu source package in Disco:
  Confirmed
Status in linux source package in Eoan:
  Confirmed
Status in qemu source package in Eoan:
  Confirmed

Bug description:
  [Impact]

   * QEMU does not support IceLake and CascadeLake CPUs specific features.
   * Most important feature to be supported is: IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
   * With IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, QEMU is able to advertise HW mitigations:
     - Rogue Data Cache Load
     - Enhanced IBRS
     - RSB Alternate
     - L1D flush need on VMENTRY
     - speculative Store Bypass
     to guests, as described in document:
     Intel 336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf

  [Test Case]

   * From Original Description:

  """
  1. Boot up guest using: -cpu Cascadelake-Server

  [root@clx-2s2 yexin]# qemu-system-x86_64 -accel kvm -drive
  if=virtio,id=hd,file=/home/x/x,format=qcow2  -m 4096 -smp 4 -cpu
  Cascadelake-Server -serial stdio

  char device redirected to /dev/pts/3 (label serial0)

  qemu-system-x86_64: warning: host doesn't support requested feature:
  CPUID.07H:ECX [bit 4]

  qemu-system-x86_64: warning: host doesn't support requested feature:
  CPUID.07H:ECX [bit 4]

  qemu-system-x86_64: warning: host doesn't support requested feature:
  CPUID.07H:ECX [bit 4]

  qemu-system-x86_64: warning: host doesn't support requested feature:
  CPUID.07H:ECX [bit 4]

  2. To check CPU ID related to features[FEAT_7_0_EDX]
  :CPUID_7_0_EDX_ARCH_CAPABILITIES

  Expected Result: Both host and guest's CPUID.07H EDX bit 29 should be
  1.

  Actual Result:

  Host's cpuid: 0x00000007 0x00: eax=0x00000000 ebx=0xd39ffffb
  ecx=0x00000818 edx=0xbc000000  (EDX bit 29=1)

  Guest's cpuid : 0x00000007 0x00: eax=0x00000000 ebx=0xd19f0fb9
  ecx=0x00000818 edx=0x84000000 (EDX bit 29=0)

  Commit:2bdb76c015df7125783d8394d6339d181cb5bc30

  Target Kerned: 5.1
  Target Release: 19.10

  """

  [Regression Potential]

   * Most changes are related to CPU type definitions and its supported
  features. They are all based in upstream changes but, for obvious
  reasons, backporting and/or cherry-picking those could bring issues.
  Biggest concern is breaking something that currently works. Right now,
  the parts being changed that could affect other CPU types would be
  related to a small refactoring of how the features are organized, and
  that would be seen right away when trying to start a new VM after the
  package is installed.

   * Other tests, related to the features being backported, are being
  done by our KVM regression tests, including migration combinations, to
  reduce chances that a regression is introduced.

  [Other Info]
   
   * N/A

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