Author: dannf
Date: Sat Feb 10 22:06:03 2007
New Revision: 8299
Added:
dists/sarge-security/kernel-2.4/source/kernel-source-2.4.27-2.4.27/debian/patches/239_mincore-hang.diff
dists/sarge-security/kernel-2.4/source/kernel-source-2.4.27-2.4.27/debian/patches/240_smbfs-honor-mount-opts-2.diff
dists/sarge-security/kernel-2.4/source/kernel-source-2.4.27-2.4.27/debian/patches/series/2.4.27-10sarge6
Modified:
dists/sarge-security/kernel-2.4/source/kernel-source-2.4.27-2.4.27/debian/changelog
Log:
* 239_mincore-hang.diff
[SECURITY] Fix a potential deadlock in mincore
See CVE-2006-4814
* [ERRATA] 240_smbfs-honor-mount-opts-2.diff
Fix some regressions with respect to file types (e.g., symlinks)
introduced by the fix for CVE-2006-5174 in 2.4.27-10sarge5
Modified:
dists/sarge-security/kernel-2.4/source/kernel-source-2.4.27-2.4.27/debian/changelog
==============================================================================
---
dists/sarge-security/kernel-2.4/source/kernel-source-2.4.27-2.4.27/debian/changelog
(original)
+++
dists/sarge-security/kernel-2.4/source/kernel-source-2.4.27-2.4.27/debian/changelog
Sat Feb 10 22:06:03 2007
@@ -1,3 +1,14 @@
+kernel-source-2.4.27 (2.4.27-10sarge6) UNRELEASED; urgency=high
+
+ * 239_mincore-hang.diff
+ [SECURITY] Fix a potential deadlock in mincore
+ See CVE-2006-4814
+ * [ERRATA] 240_smbfs-honor-mount-opts-2.diff
+ Fix some regressions with respect to file types (e.g., symlinks)
+ introduced by the fix for CVE-2006-5174 in 2.4.27-10sarge5
+
+ -- dann frazier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sat, 10 Feb 2007 14:02:16 -0700
+
kernel-source-2.4.27 (2.4.27-10sarge5) stable-security; urgency=high
* 233_ia64-sparc-cross-region-mappings.diff
Added:
dists/sarge-security/kernel-2.4/source/kernel-source-2.4.27-2.4.27/debian/patches/239_mincore-hang.diff
==============================================================================
--- (empty file)
+++
dists/sarge-security/kernel-2.4/source/kernel-source-2.4.27-2.4.27/debian/patches/239_mincore-hang.diff
Sat Feb 10 22:06:03 2007
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+From: Linus Torvalds <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
+Date: Sun, 17 Dec 2006 14:38:15 +0000 (+0000)
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix incorrect user space access locking in mincore()
(CVE-2006-4814)
+X-Git-Tag: v2.4.34-rc3
+X-Git-Url:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/wtarreau/linux-2.4.git;a=commitdiff;h=72c7eb646f51044e530da5d85c2c78494341230f
+
+[PATCH] Fix incorrect user space access locking in mincore() (CVE-2006-4814)
+
+Fix incorrect user space access locking in mincore()
+
+Doug Chapman noticed that mincore() will do a "copy_to_user()" of the
+result while holding the mmap semaphore for reading, which is a big
+no-no. While a recursive read-lock on a semaphore in the case of a page
+fault happens to work, we don't actually allow them due to deadlock
+scenarios with writers due to fairness issues.
+
+Doug and Marcel sent in a patch to fix it, but I decided to just rewrite
+the mess instead - not just fixing the locking problem, but making the
+code smaller and (imho) much easier to understand.
+
+Hugh "ported" it to 2.4:
+please note two slight changes to behaviour under error conditions:
+
+(a) mincore used to report -EINVAL if input len was so big that the
+given area wrapped: that shouldn't be a distinct case from crossing
+a hole in the address space, 2.6.11 corrected the error to -ENOMEM,
+and this patch extends that correction to 2.4.
+
+(b) mincore used to report -ENOMEM if the given area crossed a hole
+in the address space, but continued to fill in the vector for file-
+backed regions above - yet didn't fill the vector with non-present
+entries for the hole, just ignored it. This patch continues to
+report -ENOMEM if the given area crosses a hole in the address
+space, but simply stops filling the vector at that point. We
+doubt any app could be relying on the previous weird behaviour.
+
+Cc: Doug Chapman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
+Cc: Marcel Holtmann <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
+Cc: Hugh Dickins <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
+Cc: Andrew Morton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
+Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
+---
+
+--- a/mm/filemap.c
++++ b/mm/filemap.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /*
+ * linux/mm/filemap.c
+ *
+- * Copyright (C) 1994-1999 Linus Torvalds
++ * Copyright (C) 1994-2006 Linus Torvalds
+ */
+
+ /*
+@@ -2808,46 +2808,51 @@ static unsigned char mincore_page(struct
+ return present;
+ }
+
+-static long mincore_vma(struct vm_area_struct * vma,
+- unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned char * vec)
++/*
++ * Do a chunk of "sys_mincore()". We've already checked
++ * all the arguments, we hold the mmap semaphore: we should
++ * just return the amount of info we're asked for.
++ */
++static long do_mincore(unsigned long addr, unsigned char *vec, unsigned long
pages)
+ {
+- long error, i, remaining;
+- unsigned char * tmp;
+-
+- error = -ENOMEM;
+- if (!vma->vm_file)
+- return error;
++ unsigned long i, nr, pgoff;
++ struct vm_area_struct *vma = find_vma(current->mm, addr);
+
+- start = ((start - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + vma->vm_pgoff;
+- if (end > vma->vm_end)
+- end = vma->vm_end;
+- end = ((end - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + vma->vm_pgoff;
+-
+- error = -EAGAIN;
+- tmp = (unsigned char *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+- if (!tmp)
+- return error;
++ /*
++ * find_vma() didn't find anything above us, or we're
++ * in an unmapped hole in the address space: ENOMEM.
++ */
++ if (!vma || addr < vma->vm_start)
++ return -ENOMEM;
+
+- /* (end - start) is # of pages, and also # of bytes in "vec */
+- remaining = (end - start),
++ /*
++ * Ok, got it. But check whether it's a segment we support
++ * mincore() on. Right now, we don't do any anonymous mappings.
++ *
++ * FIXME: This is just stupid. And returning ENOMEM is
++ * stupid too. We should just look at the page tables. But
++ * this is what we've traditionally done, so we'll just
++ * continue doing it.
++ */
++ if (!vma->vm_file)
++ return -ENOMEM;
+
+- error = 0;
+- for (i = 0; remaining > 0; remaining -= PAGE_SIZE, i++) {
+- int j = 0;
+- long thispiece = (remaining < PAGE_SIZE) ?
+- remaining : PAGE_SIZE;
++ /*
++ * Calculate how many pages there are left in the vma, and
++ * what the pgoff is for our address.
++ */
++ nr = (vma->vm_end - addr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
++ if (nr > pages)
++ nr = pages;
+
+- while (j < thispiece)
+- tmp[j++] = mincore_page(vma, start++);
++ pgoff = (addr - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
++ pgoff += vma->vm_pgoff;
+
+- if (copy_to_user(vec + PAGE_SIZE * i, tmp, thispiece)) {
+- error = -EFAULT;
+- break;
+- }
+- }
++ /* And then we just fill the sucker in.. */
++ for (i = 0 ; i < nr; i++, pgoff++)
++ vec[i] = mincore_page(vma, pgoff);
+
+- free_page((unsigned long) tmp);
+- return error;
++ return nr;
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -2867,77 +2872,61 @@ static long mincore_vma(struct vm_area_s
+ * return values:
+ * zero - success
+ * -EFAULT - vec points to an illegal address
+- * -EINVAL - addr is not a multiple of PAGE_CACHE_SIZE,
+- * or len has a nonpositive value
++ * -EINVAL - addr is not a multiple of PAGE_CACHE_SIZE
+ * -ENOMEM - Addresses in the range [addr, addr + len] are
+ * invalid for the address space of this process, or
+ * specify one or more pages which are not currently
+ * mapped
+ * -EAGAIN - A kernel resource was temporarily unavailable.
+ */
+-asmlinkage long sys_mincore(unsigned long start, size_t len,
+- unsigned char * vec)
++asmlinkage long sys_mincore(unsigned long start, size_t len, unsigned char
*vec)
+ {
+- int index = 0;
+- unsigned long end;
+- struct vm_area_struct * vma;
+- int unmapped_error = 0;
+- long error = -EINVAL;
++ long retval;
++ unsigned long pages;
++ unsigned char *tmp;
+
+- down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ /* Check the start address: needs to be page-aligned.. */
++ if (start & ~PAGE_CACHE_MASK)
++ return -EINVAL;
+
+- if (start & ~PAGE_CACHE_MASK)
+- goto out;
+- len = (len + ~PAGE_CACHE_MASK) & PAGE_CACHE_MASK;
+- end = start + len;
+- if (end < start)
+- goto out;
++ /* ..and we need to be passed a valid user-space range */
++ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, (void *) start, len))
++ return -ENOMEM;
+
+- error = 0;
+- if (end == start)
+- goto out;
++ /* This also avoids any overflows on PAGE_CACHE_ALIGN */
++ pages = len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
++ pages += (len & ~PAGE_MASK) != 0;
+
+- /*
+- * If the interval [start,end) covers some unmapped address
+- * ranges, just ignore them, but return -ENOMEM at the end.
+- */
+- vma = find_vma(current->mm, start);
+- for (;;) {
+- /* Still start < end. */
+- error = -ENOMEM;
+- if (!vma)
+- goto out;
++ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, vec, pages))
++ return -EFAULT;
+
+- /* Here start < vma->vm_end. */
+- if (start < vma->vm_start) {
+- unmapped_error = -ENOMEM;
+- start = vma->vm_start;
+- }
++ tmp = (void *) __get_free_page(GFP_USER);
++ if (!tmp)
++ return -EAGAIN;
+
+- /* Here vma->vm_start <= start < vma->vm_end. */
+- if (end <= vma->vm_end) {
+- if (start < end) {
+- error = mincore_vma(vma, start, end,
+- &vec[index]);
+- if (error)
+- goto out;
+- }
+- error = unmapped_error;
+- goto out;
+- }
++ retval = 0;
++ while (pages) {
++ /*
++ * Do at most PAGE_SIZE entries per iteration, due to
++ * the temporary buffer size.
++ */
++ down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ retval = do_mincore(start, tmp, min(pages, PAGE_SIZE));
++ up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+
+- /* Here vma->vm_start <= start < vma->vm_end < end. */
+- error = mincore_vma(vma, start, vma->vm_end, &vec[index]);
+- if (error)
+- goto out;
+- index += (vma->vm_end - start) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
+- start = vma->vm_end;
+- vma = vma->vm_next;
++ if (retval <= 0)
++ break;
++ if (copy_to_user(vec, tmp, retval)) {
++ retval = -EFAULT;
++ break;
++ }
++ pages -= retval;
++ vec += retval;
++ start += retval << PAGE_SHIFT;
++ retval = 0;
+ }
+-
+-out:
+- up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+- return error;
++ free_page((unsigned long) tmp);
++ return retval;
+ }
+
+ static inline
Added:
dists/sarge-security/kernel-2.4/source/kernel-source-2.4.27-2.4.27/debian/patches/240_smbfs-honor-mount-opts-2.diff
==============================================================================
--- (empty file)
+++
dists/sarge-security/kernel-2.4/source/kernel-source-2.4.27-2.4.27/debian/patches/240_smbfs-honor-mount-opts-2.diff
Sat Feb 10 22:06:03 2007
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From: dann frazier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
+Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2007 21:12:57 +0000 (-0700)
+Subject: [PATCH] smbfs: fix problems introduced by last security backport
+X-Git-Url:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux%2Fkernel%2Fgit%2Fwtarreau%2Flinux-2.4.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=db3511de156debbea8966b926d391d7ba6e6958b
+
+[PATCH] smbfs: fix problems introduced by last security backport
+
+Users have reported a symlink issue with my recent smbfs backport.
+Turns out my backport overlooked a second 2.6 patch w/ the fix:
+
http://linux.bkbits.net:8080/linux-2.6/?PAGE=cset&REV=419e7b76CdrmRG_NZ8LKj9DUUBGu1w
+
+This is a backport of Haroldo Gamal's 2.6 patch that fixes the symlink
+issue, and also cleans up an unnecessary double assignment. As his
+commit message notes, you will need the userspace patches from Samba
+Bug #999 in order to use the permission/ownership assigned by the
+server.
+
+Signed-off-by: dann frazier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
+---
+
+diff --git a/fs/smbfs/inode.c b/fs/smbfs/inode.c
+index be975fe..7fd9b51 100644
+--- a/fs/smbfs/inode.c
++++ b/fs/smbfs/inode.c
+@@ -513,10 +513,10 @@ smb_read_super(struct super_block *sb, void *raw_data,
int silent)
+ mnt->flags = (oldmnt->file_mode >> 9) | SMB_MOUNT_UID |
+ SMB_MOUNT_GID | SMB_MOUNT_FMODE | SMB_MOUNT_DMODE;
+ } else {
+- mnt->file_mode = mnt->dir_mode = S_IRWXU | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP |
+- S_IROTH | S_IXOTH | S_IFREG;
+- mnt->dir_mode = mnt->dir_mode = S_IRWXU | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP |
+- S_IROTH | S_IXOTH | S_IFDIR;
++ mnt->file_mode = S_IRWXU | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP |
++ S_IROTH | S_IXOTH | S_IFREG;
++ mnt->dir_mode = S_IRWXU | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP |
++ S_IROTH | S_IXOTH | S_IFDIR;
+ if (parse_options(mnt, raw_data))
+ goto out_bad_option;
+ }
+diff --git a/fs/smbfs/proc.c b/fs/smbfs/proc.c
+index 7f0794c..5570007 100644
+--- a/fs/smbfs/proc.c
++++ b/fs/smbfs/proc.c
+@@ -1994,10 +1994,11 @@ void smb_decode_unix_basic(struct smb_fattr *fattr,
struct smb_sb_info *server,
+
+ if ( (server->mnt->flags & SMB_MOUNT_DMODE) &&
+ (S_ISDIR(fattr->f_mode)) )
+- fattr->f_mode = (server->mnt->dir_mode & (S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG |
S_IRWXO)) | S_IFDIR;
++ fattr->f_mode = (server->mnt->dir_mode & S_IRWXUGO) | S_IFDIR;
+ else if ( (server->mnt->flags & SMB_MOUNT_FMODE) &&
+ !(S_ISDIR(fattr->f_mode)) )
+- fattr->f_mode = (server->mnt->file_mode & (S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG |
S_IRWXO)) | S_IFREG;
++ fattr->f_mode = (server->mnt->file_mode & S_IRWXUGO) |
++ (fattr->f_mode & S_IFMT);
+
+ }
+
Added:
dists/sarge-security/kernel-2.4/source/kernel-source-2.4.27-2.4.27/debian/patches/series/2.4.27-10sarge6
==============================================================================
--- (empty file)
+++
dists/sarge-security/kernel-2.4/source/kernel-source-2.4.27-2.4.27/debian/patches/series/2.4.27-10sarge6
Sat Feb 10 22:06:03 2007
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
++ 239_mincore-hang.diff
++ 240_smbfs-honor-mount-opts-2.diff
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