Andrew Morton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > We don't even know the extent of the damage yet. Which distros were > affected? With which versions of which userspace packages?
This seems to me to be an extremely fragile selinux user space policy. In their code that derives security labels from path names. Why don't we have AppArmor in the kernel again? Further I don't see how we could have possibly have supported that user space policy. How can we apply a user space defined label required by the selinux policy to a symlink that did not exist? I expect cd /proc/self/net would work. In your situation and you can see /proc/self/net/dev. Everything here sounds to me like that selinux policy is impossibly brittle. And anything that is that brittle I have no intention in claiming is a bug in proc. Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kernel-testers" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
