Hi Jean-Piet,

sure, the implementation in Knot would be fully flexible and up to the operator, how long the 'revoked' period would be.

I'm just curious about your thoughts and interpretation of 5011, mostly induced by thinking about automatic management... The hold-down timers are "30 days *OR* some TTLs", which is not clear if it's a maximum or minimum. Interestingly, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6781.html#section-4.1.2.1 requires 'zone maximum TTL', which sounds really odd to me, since KSK has nothing to do with zone contents besides DNSKEY RRSet (and its TTL).

BR,

Libor

Dne 14.07.20 v 18:43 Jan-Piet Mens napsal(a):
Hi Libor,

I'm open to implement this for the next version, at least for the manual key management, as you suggested.

I'm tentative for enabling this with automatic key management, since it's quite complicated, and with algorithm rollover maybe even fragile: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6781.html#section-4.1.4.2

It's super complicated. I "fondly" recall how 5011 brought me the very first CVE with my name on it! I know Evan wasn't amused. :-)

Anyway, I'd like to ask you for an operational opinion: for how long period would you publish the old KSK with 'revoked' flag before deleting it

RFC5011 specifies add/remove hold-down timers of 30 days each, but if we do this with manual key management, I think it should be either configurable or be defined by the operator, a bit like active= and retire= work: just let the operator specify a (relative) time. (This is particularly important for testing, as BIND and Unbound have switches with which to reduce the 30 days to, say, minutes, if I want.)

I'd be fine with manual mode permitting me to have keymgr(8) revoke the key, and sometime later, at my discretion, remove the key as we do now.

To the side note: For the sake of simplicity, when manual key management is enabled, knotd is simply not allowed to modify the keyset in any way

Understood, thank you.

    -JP
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